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Although the number of non-EU interest groups seeking to exert political influence in 
Brussels has been rising, research examining factors behind their success is scarce. 
This thesis contributes towards filling this gap by examining the success of foreign 
groups in the energy policy domain. Specifically, it examines how the European 
Commission’s initial preferences on both - the policies under consideration as well as 
the involved non-EU interest groups - affect the groups’ prospects of lobbying 
successfully. Employing process-tracing and cross-case comparison, the thesis 
explores four cases of Commission proposals covering the main aspects of the EU 
energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability and security. The extant literature on 
lobbying as information exchange assumes that the Commission has strong 
preferences regarding outcomes, but not on policy measures generating the desired 
outcomes. Interest groups, in return, shape a Commission’s proposal by providing 
expertise on which policies will lead towards the outcomes. The thesis complements 
this literature by arguing that in some cases, decision-makers have strong preferences 
concerning both - the outcomes and means necessary to achieve them - thus making 
interests groups’ attempts to alter their positions less likely to succeed. However, in 
the absence of the Commission holding strong views on policies, there is no guarantee 
that an interest group will be successful. Instead, a group’s success is affected by its 
status within the Commission. Drawing on research on the insider/outsider status of 
lobbyists, the thesis finds evidence that insiders are more likely to lobby successfully 
than outsiders. It contributes to this strand of literature by introducing an additional 
criterion underpinning the insider/outsider distinction, which concern specifically 
non-EU interest groups. Thus, the research suggests that a foreign interest group’s 
prospect of lobbying successfully is affected by the Commission’s positions on 
policies and involved lobbyists: how strong its initial view on issues under 
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Over the recent decades, the number of lobbyists in Brussels has grown to massive 
proportions. According to the Transparency International EU, more than 37,000 
individual lobbyists are registered in Brussels (Freund, 2016), seeking to shape EU 
policies. Their number is similar to the number of EU staff, since the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council combined employ around 
43,000 people1. While most observers of the interest groups’ growing engagement 
would agree that they represent a “mixed blessing” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 
xv), very few would deny their relevance for EU policy-making. With more than 
23,000 meetings held with high-ranking EU officials2 during the last five years only, 
it seems that interest groups are capable of making a lot of noise in Brussels.  
The rising number of interest groups has been accompanied by the development of 
literature aiming to explain the extent of their influence. The question who influences 
the EU law-making process and how has arrived at the centre of scholarly attention. 
Still, the fact that the European Union is embedded in a wider global environment and, 
thus, not insulated from the impact of third countries’ actors has been little explored 
in the literature on interest groups. Although the role played by companies such as 
Russian Gazprom or American Google makes newspaper headlines and dominates 
debates over EU law, their lobbying in Brussels has not attracted much scholarly 
attention. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by examining the lobbying success of non-
EU (foreign) interest groups in the energy policy domain. Non-EU interest groups are 
defined as companies and associations who seek to exert political influence in the EU, 
but whose countries of origin are outside the EU.    
Foreign interest groups make up a significant proportion of the groups that are 
currently registered in the EU Transparency Register3. Approximately 1,100 out of 
11,800 registered interest groups have offices outside the EU (see appendix I). In 
                                                          
1 Available at the European Commission’s website: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/figures/administration_en. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
2 Available at the EU Integrity Watch: https://www.integritywatch.eu/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
3 Transparency Register contains information about interest groups that are represented at the level of 
EU institutions. See:  




addition, three foreign countries - the US, Switzerland, and Norway - separately have 
more registered lobbyists in Brussels than ten member states, respectively: Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Luxembourg (see appendix I). Their growing engagement is not a current trend only. 
In 2007, the number of certain non-EU countries’ organisations had already surpassed 
the number of interest groups coming from some EU member states (Wonka et al., 
2010, p. 7). What is more, non-EU actors, in particular US companies, were among 
the first established lobbyists in the EU (Coen, 1999; Cowles, 1996).  
The rising engagement of foreign interest groups in the EU is hardly surprising. As 
one of the largest markets in the world, accounting for 500 million consumers4, many 
non-EU companies are seeking to expand their business into the EU. Since some of 
them have high stakes across the European Union, it is no wonder that these actors 
tend to shape EU decisions in line with their own interests. Besides, “the global reach” 
of many EU-made rules has reaffirmed the intention of foreign companies and 
associations to take part in policy debates held by EU officials (Korkea-Aho, 2016, p. 
47). Hence, non-EU groups try to shape EU policies because of their possible effects 
on foreign interests, both inside as well as outside the EU.  
While the rationale behind this growing engagement is clear (the supply side of 
lobbying), it might be puzzling as to why EU officials provide non-EU groups with 
access to the law-making process (the demand side of lobbying)? Unlike their 
domestic (EU) counterparts, foreign (non-EU) interest groups neither have their 
national representatives in the EU institutions, nor do they hold EU citizenship. This 
lack of “national patronage” has triggered several questions: Does EU membership 
matter for the prospect of lobbying success? Are foreign groups disadvantaged in 
comparison to domestic interest groups? Are they Brussels’ outsiders? (Eliassen and 
Peneva, 2011; Hamada, 2007a; Korkea-Aho, 2016; Miard, 2014).  
To address these questions, it is necessary to examine not only the supply but also 
the demand side of lobbying (Bouwen, 2002; Klüver, 2013b; Mahoney, 2004). To 
perform their institutional roles, the EU institutions need various sorts of “goods”, 
such as expert knowledge and citizen support, provided by interest groups (Bouwen, 
                                                          
4 Available at the European Commission’ website: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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2002, p. 369; Klüver, 2013b, p. 3). Therefore, to understand foreign groups’ lobbying 
success, it is important to understand EU institutions’ objectives and related needs for 
certain “goods”, on the one hand, and the ability of these groups to meet these needs 
of the EU institutions, on the other hand. 
Following the resource dependency and exchange theory developed by Bouwen 
(2002, p. 369-382) and building on the findings offered by prior studies on non-EU 
interest groups in Brussels (e.g. Cowles, 1996; Eliassen and Peneva, 2011), the 
European Commission should be the most likely lobbying target for foreign business 
groups, due to their capacity to provide expertise (aiming at increasing output 
legitimacy), and vice versa because of these groups’ lack of capacity to provide other 
“access goods” needed by the European Parliament and the Council (aiming at 
increasing input legitimacy). The thesis, therefore, explores the success of foreign 
lobbyists during the preparation of energy-related policy proposals by the European 
Commission (the policy formulation phase).  
However, while the provision of expertise to the European Commission 
(Commission) is a necessary condition for lobby groups to make an impact, it is still 
insufficient to give a full account of their lobbying success. Firstly, the Commission’s 
need for expertise provided by interest groups, as well as its preferences over policy 
measures, vary among proposals. Secondly, all foreign interest groups involved in 
lobbying during a legislative process provide the Commission with certain types of 
information: statistics, analysis, and/or arguments. Since groups often have competing 
interests, and since they provide different figures and competing arguments, the 
question is: whose figures/arguments will achieve the greatest impact?  
The thesis, therefore, asks: Whether, how, and why European Commission’s initial 
preferences - over policies under consideration and over involved non-EU interest 
groups - affect the groups’ prospects to lobby successfully? 
The underlying assumption of the scholarship on lobbying in the EU is that 
information asymmetry exists in favour of the interest groups (Chalmers, 2013, p. 39). 
Arguably, the Commission is understaffed and overwhelmed by many issues on its 
agenda (Chalmers, 2011, p. 472; Bouwen, 2009, p. 20). Consequently, it often faces 
difficulties when dealing with complex problems, especially when these feature highly 
technical issues. As a result, the Commission might have strong preferences over 
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outcomes, but be uncertain about policies that shall generate the desired outcomes 
(Klüver, 2013a, p. 61-62). As experts on narrow, particular issues, interest groups can 
shape the Commission’s proposals by providing technical knowledge on what policies 
will lead towards the desired outcomes (Klüver, 2013a, p. 62). Put simply, policy-
makers know what they want to achieve, but they do not have the required expertise 
on how to achieve the desired outcomes. This supposed lack of expertise provides a 
window of opportunity for groups to influence decision-makers’ preferences by 
providing knowledge about the link between policy measures and their consequences. 
The thesis, however, makes the argument that the Commission sometimes has 
strong early preferences, not only over outcomes but also over policy measures 
necessary to achieve them, regardless of input from interest groups. These preferences 
may be based on institutional expertise, predefined policy priorities, as well as 
previous experience, beliefs, and the knowledge of individual Commissioners. The 
initial positions taken by the Commission may affect the prospects of groups’ 
successful lobbying. When the Commission has strong initial views on policies under 
consideration, attempts by opposing interest groups to alter its preferences will be less 
likely. Conversely, supportive interest groups - those whose preferences converge with 
the Commission’s, would find themselves in a more advantageous position to make 
an impact when Commission’s early preferences for the considered policy measures 
are strong.  
The absence of Commission’ strong views on policies, however, does not guarantee 
that an interest group will be successful. Instead, a group’s success is also affected by 
its status enjoyed among Commission officials. Drawing on the research on 
insider/outsider status of lobbyists (Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Coen, 2010; Grant 
1978; 2004; Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994), the thesis suggests that insiders 
might be more likely to lobby successfully than outsiders. The thesis contributes to the 
literature on insiders and outsiders by introducing an additional criterion attached to 
the traditional insider/outsider distinction, which concerns specifically non-EU 
interest groups – the importance of their particular non-EU origin for the achievement 
of the Commission’s policy objectives. Specifically, the thesis argues that those non-
EU interest groups whose countries of origin are strategically important for the 
achievement of the EU objectives are more likely to be given the status of an insider 
– and consequently - to lobby successfully. 
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Thus, the thesis suggests that a foreign interest group’s lobbying success is affected 
by the Commission’s positions on policies and involved lobbyists: how strong its 
initial view on the issues under consideration is, as well as whether it sees interest 
groups as “insiders” or “outsiders”.  
This research explores four cases of Commission proposals covering the main 
aspects of EU energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability, and security5. Since the 
very beginning of European Union integration, energy has been at the top of the EU 
policy agenda. More importantly for this research project, the energy domain has been 
attracting a considerable number of lobbyists. Approximately 4,500 out of all currently 
registered entities in the Transparency Register (11,800) declare that energy is among 
their fields of interest. Where non-EU interest groups are concerned, more than one-
third of these groups report energy as a domain of their interests. This is not surprising 
since the EU is the largest energy importer in the world (European Commission, 
2014a, p. 4). Yet, while energy has been at the top of the EU agenda, engendering 
considerable lobbying, the literature about lobbying in the energy sector is still scarce. 
Reviewing the scholarship on interest groups in the EU, Bunea and Baumgartner 
(2014, p. 1424) have shown that eight out of 196 analysed articles examined lobbying 
in the energy domain. The present study offers a contribution to further developing the 
research on lobbying in this policy domain. 
In particular, the thesis examines legislative provisions that concern: (1) ownership 
unbundling (separation) of vertically integrated gas companies; (2) third-party access 
to natural gas infrastructure; (3) indirect land-use change caused by the production of 
biofuels; and (4) energy security. Several case studies – of foreign 
companies/associations - are analysed within these four cases of EU energy 
legislation. The research employs process-tracing and cross-case comparison as the 
main methods.  
The thesis contributes to the literature on non-EU interest groups. To the author’s 
best knowledge, Rasmussen and Alexandrova’s (2012) and Korkea-Aho’s (2016) 
articles are the only two studies so far which, in a systematic manner, consider non-
EU lobby groups. Other authors exploring foreign lobby groups focus only on a single 
country’s groups - Hamada (2007a; 2007b) on Japanese groups, Cowles (1996) and 
                                                          
5 For more about the EU energy objectives see the European Commission (2006b).  
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Coen (1999) on the US groups, Pang (2004) on Korean groups, and Eliassen and 
Peneva (2011) and Miard (2014) on Norwegian groups. Among these studies, only 
Cowles’ (1996) and Coen’s (1999) studies offer empirical findings on factors behind 
non-EU interest groups lobbying success. All the other studies investigate, primarily, 
the lobbying strategies employed by foreign interest groups. 
The thesis aims to further these studies by examining interest groups coming from 
several foreign countries. Additionally, the thesis departs from the extant research by 
examining factors that can explain non-EU groups’ lobbying success, rather than their 
lobbying strategies. As already mentioned, the Cowles’ (1996) and Coen’s (1999) 
studies are the only ones exploring determinants behind the lobbying success of the 
US companies. However, their empirical findings concern only the experience of 
companies coming from a single country – the United States. The experience of the 
US companies might be unique, given that the American firms were among the 
pioneers when it comes to lobbying in Brussels. Since their early positioning in 
Brussels is not necessarily shared by other foreign groups, it seems important to 
analyse interest groups from several non-EU countries to comprehend whether the 
determinants of the US interest groups’ success travel across actors with different 
foreign origins.  
Besides, the studies on non-EU interest groups offer conflicting assumptions and 
empirical findings over the lobbying success of foreign interest groups. While one 
strand argues that a lack of national patronage within the EU may hamper a group’s 
success (for instance Eliassen and Peneva, 2011, p. 29), the other holds that non-EU 
companies can still be as successful as their EU counterparts (Korkea-Aho, 2016). The 
thesis seeks to address this question by offering an explanation that the lack of EU 
membership by itself is not necessarily a lobbying disadvantage; instead, the success 
of foreign interest groups depends on the Commission’s positions on both policies 
under consideration and the involved lobbyists. 
Furthermore, the thesis offers conclusions that could be used in the literature on 
lobbying regardless of an interest group’s country of origin. It complements the 
literature on informational lobbying by arguing that, in some cases, decision-makers 
have strong preferences over both - the outcomes and means required to achieve them, 
thus making interests groups’ attempts to alter their positions less likely. Additionally, 
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the research contributes to the strand of literature that explores the insider/outsider 
status of lobbyists by introducing an additional criterion underpinning the 
insider/outsider distinction, which concerns specifically non-EU interest groups.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework used 
to explain whether and how the European Commission’s initial preferences on both 
the policies under consideration as well as the involved non-EU interest groups affect 
the groups’ prospects of lobbying successfully. Before turning to the main research 
question and the thesis’ central argument, the chapter provides an overview of the 
engagement of foreign interest groups in the EU and explains why studying non-EU 
interest groups is important. The chapter then turns to those few extant studies that 
have explored foreign interest groups in Brussels and thereafter elaborates the research 
question. It then proceeds to a summary of determinants of lobbying success in the 
literature on domestic (EU) interest groups. Finally, the last section presents the 
theoretical framework, explaining whether and how the Commission’s initial 
preferences affect non-EU interest groups’ prospects of lobbying successfully. 
Chapter 2 discusses the research design of the thesis. It starts with definitions of the 
main concepts, such as lobbying, interest groups, and foreign interest groups. After 
that, the chapter turns to the definition of lobbying success and how it differs from 
other related concepts, such as influence and access. The following section provides 
justification for the case selection. The chapter then turns to data sources, and then the 
methods that are employed for the analysis of the case studies.   
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain the empirical analyses of four case studies covering 
three main aspects of EU energy policy: sustainability, competitiveness, and security. 
Chapter 3 looks into the legislative provisions regulating ownership unbundling, i.e. 
the separation of vertically integrated gas companies, and the Gazprom clause. 
Chapter 4 analyses the provisions on third-party access to natural gas infrastructure. 
Chapter 5 examines the regulation of indirect land-use change (ILUC) related to the 
production of biofuels. Chapter 6 deals with the Energy Security Package.  
Following the empirical chapters, the thesis presents a comparative analysis of their 
findings, discussing how well they fit the theoretical expectations set out in Chapter 
1. The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) summarises the analysis reflecting on its 
broader theoretical implications. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework, aiming to explain whether and how 
the European Commission’s initial preferences on the policies under consideration and 
the involved non-EU interest groups affect the groups’ prospects of lobbying 
successfully. The first section in this chapter provides an overview of the engagement 
of foreign interest groups in the EU.  Following that, a brief description of lobbying in 
the energy domain is presented. The subsequent section explains why studying non-
EU interest groups is important. The chapter then turns to those few existing studies 
that have explored foreign interest groups in Brussels and thereafter elaborates the 
thesis’ research question. It then proceeds to a summary of determinants of lobbying 
success in the literature on interest groups in general, regardless of an interest group’s 
nationality, aimed at positioning the thesis’ theoretical expectations within this 
broader literature on lobbying in the EU. Finally, the last section presents the thesis’ 
theoretical expectations about foreign groups’ access to EU policy-makers and how 
the latter’s initial preferences affect the non-EU interest groups’ prospects of lobbying 
successfully.  
 
1.1. Non-EU interest groups in Brussels 
From theories explaining the process of European integration to approaches aimed at 
understanding how the EU functions (see Bache et al., 2014, p. 5-44), interest groups 
have been seen as significant actors in EU policy-making (Bache et al., 2014; Bache 
and Flinders, 2004; Hix, 2005; Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015). While their 
relevance has already been noted in the early days of European integration (Haas, 
1958), the presence of interest groups in Brussels only started to increase rapidly 
during the 1980s, owing to the growing transfer of competencies from the national to 
the EU level (Bache et al., 2014, p. 309; Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 5; Klüver, 
2010, p. 175-176). Witnessing the shift of authority from the member states towards 
the supranational institutions, lobby groups realised that in a newly created 
environment, their interests could no longer be guarded only through engagement at 
the national level. Instead, lobbying at the EU level became more appealing. And, 
“once some groups started to shift their activity to Brussels”, others could not “afford 
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to be left out” (Bache et al., 2014, p. 311). The terms ‘interest groups’, ‘groups’, ‘lobby 
organisations’, ‘lobbyists’, and ‘organised interests’ are used interchangeably.  
Though it might be difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the exact number of 
interest groups in the EU and their growth over the years, Grande (1996, p. 320) has 
referred to the Commission’s estimation of 3,000 organisations that were active in 
Brussels in 1992, whereas Wonka et al. (2010, p. 4) have provided a dataset of around 
3,700 groups in 2007. The latest figures obtained from the EU Transparency Register 
show that the number of registered groups doubled between 2012 and 2018 – from 
5,431 to 11,901 (Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, 2018 p. 7). As for individual 
lobbyists, those employed by interest groups, estimates vary from 10,000 in 1992 
(Grande, 1996, p. 320) to 37,000 in 2016 (Freund, 2016). Certainly, many groups and 
lobbyists have not been covered by the mentioned estimations, meaning that the total 
number is probably even higher. Nevertheless, the trend of increasing engagement of 
interest groups in Brussels is clear, lending credence to the assertion that lobbying is 
an important activity in the EU’s capital.  
The growing number of organised interests in Brussels was followed by an 
expansion of academic research on their lobbying activities. Operating in a complex 
system of multi-level governance where decisions are made at different territorial 
levels (Bache and Flinders, 2004, p. v) has provided both “a window of opportunity” 
and “a hard time” for organised interests seeking to shape EU policies. Lobbying in 
such a multi-layered environment has attracted scholars aiming to explain the interest 
groups’ characteristics, diversity, tactics and, most importantly, the extent of their 
influence relative to other actors. Still the fact that, in parallel with domestic interest 
groups, actors from third countries also try to shape EU legislation has been largely 
overlooked. Instead, the literature has been focussed on determinants of EU lobby 
groups’ influence, whereas the question of how successful non-EU groups are in 
shaping EU laws - has remained overlooked. 
A vast portion of scholarship studied the European Union’s relationships with non-
EU countries by analysing the role of the EU as a global actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006; Manners, 2006; Smith, 2011), its external policy (Birchfield, 2013; Niemann 
and Bretherton, 2013; Smith, 2016), and its diplomatic relationships (Cross, 2016; 
Woolcock, 2011). Usually, however, the EU influence over other states’ policies has 
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received the most attention. How non-EU countries shape EU policies has remained 
largely an unexplored theme (Newman, 2018; McGuire and Lineque, 2010, p. 1345-
1346; Rasmussen and Alexandrova, 2012, p. 615). The literature about non-EU 
companies and organisations that are involved in EU policy-making is even scarcer 
(Rasmussen and Alexandrova, 2012, p. 615). Only a few studies so far have examined 
foreign interest groups in the EU. The terms ‘non-EU’, ‘foreign’, ‘outside the EU’, 
and ‘external’ are used as synonyms.  
Many newspaper stories are run under headlines about foreign groups lobbying in 
the EU: “Google spent €31m to influence EU copyright law” (EUobserver, 04 July 
2018), “U.S. firms lead EU lobbying league” (Macdonald, 2015), “Follow the new 
silk road: China’s growing trail of think tanks and lobbyists in Europe” (Corporate 
Europe Observatory, 2019), etc. Though real-world instances underpin the claim that 
foreign interest groups have been following the footsteps of their EU colleagues, most 
of these actors’ lobbying activities did not capture the scholars’ attention.  
A significant portion of interest groups in Brussels represents third countries 
interests. According to the latest data obtained from the EU Transparency Register, 
around 1,100 out of 11,800 registered interest groups have a foreign origin.6 Only 
interest groups that have registered head-offices in non-EU states were counted (see 
appendix I). Foreign groups with offices inside the EU member states were excluded,7 
following a similar approach by Korkea-Aho (2016, p. 46). Besides, many non-EU 
companies seek to make an impact not directly, but through European consultancy 
firms and/or business associations representing foreign in addition to domestic (EU) 
interest groups8. Similarly, foreign companies often lobby through their subsidiaries9 
                                                          
6 Data obtained from the Transparency Register on 01 Jun 2019. See appendix I.  
7 For example, the American Chamber of Commerce EU, the Japanese company Ajinomoto Europe, 
and American Facebook are excluded since they have offices in Belgium, France, and Ireland 
respectively, not outside the EU. Although these groups represent foreign interests, they have not been 
counted because it would be difficult to analyse the territorial origin of interests represented by each of 
the 11,800 groups. Since the register allows the search for groups by the location of their head-offices, 
only those lobbyists with registered offices outside the EU were counted. 
8 For example, the Norwegian company Gassco is not registered in the Transparency Register as an 
individual company; instead, the company’s interests are represented through an association - Gas 
Infrastructure Europe (Gassco is a member of this association).  
9 For instance, a Gazprom’s subsidiary WINGAS. 
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and joint ventures10 operating in the EU market. The proportion of non-EU lobbyists 
is, thus, probably even higher, given that the following categories have not been 
included in this figure of 1,100 foreign groups: (a) non-EU interest groups with offices 
inside a member state; (b) non-EU interest groups’ representation through European 
associations and consultancy firms, and (c) foreign companies’ subsidiaries. 
The largest number of non-EU groups are those from the US (394), followed by 
Switzerland (251), Norway (89), Canada (34), Japan (25), Turkey (22), and Ukraine 
(18) (see appendix I). Other studies examining the territorial origin of interest groups 
provide similar figures (Korkea-Aho, 2016, p. 46; Wonka et al., 2010, p. 7). In 
addition, three foreign countries - the US, Switzerland and Norway - have more 
registered interest groups in Brussels, respectively, than ten EU states individually - 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Luxembourg (see appendix I). The fact that some non-EU countries have more 
registered groups than the ten EU countries additionally strengthens the assumption 
that foreign organisations represent relevant actors in Brussels.   
Furthermore, certain non-EU companies have established regular contact with 
senior policy-makers in the EU. For instance, over the last five years, representatives 
of Norwegian Equinor11, Swiss Novartis International, and the American Chamber of 
Commerce EU have attended 42, 20, and 104 meetings, respectively, with the 
European Commissioners and members of their cabinets12. Besides, of the ten interest 
groups with the highest number of meetings with EU officials between 2015 and 2019, 
three have the American origin - Google (203 meetings), Microsoft (110 meetings), 
and Facebook (106 meetings).13   
Finally, the lobbying budgets of some foreign companies and associations are 
exceptionally large, even when compared with domestic (EU) interest groups. 
According to an interactive database made by Transparency International EU, 1.53% 
of all registered organisations spend annually more than one million euro on 
                                                          
10 For example, South Hook LNG Terminal Company - a joint venture of Qatar Petroleum, Exxon, and 
Total.   
11 Equinor is formerly known by the name Statoil. 
12 Data obtained from the EU Transparency Register. [Accessed on 01/07/2019]. 




lobbying14. All other lobbyists declare less than this on lobbying, with most of them 
spending less than 100,000 € per year (see table 1). Some of the biggest lobbying 
spenders have a foreign origin. For instance, the American multinationals Google and 
Microsoft Corporation, the Chinese Huawei, the Swiss Novartis International AG, the 
Norwegian Equinor, and the Malaysian Employers Federation all spend more than  
two million euro annually on lobbying in the EU.15  
   
Table 1.  Lobbying budgets declared by interest groups in the Transparency Register. 
Lobbying expenses Number of interest groups Percentage* 
0 € 495  4.1% 
Less than 10,000 € 3216 27.2% 
10,000 – 50,000 € 4133 34.9% 
50,000 – 100,000 € 1357 11.4% 
100,000 – 500,000 € 1839 15.5% 
500,000 – 1,000,000 € 591 5% 
1,000,000 – 2,000,000 € 105 0.88% 
2,000,000 – 5,000,000 € 64 0.54% 
More than 5,000,000 € 14 0.11% 
* Based on the author’s calculation.  
Source: Compiled from the EU Integrity Watch’s database. Available at: 
https://www.integritywatch.eu/organizations. Accessed on 01/07/2019. 
 
Thus, at least 9% of all registered interest groups have a foreign origin. The number 
is not final since it excludes non-EU organisations with head-offices inside the EU, as 
well as European consultancy companies and associations speaking on behalf of both 
domestic and non-EU stakeholders. In addition, the three foreign countries - the US, 
Switzerland, and Norway - separately have more lobbyists in Brussels than the ten 
member states individually. Some non-EU groups (for example, Google and 
Facebook) exceed a vast majority of domestic groups when the number of high-level 
meetings with the Commission’s officials is considered. Finally, the impressive 
lobbying budgets of several non-EU companies provide additional confirmation that 
non-EU interest groups represent a significant lobbying force in the EU. 
                                                          
14 Compiled from the EU Integrity Watch’s database. Available at: 
https://www.integritywatch.eu/organizations. [Accessed on 01/07/2019]. 
15 Data obtained from the Transparency Register. [Accessed on 01/07/2019]. 
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Why does the European Union attract foreign interest groups? Firstly, non-EU 
groups, to be precise, US firms, “have brought” lobbying to the EU. These firms were 
among the firstly established lobbyists in Brussels (Coen, 1999; Cowles, 1996). 
Moreover, they “have acted as a catalyst for change in the European business-
government relationship” (Coen, 1999, p. 27). Part of the reason for their early 
presence in the capital of Belgium was the restricted influence over policy-making in 
member states (Coen, 1999, p. 35; Cowles, 1996, p. 346). To compensate for the 
absence of a “national patron” among EU countries, the US companies concentrated 
their lobbying activities on the Commission (Cowles, 1996, p. 346-347). In doing so, 
they have created one of the most powerful organisations in Brussels – the American 
Chamber of Commerce EU. In contrast, until the early 1990s European companies 
preferred to lobby at the national level since their interests were safeguarded by the 
member states’ veto powers in the Council (Coen, 1999, p. 35). However, with the 
increase of supranational competencies and the parallel growth of legislation adopted 
under the co-decision procedure, the focus of EU interest groups has started to shift 
from member states to EU institutions.   
The reason behind the US and other foreign companies’ engagement in Brussels 
rests with the attractiveness of the European single market for foreign actors. As one 
of the world’s largest markets, accounting for 500 million citizens, the EU market 
attracts many foreign companies aiming to extend their businesses there. Since some 
of them have high stakes in Europe, it comes as no surprise that these non-EU actors 
have tended to shape EU decisions in line with their interests. For instance, the recent 
Commission’s report on foreign direct investments (FDI) shows that 2.8% of unlisted 
firms and 9.3% of firms that are listed in the EU stock exchange have a non-EU owner 
(European Commission, 2019, p. 7). What is more, these companies control at least 
35% of EU total assets in the considered sample and provide approximately 16 million 
jobs (European Commission 2019, p. 1). Foreign companies, therefore, have strong 
reasons to try to defend their businesses inside the EU.  
Another sound reason for the increasing presence of non-EU interest groups is “the 
global reach of EU law” (Korkea-Aho, 2016, p. 47). Thanks to its market size, 
“regulatory capacity” (Bach and Newman, 2007, p. 830), and “normative power” 
(Birchfield, 2013; Manners, 2006), the EU has been empowered with the ability to 
shape rules and policies beyond its borders (for more, see Cremona and Scott, 2019). 
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As a result, actors from outside the EU have incentives to try to shape EU policies 
because of their possible effects on foreign interests not only inside, but outside the 
EU as well.  
Given that non-EU companies lack political representation in the EU, they can only 
make an impact either indirectly through their countries’ diplomatic channels or 
directly by engaging in the EU law-making process. Public officials’ communication 
through established diplomatic relations, however, differs from non-EU groups 
lobbying in the European Union. While the former concerns primarily external 
policies substantively affecting other countries and often involves mutual concessions 
(reciprocity), the latter mostly concerns EU internal policies. This is not to say that 
foreign lobby groups cannot influence other countries’ external policies. Gawande’s 
Krishna’s, and Robbins’ (2006) research showing that lobbying by foreign actors had 
a significant influence on US trade policy is a case in point. Instead, the intention here 
is to say that the main concern of this thesis is to explain the influence of foreign actors 
on the EU legislation governing mainly the EU internal market, rather than its external 
policy.   
Still, even when trying to engage in debates on internal EU rules, foreign actors can 
be, and often are, supported by their governments. Their assistance, however, should 
not be overstated. A study of Norwegian interest groups shows that foreign 
governments and their diplomatic missions to the EU are of less importance for the 
Norwegian groups than the groups’ direct contacts with EU law-makers (Eliassen and 
Peneva, 2011, p. 25). Norwegian organisations occasionally even lobby on behalf of 
their government, instead of the other way around, due to these groups’ access to 
“inside parts of the EU decision-making system not open to (…) the Norwegian 
government” (Eliassen and Peneva 2011, p. 25). Similarly, Cowles (1996, p. 351) 
describes relations between the American Chamber of Commerce EU (AmCham) and 
the US Mission to the EU as a “two-way” information exchange in which AmCham 
“receives the view of Washington DC on policy matters”, while the US Mission to the 
EU “benefits from the intelligence network” of AmCham.  
The literature on the Europeanisation of interests groups further reinforces the 
assumption that traditional diplomatic relations between member states and third 
countries have been losing value as channels through which foreign companies and 
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associations seek to influence EU legislation. As mentioned earlier, the growing 
transfer of competencies from the national to the EU level has triggered the shift of 
lobbying activities from member states to the EU institutions because a group’s 
interests can no longer be protected only by its government16 (Bache et al., 2014, p. 
309-310). For the same reason, non-EU interest groups cannot rely only on their 
governments’ traditional relations with member states when trying to exert influence 
in the EU. The motivation – a shift of power from member states to supranational 
institutions triggering the increased engagement of domestic (EU) interest groups at 
the EU level - has also pushed non-EU actors to move their lobbying activities from 
diplomatic channels with governmental intermediation to direct communication with 
EU policy-makers. Otherwise, why would these groups invest effort and resources to 
open offices in Brussels, employ lobbyists, write position papers, and undertake other 
costly lobbying activities if they can rely on their governments’ diplomacy alone? 
After all, as suggested by Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012, p. 615): “it is often in 
everyday politics rather than at the high-level summits that many of the issues of 
concern to foreign interests are reconciled”. Nonetheless, it is important to note here 
that this does not mean that foreign origin and foreign governments are irrelevant. On 
the contrary, both are important, as will be explained in detail later. The point here is 
that the transfer of power from member states to EU institutions has limited the value 
of exerting influence via diplomatic relations with the former in favour of the latter. 
Besides, the EU external policy and its relations with third countries sometimes differ 
from those of individual member states.  
In sum, non-EU groups try to shape EU policies because of their possible effects 
on foreign interests inside the EU, as well as abroad. As a result of growing delegation 
of competencies to the EU institutions, governmental relations between an interest 
group’s country of origin and a member state have been losing utility as a lobbying 
channel. Hence, foreign actors have to seek direct communication with policy-makers 
at the EU level. This explains the rising number and engagement of non-EU lobby 
organisation in Brussels. However, despite their growing presence in the EU, foreign 
groups have not received sufficient attention in the extant literature. 
                                                          
16 However, as shown by some studies, transfer of competencies from member states to the EU did not 
equally affect all interest groups – some groups have reoriented their lobbying towards the EU 
institutions but others retain their lobbying on the level of member states (see Beyers and Kerremans, 
2012, and Klüver, 2010).  
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1.2. Lobbying in EU energy domain 
Since the early days of the European integration up until today, energy has been at the 
top of the EU policy agenda. From the treaties establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and Euratom in 1957, energy has been seen as an 
essential good for European citizens’ well-being, “the life blood” of the EU society 
(European Commission, 2011a, p. 2). Thus already by the 1960s, member states had 
recognised the need to “work together” on energy-related issues (European 
Commission, 2014a, p. 4). However, the creation of the European energy market has 
been slow-moving, due to member states’ resistance to give up their sovereignty on 
energy issues. As a result, neither the Treaty of Rome (1957) nor the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) provided the EU with competence in the energy domain (Yafimava, 2013, p. 
2). It was not until the Lisbon Treaty that the legal basis for EU competencies on 
energy-related issues was established (Talus, 2016, p. 12).  
Still, EU legislation on energy started to develop even before the Lisbon Treaty was 
introduced, mostly because the energy domain has been seen as a part of the European 
single market. The Community legislator was thus “able to expand its energy acquis 
communautaire” (Yafimava, 2013, p. 2) by using its competencies (mostly 
competition law) over the single market (Yafimava, 2013, p. 2; Talus, 2016, p. 12). 
This was especially after 1994, when the European Court of Justice took the position 
that electricity is a commodity “like any other”, thus reinforcing the Commission’s 
ability to propose rules that would govern the European energy market even without 
any formal competencies over the energy domain (Yafimava, 2013, p. 2).  
Today, the outgoing Commission under the Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker has 
left behind a finalised project establishing the European Energy Union, aiming to 
bring together energy systems across Europe (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). 
The creation of a new portfolio of the Commission Vice-President for Energy Union 
in 2014 confirmed that energy remains one of the top policy priorities.  
Rather than being significant for policy-makers only, the energy sector has also 
been attracting a considerable number of lobbyists. Approximately 4,500 out of all the 
currently registered entities in the EU Transparency Register (11,800) declare that 
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energy is among their fields of interest17. This is not necessarily to say that energy is 
an exclusive or even the most important field of interest for all these groups given that 
the register allows stakeholders to declare more than one domain of their interest. For 
instance, an organisation - “Airlines for America” - refers to energy as one of its fields 
of interest, even though its lobbying concerns other policy domains too. In any case, 
the significance of the EU energy policy for interest groups, regardless of whether it 
has been of primary or secondary importance for them, can be hardly challenged.  
This claim is additionally supported by the number of high-level meetings with 
lobbyists on energy-related issues that take place. Maroš Šefčovič, the Commission 
Vice-President for Energy Union, and his cabinet members held 1,280 meetings with 
lobbyists between 2014 and 2019. Over the same period, Miguel Arias Cañete, 
Climate Action and Energy Commissioner, and his cabinet attended 1,476 meetings 
with interest groups.18 When combined, since both cover the same portfolio, the 
number of meetings on energy policy exceeds the number of meetings held by the 
Commissioners in charge of any other portfolio19.  
Foreign interest groups are also considerably interested in EU energy legislation. 
Approximately one-third of currently registered non-EU interest groups declare 
energy as one of their fields of interest.20 This is not surprising since the EU consumes 
more energy than it produces (European Commission, 2014a, p. 4). The most recent 
data illustrates that the EU is the world’s biggest energy importer, with 53% of its 
energy needs being satisfied from external (non-EU) sources at the cost of 400 billion 
euro (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2).  
While energy has been among the top policy priorities at the Brussels’ agenda, 
attracting a significant number of interest groups, studies about lobbying in the energy 
sector are rare. Reviewing the literature on interest groups in the EU, Bunea and 
Baumgartner (2014, p. 1424) have shown that eight out of 196 analysed articles focus 
                                                          
17 Data obtained from the Transparency Register on 01 Jun 2019. The register allows a search of interest 
groups by domains of their interest. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].  
18 Transparency International EU. Available at: https://www.integritywatch.eu/. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019].  
19 If analysed individually, the number of meetings with lobbyists covering four other portfolios – digital 
economy, financial markets, jobs and growth, and the digital market -  surpasses the number of meetings 
held by Maroš Šefčovič and Miguel Arias Cañete, separately.  
 20 Data obtained from the Transparency Register on 01 Jun 2019. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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on energy policy. But, as they note, the literature usually overlooks the question where 
lobbying happens most often (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014, p. 1424). Hence, 
advancing studies on lobbying in the energy domain would improve the understanding 
of interest groups’ activities in the European Union.    
 
1.3. Why studying non-EU interest groups is important?  
Foreign interest groups comprise a significant portion of the groups that have strong 
interests to seek influence over EU decision-making, but are they substantially 
different from domestic organisations and, if so, why?  
The apparent feature distinguishing foreign from domestic interest groups is their 
country of origin – while the former come from non-EU countries, the latter have EU 
origins. The terms ‘domestic interest groups’ and ‘EU interest groups’ are used as 
synonyms, and concern both interest groups that are organised at the level of an EU 
member state (e.g. the French Automobile Manufacturers’ Association and the 
German BMW) and groups whose members are active in more than one EU state (e.g. 
the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association). Non-EU groups, on the other 
hand, are those with a foreign origin (e.g. the American Chamber of Commerce EU 
and the Russian company Gazprom). In addition, some groups have mixed 
membership: for example, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
represents the interests of both the EU (e.g. Hungarian MOL) and third countries’ 
companies (e.g. the Kuwait Oil Company)21.   
The country of origin, thus, represents the main difference between foreign and 
domestic groups or, more specifically, the non-EU origin with regard to the former. 
This feature is usually described as the lack of ‘EU membership’, ‘EU representation’, 
‘EU citizenship’, ‘EU national patron/patronage’ and ‘EU governmental safeguards’ 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009; Coen, 1999; Cowles, 1996; Eliassen and Peneva, 
2011; Hamada, 2007a; Miard, 2014). Korkea-Aho (2016, p. 45) studied foreign 
interest groups in the EU under the title “Mr Smith goes to Brussels”, whereas Cowles 
(1996, p. 350) referred to the US companies in Brussels as “European firms of 
American parentage”. In any case, the non-EU origin is the distinctive feature of these 
                                                          
21 Chapter 2 provides the definition of foreign interest groups and their distinct features in comparison 
to domestic groups and groups with mixed membership. 
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groups when comparing them with domestic groups. However, even when the lack of 
EU membership is taken into account, one could wonder, to use the words of Maggetti, 
Radaelli, and Gilardi (2013, p. 11), “so what”?  Why is the lack of EU origin important, 
and is it important at all?   
To answer this question, it is necessary to start with foreign groups’ access to EU 
institutions. When trying to shape EU legislation, interest groups tend to use various 
channels to present their positions vis-à-vis decision-makers. Though access to the EU 
institutions does not automatically “translate into influence” (Dür, 2008a, p. 1221), it 
still represents a necessary condition for having an influence (Bouwen, 2002, p. 366). 
The rule ‘the more, the better’ applies in this respect. The key concern of this thesis is 
to explain the success of foreign groups rather than just their access to policy-makers 
(the differences between access, success, and influence are clarified in the second 
chapter). Yet, the extant studies on non-EU lobbyists have considered the question of 
these groups’ (limited) access to EU policy-makers as one of the main consequences 
of the lack of EU membership (Coen, 1999; Cowles, 1996; Eliassen and Peneva, 2011; 
Korkea-Aho, 2016; Miard, 2014; Pang, 2004). Do foreign groups have an equal 
chance to gain access to policy-makers as their EU counterparts? The existing studies 
offer conflicting findings. 
Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012, p. 616-617) argue that the Commission is open 
to non-EU interest groups because it needs expertise about foreign market 
developments, because it aspires to be transparent about how decisions are made, and 
because it is interested in the opinions of those foreign companies that make 
investments and provide jobs in the EU. The authors, nevertheless, did not test these 
assumptions. By exploring the influence of the American Chamber of Commerce 
(AmCham) on the Commission, Cowles (1996) has shown that AmCham’s limited 
access to member states’ governments (at the national level) had motivated the 
chamber to concentrate its lobbying activities on the Commission. The author 
demonstrates that AmCham has had regular access to the Commission, but underlines 
that “there are times, however, when the demarcation between ‘European firms’ and 
‘European firms of American parentage’ becomes evident” (Cowles, 1996, p. 350). 
By examining how foreign groups lobby throughout the whole policy cycle, Korkea-
Aho (2016) has shown that EU institutions are generally open to non-EU groups. 
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On the other hand, a study exploring Norwegian groups’ lobbying strategies has 
revealed that “without patrons, there seems to be a lack of ‘ears’ in the EU institutions” 
for positions preferred by Norwegian companies (Miard, 2014, p. 84). What is more, 
some of the Norwegian organisation have been feeling that, due to a lack of national 
patronage, they need to invest extra resources, when compared with domestic groups, 
to make an influence in the EU (Eliassen and Peneva 2011, p. 7). Similarly, a study 
on Japanese firms lobbying in Brussels provides an example of a Japanese firm 
exclusion from a meeting held by the Commission for the reason that Japanese 
companies do not “represent European views” (Hamada, 2007a, p. 415).  
Therefore, the question remains open: Do foreign groups have restricted access to 
EU policy-makers? Since the literature still has not provided the final say to this 
question, it is important to advance studies concerning non-EU interest groups by 
examining not only their access to decision-makers but rather their lobbying success. 
The main objective of interest groups is to shape EU policies in line with their 
interests; access to EU officials represents only a channel through which they can exert 
influence. The thesis, therefore, aims to address this debate by examining the success 
of foreign groups. In addition, one of the sections below (1.7.1.) provides a summary 
of findings related to access to EU institutions by foreign groups since these findings 
have been used to guide process-tracing employed by this research project.  
 
1.4. Extant studies on non-EU interest groups 
Academic research on foreign interest groups in the European Union is modest. To the 
authors’ best knowledge, Rasmussen and Alexandrova’s (2012) and Korkea-Aho’s 
(2016) articles are the only two studies so far which in a systematic manner have 
considered the activity of non-EU lobby groups in the EU. Other authors exploring 
foreign lobby groups focus only on a single country’s lobby groups - Hamada (2007a; 
2007b) on Japanese groups, Cowles (1996) and Coen (1999) on the US groups, Pang 
(2004) on Korean groups, and Eliassen and Peneva (2011) and Miard (2014) on 
Norwegian groups. In addition, in an article exploring the determinants of firms’ direct 
lobbying, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) have identified foreign companies as a 
distinct category of interest groups by analysing the likelihood of their direct 
engagement at the EU level. Finally, a number of studies have recognised that foreign 
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groups compete with domestic organisations for influence in Brussels (e.g. Coen, 
2009, p. 155; Wonka et al., 2010, p. 7). How does the thesis contribute to this 
literature?  
In their study, Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012, p. 614) analysed foreign groups’ 
engagement during public consultations held by the Commission. The authors have 
found that non-EU lobby groups coming from democratic and wealthier states with 
close economic ties with the EU tended to be more active in Brussels than groups from 
less developed countries (2012, p. 614). However, countries, rather than individual 
interest groups, were the units of the analysis (Rasmussen and Alexandrova 2012, p. 
629). Also, the authors only analysed the level of non-EU groups’ activities during the 
Commission’s public consultations; other channels of influence were not examined 
(Rasmussen and Alexandrova 2012, p. 629). Finally, the study did not explore the 
reasons underpinning the non-EU groups’ success, but rather their level of activity 
during the consultations. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond Rasmussen and 
Alexandrova’s methodology in order to explain any success of the foreign groups. 
Korkea-Aho’s (2016, p. 47) article examined why and how non-EU actors 
participate in the EU decision-making process. The study provided an analysis of the 
lobbying carried out by foreign groups during the creation, implementation, and 
enforcement of the EU regulation on chemicals - REACH22. It has demonstrated that 
the global influence of the EU legislation is a key reason behind the engagement of 
foreign groups in the EU (Korkea-Aho 2016, p. 47). The author also showed that the 
European Union is open to interest groups coming from third countries by allowing 
them to participate in EU policy-making. Similar to Rasmussen and Alexandrova 
(2012), Korkea-Aho (2016) does not explain the factors behind the foreign groups’ 
success; instead, the author provides empirical data on the reasons behind their 
engagement and the strategies they employed in that respect. Since the article is based 
only on a single case study, further analysis covering a larger number of cases is 
necessary to shed some light on the lobbying success of foreign groups. The following 
paragraphs briefly explain the main findings of studies exploring non-EU lobby 
groups coming from a single country. 
                                                          
22 REACH is an acronym for Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. 
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By comparing the lobbying activities of Norwegian and Swedish companies during 
the revision of the EU Emissions Trading System, Miard’s (2014) article examined 
the effect of EU membership on the lobbying strategies of interest groups. The 
empirical findings indicate that the lack of EU membership has had adverse effects on 
the ability of Norwegian firms to lobby at the EU level. Unlike their Swedish 
counterparts, Norwegian companies have been less able to lobby alone, through 
national associations, and institutions at the level of member states (Miard 2014, p. 
73). Eliassen and Peneva (2011) also explored Norwegian interest group lobbying 
strategies. The authors confirmed Miard’s (2014) findings that Norwegian 
organisations lobby more frequently indirectly, via European associations, than 
directly, as individual groups. Their analysis also shows that the most important 
institution for the Norwegian groups’ lobbying activities is the Commission. These 
groups see “continuity in the representation and preferably from a Brussels office” as 
a key condition to lobbying successfully (Eliassen and Peneva, 2011, p. 23). When 
asked to estimate the efficiency of their lobbying, the Norwegian groups responded 
with “an average score of 3.36 out of 5” (Eliassen and Peneva 2011, p. 26). 
Hamada’s (2007a) study explains the lobbying strategies employed by Japanese 
companies in the EU. The author investigated the effects of both Japanese and 
European corporate culture on the Japanese firms’ preferences for specific lobbying 
strategies (Hamada, 2007a, p. 404). The main finding is that Japanese companies have 
adapted their strategies to a specific environment of EU decision-making, but the 
extent of their adaptation is intermediated by sectoral and corporate factors (Hamada 
2007a, p. 408). Pang’s (2004) article examines the lobbying strategies of Korean firms. 
Drawing from a detailed analysis of EU policy-making on trade, Pang (2004) provides 
recommendations on what strategies Korean firms should employ to improve their 
position vis-à-vis EU law-makers.  
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) did not explore foreign interest groups; instead, 
they examined determinants motivating large companies to engage in direct lobbying 
at the EU level. One of the explored factors was the lack of EU membership; the 
authors hypothesised that non-EU companies had strong incentives to lobby the EU 
institutions directly due to the absence of governmental safeguards within these 
institutions (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009, p. 161). Their empirical findings have 
confirmed the assumption.  
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The mentioned studies share an interest in examining non-EU groups’ lobbying 
strategies. Most of these studies share a view that, in comparison to domestic groups, 
foreign groups often face obstacles when trying to gain access to EU decision-makers 
since the former use their governmental representatives in EU institutions as lobbying 
channels, while the latter lack this sort of national safeguard (Eliassen and Peneva, 
2011; Hamada, 2007a; Miard, 2014; Pang, 2004). Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
question of what lobbying strategies groups tend to employ to compensate for lack of 
EU membership, the extant studies offer different conclusions. For instance, whereas 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) have provided evidence that foreign groups tend to 
lobby directly, Miard’s (2014) and Eliassen and Peneva’s (2011) studies have 
demonstrated the limited ability of non-EU groups to lobby alone; instead, more 
frequently, these groups tend to lobby through EU associations. Hamada’s (2007a) 
paper, however, shows that lobbying strategies might be determined by non-EU 
groups’ cultural background, as well as specific sectoral and corporate factors (e.g. 
firm size).  
Variations in empirical findings testify that a uniform theoretical framework should 
be applied across lobby groups coming from different countries in order to draw more 
plausible conclusions about their lobbying. This thesis aims to achieve this by 
examining interest groups with different foreign origins. Moreover, rather than 
exploring lobbying strategies, the main goal of the thesis is to explain lobbying 
success. Among the mentioned studies, only Eliassen and Peneva (2011) considered 
lobbying success, by asking the Norwegian groups to provide a self-assessment of 
their success in Brussels. These groups have seen “continuity in the representation” as 
the main condition to lobby successfully, surpassing other determinants of lobbying 
success, such as hiring lobbying experts, coordinating activities with other 
stakeholders, and lobbying resources, respectively (Eliassen and Peneva 2011, p. 23). 
These findings will be further discussed in the following section.  
Finally, Cowles (1996) and Coen (1999) examine the influence of US companies, 
most notably the American Chamber of Commerce EU (AmCham), on lobbying 
culture and decision-making process in Brussels. The authors agree that the US 
companies, individually as well as via the American Chamber of Commerce, have 
been among the most prominent lobbyists in Brussels since the establishment of the 
European Economic Community. Their early establishment has enabled the US firms 
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to create close and regular contacts with the Commission, thus becoming “a role 
model” for European interest groups’ activities in the EU capital (Coen, 1999, p. 35; 
Cowles, 1996, p. 352). AmCham’s recognition that “information is power” (Cowles 
1996, p. 348) has resulted in the creation of specialised committees, aimed at assisting 
the Commission (Coen 1999, p. 35). Even though the supremacy of AmCham was 
challenged during the 1990s (Coen 1999, p. 36), AmCham has remained one of the 
most influential actors in Brussels (Cowles 1996, p. 355).  
Thus, Cowles’ (1996) and Coen’s (1999) articles, together with Eliassen and 
Peneva’s (2011) report, represent the only studies offering empirical findings on 
factors behind the lobbying success of non-EU groups. A long-term presence in 
Brussels coupled with regular contacts with policy-makers are seen as the main 
determinants of lobbying success for both the US companies (Coen, 1999; Cowles, 
1996) and Norwegian interest groups (Eliassen and Peneva, 2011). In addition, early 
recognition of the “power of information” has made AmCham one of the most 
powerful lobbyist in Brussels (Cowles, 1996; Coen, 1999). These findings will be used 
for the development of the main argument in this thesis, which will be discussed in 
more detail below. For now, it is important to note that the experience of AmCham 
and the US companies might be unique, given that the American firms were among 
the pioneers when it comes to lobbying in Brussels. They were among the first interest 
groups to engage in lobbying at the EU level. What is more, the US companies have 
shaped the lobbying culture in Brussels (Coen, 1999, p. 27). Since other foreign groups 
do not necessarily share their experience of early positioning in the EU, it is important 
to analyse groups coming from several non-EU countries to establish whether the 
determinants of the US interest groups’ success travel across groups with different 
foreign origins.  
In sum, while foreign interest groups represent an important lobbying force in 
Brussels, only a few studies have examined their lobbying activities. By focusing 
mostly on the lobby groups of individual countries, the extant studies offer different 
findings with respect to strategies employed by foreign groups. One contribution of 
this thesis, therefore, will be to provide an analysis of interest groups coming from 
several foreign countries by applying a uniform methodology and theoretical 
framework across all groups. Secondly, the extant studies mostly explore lobbying 
strategies instead of lobbying success. The empirical findings on lobbying strategies 
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offered by the existing literature are beneficial for tracing the activities of the interest 
groups examined as a part of this research project. On the other hand, this thesis’ 
departs from these studies by exploring the interest groups’ success, rather than their 
lobbying strategies only.  
Finally, Cowles’ (1996) and Coen’s (1999) studies are the only studies exploring 
the determinants of non-EU groups’ lobbying success. Their findings indicate that 
provisions of expertise and a long-term presence in Brussels represent the most 
important factors behind AmCham lobbying success. The latter is also seen as the 
most important determinant of the lobbying success of Norwegian interest groups 
(Eliassen and Peneva, 2011, p. 23). The former is also recognised by Rasmussen and 
Alexandrova (2012) and Hamada (2007a). The subsequent sections discuss these 
points in more detail.  
 
1.5. Research question 
The research question addressed by the thesis is: whether, how, and why European 
Commission’s initial preferences - over policies under consideration and over 
involved non-EU interest groups - affect the groups’ prospects to lobby successfully? 
It is argued that the success of foreign interest groups depends on Commission’s initial 
positions on policies and involved lobbyists: how strong its initial views of an issue 
under consideration is, as well as whether it sees interest groups as “insiders” or 
“outsiders”.  
Lobbying assumes the interaction between policy-makers and interest groups in 
which both sides have their objectives to pursue. It is usually described as an exchange 
relationship between mutually dependent actors (Bouwen, 2002, p. 368; Klüver, 
2013b, p. 29). To understand interest groups’ lobbying success, therefore, it is 
important to consider both the demand and supply side of lobbying (Klüver, 2013b, p. 
25-40; Mahoney, 2004). The supply side, as defined by Mahoney (2004, p. 442), 
concerns motivation behind groups’ engagement in a policy debate. It is about the 
goals that lobby groups are trying to achieve. Correspondingly, the demand side of 
lobbying concerns the objectives that EU institutions try to achieve based on their 
institutional roles and policy preferences (Klüver, 2013b, p. 29). To perform their 
institutional roles, the EU institutions need different types of “goods”, such as 
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expertise and citizen support (the demand side) (Bouwen, 2002; Klüver, 2013b). 
However, groups do not have equal capacity to provide these goods (Bouwen, 2004, 
p. 341). Groups’ access to EU institutions, hence, depends on their ability to deliver 
goods needed by the policy-makers (the supply side).  
Thus, to understand foreign groups’ lobbying success it is necessary to explore the 
objectives of EU institutions and their requirements for certain “goods”, on the one 
hand, and the capacity of interest groups to meet the needs of EU institutions, on the 
other hand. As already explained, the motivation behind the growing engagement of 
foreign actors in the EU has been the impact of EU-made rules on their business, both 
inside the EU as well as abroad. What is less clear, however, is the demand side – how 
to explain EU policy-makers’ engagement with foreign groups? What objectives are 
EU institutions trying to pursue, and what kind of goods can foreign groups provide 
in this respect? 
As an intermediary between the EU institutions and citizens, interest groups are 
often perceived as actors whose main role is to facilitate citizen participation in the 
EU policy-making process (Eising and Lehringer, 2010, p. 190). Interest groups’ input 
in that respect is seen as one of the solutions to the problem of a “democratic deficit”23 
in the decision-making process (input legitimacy24) (European Commission, 2006a, p. 
2). On the other side, information provided by organised interests is valuable for the 
EU institutions because it allows for the better laws to be delivered (output legitimacy) 
(European Commission, 2006a, p. 2).   
Having a non-EU origin, foreign groups cannot offer goods aimed at increasing 
input legitimacy. Unlike their domestic (EU) counterparts, foreign interest groups do 
not hold EU citizenship. What they can provide, however, is expert knowledge aimed 
at increasing output legitimacy. Following the resource dependence and exchange 
theory (Bouwen, 2002, p. 382), the Commission should be the most likely venue for 
foreign interest groups to try to make an impact, due to their capacity to provide 
expertise (output legitimacy), and vice versa because of these groups’ lack of capacity 
                                                          
23 For more about the debate on democratic deficit see Follesdal and Hix (2006) and Moravcsik (2008).  
24 For more about input and output legitimacy see Scharpf (1997) and (2009). 
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to provide other “access goods” mostly needed by the European Parliament and the 
Council (input legitimacy).  
The thesis, therefore, explores the lobbying success of foreign companies and 
business associations during the policy formulation stage - the preparation of policy 
proposals by the European Commission. It assumes that foreign interest groups rely 
on the provision of expertise to shape Commissions’ proposals. This is especially since 
the present research project examines foreign business groups – large companies and 
business associations.  
However, while the provision of expertise to the Commission is a necessary 
condition to achieve influence on its policy-making, it is still a factor that cannot fully 
explain foreign groups’ lobbying success. Firstly, the Commission’s need for external 
expertise - provided by interest groups - varies among proposals (Broscheid and Coen, 
2007, p. 349; Klüver, 2013b, p. 58;). While some proposals concern minor changes to 
the existing legislation, other proposals design policies that cover a new issue area 
and/or a highly technical issue. Thus, the Commission’s requirement for external 
expertise depends on the nature of a specific issue (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, 
p. 451; Klüver, 2013a, p. 58;), which might define the value of information provided 
by lobbyists.  
Secondly, Commission’s preferences over certain policy measures vary from one 
policy proposal to another. In some cases, the Commission may favour specific policy 
objectives and, correspondingly, those policies that are seen necessary for the 
achievement of those objectives. In other cases, it may have preferences over policy 
outcomes, but not over what measures will lead to those desired outcomes (Klüver, 
2013a, p. 61-62). The information provided by interest groups, thus, might have 
different effects depending on whether they have been delivered to like-minded or 
opposing Commissioners.   
Finally, all interest groups taking part in lobbying during a legislative process 
provide the Commission with some sort of information: figures, statistics and/or 
arguments. Since groups often have competing interests, they might provide different 
figures and competing arguments. Besides, lobbyists often ‘babble’ – they provide 
information that is the least damaging to their interests (biased information) 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 350). Overwhelmed by a huge amount of information 
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provided by interest groups, how does the Commission decide whose information to 
follow through? Whose figures/arguments will make an impact? The insider/outsider 
distinction might be relevant in this regard (Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Grant, 2004).  
In sum, the Commission’s need for external expertise, as well as its preferences 
over policy measures, differ from one policy proposal to another. Its relationships with 
interest groups also vary. So does the value of information from one proposal to 
another, and from one interest group to another interest group. This casts doubt on the 
expectation that provided information per se will be sufficient for a full account of 
lobbying success.  
The thesis, therefore, proposes the theoretical framework aimed at explaining 
foreign groups’ lobbying success through the analysis of the dynamics between 
messengers (foreign interest groups), and the recipient (the Commission), rather than 
through analysis of the value of information (expertise/knowledge) per se. This by no 
means disputes the assumption that lobbyists utilise information when trying to make 
an impact. The thesis shares the view that useful information “buys” access to the EU 
institutions (as explained in the following sections). However, the thesis also 
recognises that the provision of information by lobbyists does not take place in a 
vacuum (Mahoney, 2004, p. 444). The Commission often has strong initial preferences 
over policies under discussion. Also, the Commission often has a history of 
relationship with involved groups. The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is to examine 
whether and how Commission’s initial views – both of the policies under 
consideration as well as of the involved non-EU interest groups - affect those groups’ 
prospects of lobbying successfully.  
In doing so, the thesis complements the literature on informational lobbying by 
arguing that, in some cases, decision-makers have strong initial preferences over both 
- the outcomes and means required to achieve them, thus making interests groups’ 
attempts to alter their positions less likely. Namely, the extant literature on lobbying 
in the EU recognises that the Commission has its own objectives to pursue (Klüver, 
2013a; Mahoney, 2004). However, these studies, based on the “informational 
asymmetry” in favour of interest groups (Chalmers, 2013, p. 39), often assume that 
the Commission has preferences over policy outcomes, but not on policy measures 
generating the desired outcomes (Klüver, 2013a, p. 61-62). Hence, interest groups are 
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supposed to be influencing a Commission proposal by providing expertise on the link 
between policy measures and the desired outcome (Klüver, 2013a, p. 62).  
The thesis, however, argues that this is not always the case. Sometimes, the 
Commission has strong early preferences over both the outcomes and means required 
to achieve them, regardless of the interest groups’ input. Those preferences are 
labelled ‘early’ or ‘initial’ in order to emphasise that these are the Commission’s 
original preferences, formed independently of the subsequent information provided by 
lobbyists. Commission’s early preferences may be based on its institutional expertise, 
its policy priorities - as defined at the beginning of a mandate, or on the experience, 
beliefs, and knowledge of individual Commissioners.  
Secondly, drawing on the research on insider/outsider status of lobbyists 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003; 2007; Coen, 2010; Grant, 2004), the thesis suggests that 
insiders might be more likely to lobby successfully than outsiders. It contributes to 
this strand of literature by introducing an additional criterion underpinning the 
insider/outsider distinction, which concerns specifically non-EU interest groups – the 
importance of their particular non-EU origin for the achievement of the Commission’s 
policy objectives. The thesis suggests that those non-EU interest groups whose 
countries of origin are strategically important for the achievement of the EU policy 
goals are more likely to be granted the status of insider and, consequently, to lobby 
successfully. 
As for the studies on non-EU interest groups, as mentioned earlier, they offer 
conflicting conclusions over the lobbying success of foreign interest groups. While 
one strand argues that a lack of national patronage within the EU may hamper a 
group’s success (for instance Eliassen and Peneva, 2011, p. 29), the other holds that 
non-EU companies can still be as successful as their EU counterparts (Korkea-Aho, 
2016). The thesis seeks to address this question by offering an explanation that the 
lack of EU membership by itself is not necessarily a lobbying weakness; instead, the 
success of foreign interest groups depends on the Commission’s positions on both – 





1.6. Determinants of EU interest groups’ lobbying success  
 
Before turning to the theoretical framework that is developed here to explain non-EU 
groups’ lobbying success, a brief overview of determinants of lobbying success 
featuring in the literature on interest groups in the EU is in order. This section’s 
objective is to review the theoretical expectations and empirical findings on lobbying 
success in general – regardless of an interest group’s nationality, and then to position 
the thesis’ theoretical expectations within this broader literature on lobbying in the 
EU.  
The common ground in the literature on interest groups is that lobbying in the EU 
is based on the provision of information (Bouwen, 2002; Broscheid and Coen, 2007; 
Chalmers, 2013). Unlike the “gangster style” of lobbying in the US (in Gardner, 1991, 
p. 63, as cited by Woll, 2012, p. 203) where lobbyists often defend their interests by 
pressuring decision-makers, interest groups in Brussels prefer a “soft-spoken” 
approach when dealing with policy-makers (Woll, 2012, p. 193). Hence, in the EU, 
unlike in the US, information constitutes the “currency of lobbying” (Chalmers, 2013, 
p. 39)25.  
However, although the saying “information is power” represents the shared wisdom 
among scholars and policy practitioners, discussions on what type of information, 
when and how converts to influence are still far from being settled (Chalmers, 2013, 
p. 40; Chalmers, 2011, p. 472). As a result, it is hard to conclude the debate on 
lobbying in Brussels merely by refereeing to the provision of information. Surely, 
interest groups feed policy-makers with information, but whether information will 
translate into an impact or not depends on many factors.  
Klüver, Braun, and Beyers (2015) have provided a comprehensive overview of 
numerous determinants that affect interest groups’ ability to influence EU legislation. 
These are divided into two groups: groups’ characteristics and contextual factors26. 
Thus, a group’s features – its type (e.g. citizen vs business group), resources, and the 
level of organisation (member states vs European level of organisation) – might affect 
                                                          
25 For more about informational vs pressure-based lobbying in the EU see Bouwen and Mccown (2007) 
and Gullberg (2013).  
26 For other comprehensive analyses of determinants of lobbying influence in the EU see Coen and 
Richardson (2009) and Mahoney (2007). 
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the group’s lobbying success (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 448). Besides 
groups’ features, contextual factors are also highlighted as important by studies on 
interest groups’ success in the EU. Klüver, Braun, and Beyers (2015, p. 450-455) 
differentiate between the two sorts of contextual factors: (a) policy-related factors such 
as – a policy type, the level of complexity of an issue under consideration, its salience, 
the level of conflict surrounding the considered issue, and the size of lobbying 
coalitions advocating in favour of or against a policy proposal; and (b) institutional 
factors – differences between and within the EU institutions, and institutional 
variations across different national systems. Lobbying is said to always takes place in 
“the complex interplay” between the two groups of determinants – groups’ 
characteristics and contextual factors (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 449). The 
extent of interest groups’ influence will further be determined by lobbying tactics and 
strategies (Chalmers, 2013; Dür and Mateo, 2016), and by the way in which a 
considered issue is framed and presented to policy-makers (De Bruycker, 2016; 
Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper, 2015). 
In sum, the scholarship on lobbying in the EU shows that interest groups try to 
make an impact by providing information in exchange for the access to the decision-
making process which affords an opportunity to shape EU laws. Groups’ provision of 
information and the related influence depends on the preferences and institutional 
demand of EU policy-makers (the demand side) and on the preferences and capacity 
of interest groups (a group’s type, resources, organisational level) to meet these 
demands (the supply side). But also, the exchange of information between lobbyists 
and policy-makers takes place in a specific context which is also a factor that affects 
groups’ prospect to lobby successfully. Thus, there is a range of factors that affects the 
level of interest groups’ engagement, access, and subsequent (lack of) influence, 
namely: groups’ characteristics, contextual factors (policy-related and institutional 
factors), lobbying tactics, strategies, and framing.   
The thesis does not dispute the above-mentioned theoretical expectations and 
empirical findings and it shares the view that lobbying in the EU concerns information 
exchange primarily. The thesis also agrees that lobbying takes place in a context of the 
interplay between various factors such as groups’ features, policy-related and 
institutional factors, as suggested by Klüver, Braun, and Beyers (2015).  
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The following sections provide more insights into the thesis’ contributions to 
particular aspects of the literature on lobbying. At this place it is important to stress 
the following – the purpose of the thesis is to investigate foreign business interest 
groups and their lobbying success in the EU. Hence, while acknowledging the 
significance of contextual factors, the thesis’ main objective is to shed some light on 
foreign groups as a distinct type of interest groups in comparison to EU (domestic) 
groups. It seeks to understand these groups’ position, status, and the prospect to shape 
EU policies from within Brussels. Thesis, therefore, takes into account the fact that 
context matters, but the attention is primarily focused on a particular type of interest 
groups, namely non-EU groups.   
The present study, furthermore, deals only with foreign business groups, meaning 
that foreign citizen groups (e.g. NGOs) are outside of its scope. The thesis’ starting 
premise is that business interest groups should not be seen as a “homogenous group” 
of lobbyists (Hamada, 2007b, p. 10). Namely, many studies have examined lobbying 
in the EU through the lens of business vs citizen groups’ ability to influence EU 
legislation (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007a; Dür and Mateo, 2012; Schneider and Baltz, 
2003). This has been justified by the argument that EU policies should not be biased 
in favour of resource-rich corporate interests and at the expanse of citizen groups. On 
the other hand, literature on winners and losers in business vs business groups 
competition is rare (for exceptions see Bouwen, 2004; Coen, 2009; 2010; Eising, 
2007a; Dür, Bernhagen, and Marshall, 2015), despite the fact that in addition to 
competing with citizen groups, business groups also compete with each other. In doing 
so, they differ with regards to their organisational structure (e.g. an individual firm vs 
an association of firms), resources (e.g. small vs large firms), and the organisational 
level (e.g. national vs EU level). Besides neglecting those major differences and the 
fact that business groups’ interests are frequently competing, extant studies on 
lobbying often overlook the difference between EU and non-EU business groups. The 
thesis aims to address this gap by examining whether the prospect of a business 
group’s lobbying success is affected by its foreign origin. Note that the thesis examines 
primarily resource-rich foreign business groups, that is large companies and business 
associations gathering such companies. This means that its findings could be 
generalised primarily to the resource-rich foreign groups, rather than those lacking 
sufficient financial resources.   
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The thesis’ main argument includes institutional factors, which, alongside policy-
related factors are subsumed under the group of contextual factors. Literature on 
interest groups in the EU agrees that lobbying and subsequent influence varies 
between and within EU institutions, namely the Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the Council (Bouwen, 2002; Coen and Richardson, 2009; Klüver, 
Braun, and Beyers, 2015). With regards to the Commission, which is the thesis’ main 
concern, interest groups’ lobbying success may be affected by which Directorate-
General (DG) is responsible for a policy proposal, as well as who is a Commissioner 
in charge of the proposal (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 453). Different 
Commissioners might have different backgrounds, experience, political views, and 
ties with their home countries which might affect groups’ influence. Similarly, due to 
different sectoral jurisdictions and culture, DGs might have different policy views and 
preferences (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 453). Lobbying is also affected by 
the Commission’s “hierarchical differentiation”, a factor denoting whether lobbying 
takes place at the level of Commissioners’ of the civil servants’ cabinets (Bouwen, 
2009, p. 25). The thesis takes this into account as a part of the analysis which concerns 
the demand side of lobbying – Commission’s preferences and institutional needs that 
could be potentially met by foreign interest groups.  
The thesis, however, does not incorporate policy-related factors into its main 
argument. Certainly, prior literature has demonstrated that policy type, issue salience, 
issue complexity, and the level of conflict surrounding a policy proposal under 
consideration, are relevant for interest groups’ strategic choices and resultant levels of 
influence. Nonetheless, the thesis’ main concern, as mentioned above, is to examine 
foreign groups’ lobbying success rather than other factors which affect groups’ 
lobbying success, regardless of the type of involved lobbyists (whether those are EU 
or non-EU groups). It analyses policy proposals featuring varying degrees of 
complexity, salience, and conflict and the only constant policy-related factor is policy 
type, given that solely the energy policy domain is examined. Based on Lowi’s (1964) 
typology differentiating between regulatory, distributive, and re-distributive policy 
domains, scholars have argued that different policy types affect interest groups’ 
mobilisation, their strategical choices, and the extent of their influence (Coen and 
Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1108; Dür and Mateo, 2013, p. 661; Klüver, Braun and Beyers, 
2015, p. 451; Rasmussen, 2012). According to Broscheid and Coen (2007, p. 362) 
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energy should be classified as a regulatory policy domain, meaning that the demand 
for technical expertise and input legitimacy is higher in comparison to the distributive 
policy domains. This point will be further discussed in section 1.7.3. For now, it is 
important to stress that since the thesis examines a single policy domain, its findings 
speak more to the analysis of regulatory rather than distributive and re-distributive 
policy areas.  
 
1.7. Explaining non-EU groups’ lobbying success  
The following section analyses the question of foreign groups’ access to the 
Commission. After that, the chapter presents a section setting up the theoretical 
framework for the explanation of the Commission’s positions on issues under 
consideration, and a subsequent explanation of the Commission’s positions on 
involved lobbyists. The chapter concludes by setting out the framework for the 
empirical analysis. 
 
1.7.1. Access to the EU institutions 
As mentioned earlier, the starting assumption in the literature on interest groups is that 
lobbying in the EU is based on the provision of information (Bouwen, 2002; Chalmers, 
2013; Woll, 2012; Broscheid and Coen, 2007). This position is also shared by the 
authors examining non-EU interest groups (Coen, 1999; Cowles, 1996). The thesis 
takes this as point of departure. Furthermore, the basic aim of the present research 
project is to examine foreign business groups. Since the resource dependence and 
exchange theory developed by Bouwen (2002) dominates the literature on business 
interest groups (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014, p. 1421), it will be used as the starting 
point in this research project, as well.  
Bouwen (2002, p. 368) argues that the relationship between public actors and 
business groups should be seen as an exchange relationship based on mutual 
dependence. Interest groups need access to policy-makers. In exchange for access to 
the EU institutions, they provide policy-makers with three sorts of information, the so-
called “access goods”: (1) expertise and technical knowledge; (2) information vital for 
comprehending the EU’s broader interests – what would be most gainful for a 
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particular sector at the EU level; and (3) information about domestic interests - that is, 
the needs of a particular sector at a member state level (Bouwen, 2002, p. 369). EU 
institutions need three sorts of information to increase input and output legitimacy (see 
Scharpf, 1997). Input legitimacy, which concerns the participation of citizens in the 
EU decision-making process and the consequent democratisation of this process 
(Scharpf, 1997, p. 19), is advanced through information about the EU and domestic 
encompassing interests (Bouwen, 2002, p. 371). Output legitimacy, referring to the 
effectiveness of EU acquis in dealing with pressing issues (Scharpf, 1997, p. 19), is 
provided through the provision of expertise and technical knowledge (Bouwen, 2002, 
p. 371).  
Different institutions mostly demand different types of access goods based on their 
role in the decision-making process (Bouwen, 2002, p. 378). The Commission mostly 
needs expertise and technical knowledge, the European Parliament information about 
European interests, while the Council primarily needs information on domestic 
interests (Bouwen, 2002, p. 378-382). However, interest groups do not have equal 
capacity to provide information needed by EU institutions (Bouwen, 2002, p. 375). It 
is large companies that can provide the looked-for expertise (Bouwen, 2002, p. 376). 
Information about EU interests is usually provided by European associations (for 
example, the European Banking Federation), while national associations provide 
information about the needs of an individual sector at a member state level (for 
instance, the Belgian Bankers’ Association) (Bouwen, 2002, p. 377). The author 
concludes that those business groups “who can provide the highest quantity and 
quality of the critical access goods” will enjoy “the highest degree of access to the EU 
institution” (2002, p. 382).   
This thesis starts from Bouwen’s resource dependence and exchange theory (2002), 
as the most prominent framework so far for explaining the access of business interest 
groups to policy-makers. However, the theory has been criticised on multiple grounds. 
First, in his study aiming to empirically test the previously outlined theoretical 
expectations, Bouwen himself disconfirmed the assumption that large firms have 
privileged access to the Commission, by showing that the European associations had 
slightly better access to the Commission than the large companies (Bouwen, 2004, p. 
355). Bouwen concluded that the Commission’s need for information about the EU’s 
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broader sectoral interests had been underestimated in relation to technical expertise 
(2004, p. 358).  
Secondly, scholars have shown that the list of types of information that interest 
groups can provide to policy-makers is broader and more complex than Bouwen’s 
study (2002) suggested. While some scholars followed Bouwen’s distinction between 
technical expertise and information about stakeholders’ and constituents’ preferences 
(Klüver, 2013b, p. 43), others have come up with more sophisticated typologies. 
Chalmers (2013, p. 46) thus differentiated between information about the feasibility 
of a policy measure, information about a proposal’s economic and social effects, 
information aimed at clarifying or highlighting the technical and scientific details, 
information on public opinion, and legal information. Similarly, Mahoney (2008, p. 
83-84) distinguished between information (“arguments”) about widely shared goals, 
highly technical information, information about a proposal’s costs, information about 
feasibility of the proposal’s implementation, its potential discriminatory nature, and 
information about public opinion.   
Thirdly, while Bouwen’s study stresses the significance of information as the key 
access good (2002, p. 369), other scholars were of the view that besides information, 
interest groups can provide a range of other goods that policy-makers need. Klüver 
(2013b, p. 19) thus defines access goods as information, “citizen support”, and 
“economic power”. She went on to argue that an interest group can gain a seat at the 
table not only when it possesses valuable information, but also when it has a “broad 
membership base” (2013b, p. 46). It is thus suggested that policy-makers will be eager 
to listen to a group that enjoys public support in order to advance the legitimacy of 
policy proposals and to increase constituencies’ support. Public officials also need 
economically powerful stakeholders on their side because the latter’s impact on 
investments, employment, and economic growth is significant (Klüver, 2013b, p. 50). 
Fourthly, Chalmers (2013, p. 40) criticised Bouwen’s and related studies for 
presenting the exchange relationship between interest groups and policy-makers as a 
“mechanical process” in which certain types of groups are allegedly predisposed to be 
in possession of specific information that particular EU institutions need. His analysis 
shows that there is no strong link between a group’s type and a type of information 
(Chalmers, 2013, p. 51). Instead, “cause-effect’ logic” stressing potential 
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consequences of a policy initiative makes the most frequently used type of information 
by all interest groups (companies, professional associations, NGOs etc.) (Chalmers, 
2013, p. 51). 
Fifthly, Bouwen’s study has been challenged on the basis that it considers primarily 
the demand side factors (Chalmers, 2013, p. 42; Eising, 2007a, p. 385). Supply side 
factors have been neglected even though they also affect interest groups’ access to the 
policy-making process. Thus, it has been argued, interest groups can deploy certain 
tactics to increase the value of provided information (Chalmers, 2013, p. 42-43). 
Information processing – how groups collect and analyse needed information, how 
they monitor law-making, anticipate the informational needs of policy-makers, and 
prioritise among different information -  may also explain variations in groups’ access 
and their consequent influence (Chalmers, 2011, p. 472). Access to the policy-making 
process also depends on whether a group already has established contacts with the 
policy-makers (Chalmers, 2014, p. 981).  
Sixty, Bouwen’s exchange theory could be challenged for overlooking differences 
within EU institutions. Coen’s and Katsaitis’s (2013, p. 1113) study shows that the 
diversity of groups engaged in lobbying during the policy formulation phase varies 
across policy domains. The explanation put forward is that DGs have different 
informational demands – those dealing with regulatory issues largely demand 
technical information aimed at increasing the output legitimacy, whereas the DGs 
handling distributive policy areas need political information to increase the input 
legitimacy (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1108). In their study of groups participation 
in European Parliament’s hearings, Coen and Katsaitis (2019, p. 762) have reached 
the same conclusion. A study by Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2011, p. 50), which analyses 
groups’ participation in Commission’s advisory groups, also found that the actors’ 
access varied greatly across different policy domains. DGs featuring a larger staff 
(surprisingly) and a bigger density of interest groups (unsurprisingly) tended to engage 
more with interest groups than those with smaller staff and smaller number of interest 
groups respectively (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011, p. 62). Eising (2007a, p. 388-389) 
also suggested that Bouwen’s theoretical framework fails to account for the 
differences in groups’ access at different hierarchical levels, such as the political 
leadership level and the working level, within institutions. 
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In sum, Bouwen’s exchange theory has been criticised for overlooking the 
complexity and broadens of different types of information provided by interest groups. 
Also it does not take into account other access goods (citizen support and economic 
power) which, in addition to information, lobbyists can provide in exchange for access. 
Bouwen’s exchange theory was further contested for assuming that certain types of 
information can be provided only by specific, ‘predestined’ interest groups. Finally, it 
has been suggested that the theory needs to take into account the sectoral and 
hierarchical differences within EU institutions.  
Yet, subsequent studies produced empirical support for some of the assumptions of 
the exchange theory. First, it has been shown that the ability to deliver information can 
indeed gain a business group improved access to EU policy-makers (Eising, 2007b, p. 
352). Second, the provision of “technical information” can improve interest groups’ 
access to the Commission (Chalmers, 2013, p. 49). Third, business groups use 
technical information and information about the economic costs of a proposal more 
often than other types of information (Chalmers, 2013, p. 51; Mahoney, 2008, p. 107). 
Forth, EU institutions, especially the Commission, prefer to engage with lobbyists 
representing wider European interests, rather than those representing national interests 
(Chalmers, 2014, p. 988; Eising, 2007a, p. 399). 
What can we learn from the above literature about foreign groups’ access to EU 
policy-makers? 
To remind, the thesis explores foreign interest groups as a distinct type of interest 
groups in comparison to domestic (EU) groups. The later include both, interest groups 
that are organised at the level of an EU member state (e.g. the French Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association and the German BMW) and groups whose members are 
active in more than one EU state (e.g. the European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association). Further, the thesis examines foreign business groups as a distinct type 
of interest groups in comparison to the foreign citizen groups. It, therefore, implicitly 
assigns certain background features to this type of interest groups – namely, foreign 
business groups. This is established practice in the lobbying literature, where scholars 
have used to explore lobbying access, strategies, and influence by comparing different 
types of interest groups, for instance business vs citizen groups (Dür and De Bièvre, 
2007a; Dür and Mateo, 2012). Still, it is noteworthy that background features of 
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groups belonging to the same type might vary substantially, as shown in Baroni et al.’s 
study (2014, p. 156). The study warns against some long-standing assumptions such 
as the supposed advantage of business groups (in comparison to citizen groups) in 
terms of resources, given the variations in resources and other features across business 
actors (Baroni et al., 2014, p. 156). 
The thesis takes this warning seriously. It recognises that within the so-called type 
of business interest groups there could be major variations. Indeed, one of the thesis’ 
implicit assumptions is that business groups do not represent a homogenous cluster of 
actors. Instead, they differ with regards to their organisational structure (e.g. an 
individual firm vs an association of firms), resources (e.g. small vs large firms), and 
the organisational level (e.g. national vs EU level). Also, the thesis does not assume 
business groups’ superiority in terms of resources, as suggested by Baroni et al. 
(2014). 
While recognising the existence of major differences across business groups in 
terms of resources and organisational structures, the thesis, nevertheless, assigns two 
constant features to foreign business groups. The first feature is the lack of EU 
nationality. The second feature relates to the nature of advocated interests – namely, 
these groups try to defend their particular businesses, rather than interests of some 
broader parts of society which are often advocated by citizen or “diffuse” interest 
groups (see Beyers, 2004, p. 216; Pollack, 1997, p. 573). These two characteristics - 
non-EU nationality and representation of business rather than broader societal interests 
– will be considered to have implications for the foreign business groups’ access the 
EU policy-making process.  
In general, access to policy-makers in the EU could be made at both levels - the 
national (member states) and the EU level - thanks to the multi-level structure of the 
EU decision-making process. Concerning the former, foreign groups could be 
deprived of access to the decision-making process at the member states level since EU 
states’ policy-makers prioritise groups representing their constituency. For example, 
Cowles (1996, p. 346) demonstrates that the limited access of US companies to 
decision-makers in member states has served as the motivation behind a shift of their 
lobbying activates towards the Commission. On the other hand, foreign companies 
might be well-integrated into a member state’s market, providing investments and jobs 
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for its citizens, which is why the state’s policy-makers might be interested in hearing 
what these companies have to say, as suggested by Rasmussen and Alexandrova 
(2012, p. 617). In this case, access would be granted to them based on their “economic 
power” (Klüver, 2013b, p. 50). 
Following the logic of access - the more “access goods” interest groups possess, 
the more access to policy-makers they will gain – set by Bouwen (2002), foreign 
groups would be in an underprivileged position in comparison to domestic groups 
when the access to EU institutions is concerned. Having a non-EU origin, these groups 
cannot offer two out of three types of information which, according to Bouwen, aim 
at increasing input legitimacy - information about domestic interests and information 
about European interests - since they represent neither national nor EU interests. For 
the same reason, foreign groups cannot offer what Klüver (2013b, p. 45) calls “citizen 
support” either. Citizen support, as an access good, arises from a group’s “broad 
membership base” and from the fact that it represents a significant share of EU citizens 
(Klüver, 2013b, p. 46). As such, this access good cannot be offered by foreign 
stakeholders, given that they do not represent EU citizens.  What foreign groups can 
offer, nonetheless, is expertise and technical knowledge (output legitimacy). But what 
is meant by expertise in this specific case?  
As previously discussed in this section, Bouwen (2002, p. 369) defines expertise as 
business groups’ knowledge of how the market functions. Other authors have 
developed more sophisticated typologies of information types used by interest groups 
to gain access. Chalmers (2013) and Mahoney (2008) differentiate between 
information about the feasibility of a policy measure, information about its economic 
and social consequences, technical or scientific information, etc. The thesis supports 
Mahoney’s point that it is particularly hard to list all types of information provided by 
lobbyists due to their richness and broadness (Mahoney, 2008, p. 82). And even when 
scholars make such an effort, typologies take different forms thus making a 
comparison between studies extremely hard. Still, the literature has provided the two 
empirical findings that will be useful for the purposes of this research. The first is that 
the most widely used type of information by all sorts of interest groups are ones on the 
“cause–effect-logic” which indicates the potential consequences of a policy initiative 
(Chalmers, 2013, p. 51). The second is that business groups use technical information 
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as well as information about the economic costs of a proposal more often than the 
other types of information (Mahoney, 2008, p. 107).  
The thesis, therefore, assumes that similarly to domestic (EU) business groups, 
foreign business groups will also try to secure access to the policy-making process by 
providing primarily technical information and information about the economic 
consequences of a policy proposal. They will use their knowledge and expertise about 
the European market to advance their interests vis-à-vis policy-makers. Having this 
type of information is not the exclusive privilege of business groups only, as shown 
by Chalmers (2013), but it does represent the type of information that business groups 
use more often than other types of information. Further, foreign groups can provide 
expert knowledge about foreign markets and this might be valuable for EU officials 
given the global impact of EU laws as well as the reverse influence of foreign markets 
on the EU single market (Rasmussen and Alexandrova, 2012, p. 616).  
Following Bouwen’s (2002) framework and foreign business groups’ ability to 
provide expertise, these groups should have better access to the Commission than to 
the European Parliament and the Council. Commission which initiates and prepares 
EU laws, needs technical expertise more than the other two institutions. The 
assumption is in line with Miard’s study (2014) showing that Norwegian groups have 
limited access to the European Parliament and the Council. Similarly, Eliassen and 
Peneva (2011) have shown that Norwegian interest groups prefer communication with 
the Commission, over the other two institutions. The Commission thus represents the 
most likely venue for foreign groups to make an impact.   
Still, as shown by Coen and Katsaitis (2013), the Commission’s need for expertise 
varies among policy domain. In regulatory policy domain, the Commission mostly 
needs technical expertise aimed at advancing output legitimacy (Coen and Katsaitis, 
2013, p. 1117). On the other hand, in distributive policy domains the need for technical 
information is lower and for input legitimacy higher (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 
1117). Hence, it should be expected for foreign business groups to have better access 
to those Directorates-General (DGs) whose portfolios cover regulatory policies.    
Is it possible for foreign business groups to provide other access goods besides their 
expertise about EU and foreign markets, and economic power? As explained earlier, 
these groups cannot trade citizen support and information about EU citizens’ 
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preferences (input legitimacy) for access. Still, EU laws affect not only EU citizens 
but also foreign actors inside and outside the EU. Korkea-Aho categorises worldwide 
influence of EU legislation into three groups: (a) “extraterritoriality” – when EU-made 
rules apply to conducts that take place outside the EU; (b) “territorial extension” - 
when EU laws affect conduct and laws abroad; and (c) “border crossing 
transnationalisation” – when EU laws are intended to regulate the EU market, but in 
practice they also affect foreign actors aspiring to enter the EU (2016, p. 53-55). If the 
basic idea of the input legitimacy is to enable those who are affected by EU laws to 
express their voice when laws are made (European Commission, 2002a, p. 19), then it 
would be reasonable to assume that input can also be made by those foreign actors 
affected by EU legislation.  
The thesis has no intention to engage with normative debates regarding the degree 
to which the EU should or should not be open to hearing what foreign actors have to 
say about EU laws (more details about this and similar normative questions could be 
found in Korkea-Aho, 2016). Instead, the thesis discusses input legitimacy merely as 
an access good. In doing so it makes an argument that the Commission might be 
interested in preferences of those foreign business groups whose businesses are 
affected by EU acquis. This, in turn, should be these groups’ ticket for access to the 
EU decision-making process. 
On the other hand, the Commission might prioritise gathering information about 
the needs of actors representing member states’ and EU-wider interests over those 
speaking on behalf of foreign actors. Previous research has shown that EU institutions, 
especially the Commission, prefer to engage with lobbyists representing wider 
European interests, rather than those representing an individual member state’s 
position (Chalmers, 2014, p. 988; Eising, 2007a, p. 399). Hence, it could be 
hypothesised that interest groups representing foreign interests would take the third 
position after those representing EU-wide interests and national interests, respectively. 
This does not imply that the Commission is closed for foreign actors’ preferences. It 
just means that if there is a large number of interest groups seeking access (“access 
overload” (Coen, 1997, p. 96)), the Commission might be more interested in hearing 
domestic (EU) interests’ representatives than those coming from foreign countries.  
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In addition, foreign groups may open up additional channels to policy-makers via 
membership of national and European associations. Still, the question of foreign 
groups’ membership in these associations might also be questioned due to the lack of 
EU citizenship. For example, Cowles (1996, p. 346) shows that US companies were 
treated as a persona non grata in many national business associations during the 
1980s, and when this was not the case, their influence in these associations was 
limited. However, as demonstrated by Coen (1999, p. 37), during the 1990s, American 
firms managed to integrate into EU-wide business associations, and even to take 
leading positions in some of them. The experiences of Japanese companies were, 
nevertheless, different: Hamada (2007a, p. 410) refers to Toyota’s unsuccessful 
application for membership of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association 
(ACEA).  
Overall, the Commission should be the most accessible institution for foreign 
interest groups since the good they can provide - expert knowledge – is needed mostly 
by the Commission. In addition, groups can also rely on lobbying via member states 
if they provide investments and jobs in the concerned state. Finally, they can lobby 
through national and European associations, but only if they are granted membership 
in these associations (table 2).  
 
Table 2. Foreign interest groups’ prospect of access to policy-makers in the EU. 
EU institutions and actors Access by foreign groups 
European Commission The most accessible institution 
European Parliament Limited access 
Council of Ministers Limited access 
Member states Limited access 
Exception: Companies which provide investments and jobs. 
National associations Limited access 
EU-wide associations More accessible than national associations. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of this thesis is to shed some light on the 
determinants affecting the success of foreign groups’ lobbying rather than their access 
to decision-makers only. Similarly, the research project aims to explain non-EU 
interest groups’ activities at the EU level, instead of focusing on lobbying at the level 
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of member states. However, an analysis of the access of foreign groups to policy-
makers is important for the following reasons. Firstly, it justifies the examination of 
non-EU interest groups’ engagement during the preparation of legislation by the 
Commission, given that following the resource dependence theory, the Commission 
should be the most accessible institution for foreign interest groups. The extant studies 
on non-EU lobby organisations also share the assumption that foreign groups prefer 
communication with the Commission over the other EU institutions.  
Secondly, an analysis of potential access points that could be used by foreign 
companies and associations is necessary for tracing foreign actors’ lobbying activities. 
Scholars employing process-tracing usually examine the “groups’ preferences, their 
access to decision-makers, decision-makers’ responses to the influence attempts, and 
the degree to which groups’ preferences are reflected in outcomes” (Dür, 2008b, p. 
562). Thus, in order to explore lobbying success, it is necessary to identify potential 
access points that groups may use when trying to make an impact.  
Thirdly, the thesis aims to explain non-EU interest groups’ activities at the EU 
level, rather than within member states. More specifically, it explores lobbying success 
during the policy formulation phase, led by the Commission. As the exclusive initiator 
of EU legislation, the Commission is not formally obliged to follow member states’ 
preferences while preparing legislative proposals. Nevertheless, it usually is aware of 
member states’ preferences, even before tabling a proposal. As a policy entrepreneur 
(Kingdon, 1984, 179), it strives for the proposal to eventually gain the approval of the 
European Parliament and the Council. Consequently, the Commission seeks the 
support of interest groups “with a high degree of economic power” in member states 
to please these countries and get the needed approval of the Council (Klüver, 2013b, 
p. 52). For the same reason, economically powerful interest groups might use national 
channels when trying to shape the Commission’s proposals. This is why it is necessary 
to understand the likelihood of non-EU companies gaining access to policy-makers at 
the national level. If they make huge investments or provide jobs in an EU state, 
foreign companies might use the state as channels through which they may influence 




1.7.2. Commission’s early position on issues under consideration 
European Commission’s main interest has been to maintain its competences (Klüver, 
2013b, p. 32). In order to do so, the Commission needs to draft policy proposals that 
will gain the approval of the European Parliament and the Council. Still, the 
Commission also acts as a “competence‐maximiser” who seeks both more competence 
and “more Europe” (Pollack, 2003, p. 36, 39). In addition to these “basic” and “role-
specific” interests (Klüver, 2013b, p. 32), the Commission also consistently pursues 
certain policy objectives – such as the internal market liberalisation – vis‐à‐vis other 
actors (Pollack, 2003, p. 40). Lastly, the Commission has specific preferences that 
concern each individual policy proposal (Klüver, 2013b, p. 32). Thus, whereas 
survival has been its main interest, the Commission also has other long-standing 
preferences, such as expansion of its competences (role-specific preferences) or 
internal market liberalisation (policy objectives). Finally, the Commission has some 
less general preferences, which relate to individual policy initiatives. It is this latter 
category of Commission’s preferences that the thesis focuses on.  
The underlying assumption of the scholarship on informational lobbying, including 
the resource and dependence theory, is information asymmetry in favour of interest 
groups (Chalmers, 2013, p. 39). It has been argued that the Commission is understaffed 
and overwhelmed by the many issues on its agenda (Chalmers, 2011, p. 472; Bouwen, 
2009, p. 20). Whereas areas covered by the Commission’s competencies have been 
growing, the size of its staff has remained small, similar to the size of a mid-
sized city’s administration (Bouwen, 2009, p. 20). The Commission, thus, often faces 
difficulties when dealing with complex problems. As a result, the Commission may 
have strong preferences over outcomes, but not on policies generating the desired 
outcomes (Klüver, 2013a, p. 61-62).  
On the other hand, as experts on particular issues, interest groups possess sought-
after technical knowledge (Bouwen, 2002; Chalmers, 2011; Klüver, 2013a). Operating 
in the EU market on a daily basis, companies and business associations have been 
accumulating “know-how”, thus gaining advantages over European bureaucrats with 
regard to the needed expertise. Hence, they can shape the Commission’s proposals by 
providing technical knowledge on what policies will lead towards the desired 
outcomes (Klüver, 2013a, p. 62). Put simply, policy-makers know what they want to 
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achieve, but they do not have extensive expertise on how to achieve it. This supposed 
lack of expertise provides a window of opportunity for groups to influence decision-
makers’ preferences by providing knowledge about the link between policies and their 
consequences. 
The thesis, however, makes the argument that the Commission sometimes has 
strong early preferences, not only over outcomes but also over policy measures 
necessary to achieve them regardless of input from interest groups. These preferences 
may be based on institutional expertise, predefined policy priorities, as well as 
previous experience, beliefs, and the knowledge of individual Commissioners.  
The assumption that the Commission is “too distant from the market” (Bouwen, 
2002, p. 369), should not be overstated. Indeed, the Commission sometimes drafts 
proposals that concern completely new issue areas which, previously, have not been 
regulated at the EU level. In these cases, interest groups can have more expertise than 
the Commission. Still, frequently, the Commission actually evaluates and proposes 
improvements of the existing laws, meaning that it does not deal with an issue without 
any previous knowledge on the subject.  
This is especially since, in addition to its role as the legislative initiator, the 
Commission monitors and evaluates the implementation of EU acquis in each member 
state27. It makes annual reports assessing whether EU legislation delivers the looked-
for changes across the Union. In doing so, the Commission is also empowered with 
the right to gather information about market participants, including the possibility of 
conducting investigations in the case of a suspected breach of EU law. Additionally, 
the Commission has its own in-house experts. In this way, the Commission has been 
accumulating “technical and institutional expertise” about the European internal 
market (Majone, 1996, p. 72). Finally, as shown by Kassim et al. (2013, p. 43), it 
would be wrong to assume that the Commission is staffed by bureaucrats mostly 
detached from the real world, since at least one third of the Commission staff (based 
on a sample of 1,900 employees) had worked in the business sector before joining the 
Commission. 
                                                          
27 See the European Commission’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-




Still, this does not refute the widely accepted assumption in the literature on 
lobbying that the Commission needs information from interest groups due to the 
insufficient number of staff which has to deal with the growing number of issues 
covered by the Commission’s competencies. Nonetheless, the most recent data shows 
that the number of proposals made by the Commission for adoption under the ordinary 
legislative procedure has been declining, instead of growing: from 159 in 2011 to 48 
in 2015 (European Commission, 2016a, p. 3). Besides, as shown by Gornitzka’s and 
Sverdrup’s study (2011, p. 63), DGs with larger number of stuff tend to engage more 
with interest groups than those with smaller staff. These findings challenge the long-
standing assumption that the Commission depends on external expertise provided by 
interest groups because it lacks sufficient number of staff.  
This certainly does not mean that interest groups’ expertise and even information 
asymmetry in their favour do not deserve to be noted. The point made here is that the 
Commission has developed its own expertise on the European single market, which 
might govern its preferences regardless of input from interest groups.  
Furthermore, at the beginning of each mandate, a College of Commissioners 
collectively, as well as each Commissioner individually, set up policy priorities and 
roadmaps aimed at analysing pressing problems in the EU, policy options that could 
improve the status quo, and preferred outcomes.28 Led by this list of predefined policy 
priorities, the Commission might have strong preferences over certain policy measures 
seen as necessary for the achievement of its policy priorities.  
Additionally, Commissioners in charge of a proposal might also have initial 
preferences based on their previous knowledge, beliefs or experience. Kassim et al.’s 
study (2013, p. 109-112) found that the views, preferences, and ideologies of 
Commission officials derive from their nationalities, “functional loyalties”, previous 
working experience, and gender. Further, Commissioners’ links with their home 
countries may also shape their preferences (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 453; 
Thomson, 2008, p. 169; Wonka, 2007). Even more, as Wonka (2007, p. 175) shows, 
governments tend to appoint those Commissioners whose preferences are close to their 
own – those who share the government’s policy views and party affiliation. All this 
                                                          
28 For more, see the European Commission’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/planning-and-proposing-law_en. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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means that those in charge of a policy proposal have certain policy views formed 
before coming into office and those are independent from interest groups’ input. 
Finally, a portfolio covered by a Commissioner could affect her or his preferences. 
Policy domains that fall under Commissioners’ jurisdiction have varying degree of 
specificity (Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh, 2013, p. 426). For instance, DG Environment 
has more narrowly defended jurisdictions and related tasks and priorities than DG 
Internal Market. This might affect interest groups’ mobilisation and their prospects of 
influencing policy initiatives. As an illustration, fossil fuels producers lobbying 
against a proposal on CO2 emissions might find it easier to influence the DG Energy 
than the DG Environment. This is because DG Environment takes into account only 
the environmental aspects of a proposal, whereas DG Energy has to find a good 
balance between environmental and other energy-related concerns (e.g. security and 
competitiveness), which might leave more room for making a compromise with fossil 
fuels producers. Furthermore, Kassim et al.’s research (2013, p. 116) found ideological 
variations across DGs based on sectoral differences. For example, officials in DG 
Social Policy and Environment are less “pro-market” oriented than those in DG 
Competition (Kassim et al., 2013, p. 116). 
In sum, the Commission sometimes has strong early preferences not only over 
outcomes (consequences) but also over policies (measures) aimed at achieving desired 
outcomes. These initial preferences could be based on institutional expertise, 
predefined policy priorities, and previous experience, beliefs, and knowledge of 
individual Commissioners and other officials in charge of a policy proposal. 
Commission’s early preferences might affect the prospect of interest groups lobbying 
successfully. When the Commission has strong initial views on policies under 
consideration, attempts by opposing interest groups to alter its positions would be less 
likely. Conversely, supportive interest groups - those whose preferences align with 
Commission’s early preferences - will find themselves in a better position to secure 
their interests. Commission’s strong initial preferences, therefore, are likely to have 
an indirect impact on the lobbying success of a supportive camp; convergence in 
positions between the Commission and the supportive camp will play stronger role 
when the Commission has strong initial views on policy initiatives. 
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How does the Commission’s early position affect the likelihood of foreign groups’ 
lobbying success?  
In order to pursue its objectives, the Commission may organise networks of like-
minded stakeholders, to support its positions and to counter the opposing bloc. As 
noted by many authors, the Commission has been shaping representation of interest 
groups in Brussels by organising more or less formal consultative committees, 
advisory and expert groups (Bouwen, 2009; Broscheid and Coen, 2003; 2007; 
Mahoney, 2004). By selecting policy areas where advisory groups will be established 
and by choosing interest groups which will participate in these groups, the 
Commission has been extending “the influence of the groups most in line with its 
agenda” (Mahoney, 2004, p. 462). Therefore, if the Commission has strong early 
preferences over a policy measure, it can increase the influence of like-minded 
stakeholders. The Commission also may drag into a debate those interest groups who 
otherwise would not engage in debate.  
On the other side, however, the Commission may strategically engage in dialogue 
with an opposing camp, in order to weaken their opposition, and via them – the 
opposition of member states. As mentioned earlier, the Commission’s main interest is 
to present policy proposals that will gain the approval of the European Parliament and 
the Council (Klüver, 2013b, p. 32). When pursing its objectives, the Commission 
cannot afford for any stakeholder to be too hostile (Interview 3). Therefore, if the 
Commission has strong early preferences over a policy measure, it can engage in a 
dialogue not only with like-mined groups, but also with strong opponents in order to 
try to find a compromise with them and via them to weaken member states’ opposition. 
Finally, the Commission may use its competences to put pressure on interest groups 
opposing its preferred policy. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the 
Commission’s long-standing preferences has been a liberalisation of the internal 
market (Pollack, 2003, p. 39, 322). To enforce the rules governing the internal market 
competition, the Commission has been empowered with the right to conduct 
inspections, antitrust investigations, sectoral screenings and so on29. The Commission 
                                                          
29 See the European Commission’s website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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may use these investigative powers and the information collected to “build its case” 
against a bloc opposing its preferred policy measures. 
 
1.7.3. Commission’s early position on interest groups: insiders vs outsiders 
The previous section has put forward the argument that the Commission sometimes 
may have initial preferences over issues under consideration. The absence of the 
Commission’ strong views on policies, however, does not guarantee that an interest 
group will be successful. Instead, a group’s success is also affected by its 
insider/outsider status. The present section elaborates on this issue in more detail.  
As mentioned earlier, interest groups rely on the provision of information when 
trying to shape EU laws. In doing so, they provide different sorts of information to 
policy-makers. Yet, regardless of the type of information, interest groups have to rely 
on the provision of information if they aspire to make an impact. As pointed out by an 
interest group’s representative: 
“Serious lobbying has to be based on facts and figures. Just to say, ‘we want this’ 
and ‘we don’t want that’ amounts to nothing. The basis always has to be science” 
(in Chalmers, 2013, p. 51). 
However, all interest groups taking part in lobbying during a legislative process 
provide the Commission with some sort of information: figures, statistics or 
arguments. As corroborated by Chalmers’ study, the most frequent type of information 
that has been used by all types of interest groups is the “cause–effect” information 
which outlines the consequences of a policy initiative (2013, p. 51). Since groups often 
have competing interests, they might provide different numbers and competing 
arguments. For instance, during the negotiations on the Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED), some lobbyists provided figures showing that biofuels produced from 
vegetable oils produce three times more greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than 
biofuels produced from sugarcane. Producers of vegetable oils, on the other hand, 
provided figures to show that the production of oil-based biofuels generates much 
lower levels of GHG emissions. The question is: whose figures/arguments will make 
an impact?  
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The insider/outsider distinction might be relevant in this regard. Drawing on the 
research on insider/outsider status of lobbyists (Broscheid and Coen, 2003, 2007; 
Coen, 2010; Grant, 1978; 1995; 2004), the thesis suggests that insiders might be more 
likely to lobby successfully than outsiders. It contributes to this strand of literature by 
introducing an additional criterion underpinning the insider/outsider distinction, which 
concerns specifically non-EU interest groups.  
Let start with the extant literature on the distinction between lobbying insiders and 
outsiders. The insider/outsider distinction was made by Grant in 1978 (Grant, 2004, p. 
408), although similar typologies could be found in earlier studies on interest groups 
such as that of Schattschneider from 1935 (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 713; Maloney, 
Jordan, and McLaughlin, 1994, p. 18). According to Grant’s typology, an insider has 
following characteristics: (a) an insider is recognised as a “legitimate spokesperson” 
for actors sharing common interests; (b) an insider follows the rule to always present 
“an accurate well-researched case, neither exaggerated nor untruthful”; and (c) an 
insider is willing to accept a policy outcome, even when the outcome is not entirely in 
line with her interests (Grant, 2004, p. 408-409). Grant (2004, p. 409) makes a further 
distinction between “core” insiders (who engage in debates on various topics), 
“specialist” insiders (who engage with specific topics only), and “peripheral” insiders 
(who are able to achieve only a small impact). Outsiders, on the other hand, are either 
“outsiders by necessity” – meaning that they aspire to become insiders but lack the 
needed skills and/or resources, or are “outsiders by choice”, meaning that they do not 
want to cooperate with governments’ officials on grounds of ideological divergence 
(Grant, 2004, p. 409). Insiders were said to be more successful because they have 
better access to the policy-making process, as a result of their use of insider strategies 
(direct contacts with policy-makers) in contrast to the outsider strategies (e.g. 
demonstrations or media campaigns) (Grant, 2004, p. 409-410; Grant, 2001).   
Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin (1994, p. 28) suggested that Grant’s typology 
does not distinguish groups’ strategies from groups’ status. While status is a matter of 
policy-makers’ choice, strategy refers primarily to a group’s choice of actions 
(Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin, 1994, p.28). According to Grant (1995, p. 18), 
the insider/outsider distinction implies both groups’ status, assigned by decision-
makers and strategies which groups tend to employ when trying to make an impact. 
The argument made by the author is that status and strategies are inseparable in the 
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sense that “pursuing an insider strategy is a precondition of winning an insider status” 
(Grant, 1995, p. 15-16). Other authors, on the contrary, hold that the strategical choices 
made by groups should be separated from the status that policy-makers assign to them 
(Binderkrantz, 2008, p. 176; Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 18; Maloney, Jordan, and 
McLaughlin, 1994, p. 28). To avoid terminological confusion between strategies and 
status, scholars have renamed the insider and outsider divide into a direct vs indirect 
strategies distinction (Binderkrantz, 2008, p. 176), voice vs access (Beyers, 2004, p. 
213), ‘wet suit’ vs ‘business suit’ strategies (Grant, 2004, p. 410), or inside and outside 
strategies (Dür and Mateo, 2016).  
The insider (inside, direct, access, or ‘business suit’) strategies refer to direct 
contacts between interest groups and policy-makers realised through meetings, phone 
calls, participation at conferences etc. (Chalmers, 2013, p. 43; Dür and Mateo, 2016, 
p. 70). The outsider (indirect, voice, ‘wet suit’) strategies, on the other hand, relate to 
interest groups’ attempts “to mobilise citizens” and to “pressure public officials” 
(Kollman, 1998, p. 3) – by organising media campaigns, public presentations, and 
protests, and by mobilising constituencies and associations’ members (Beyers, 2004, 
p. 214; Chalmers, 2013, p. 43; Kollman, 1998, p. 8).  
Strategical choices are, nevertheless, constrained by numerous factors 
(Binderkrantz, 2008, p. 176; Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin, 1994, p. 32-36). An 
interest group’s choice of a strategy depends, firstly, on its type; business groups tend 
to employ inside strategies more often than non-business groups (Binderkrantz, 2008, 
p. 177; Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 4). But some studies have shown that strategic choice 
is not conditioned by a group’s type – both business and citizen groups often combine 
two strategies (indirect and direct) (Beyers, 2004, p. 234). Secondly, strategic choices 
depend on a group’s resources; resource-rich groups are more likely to focus on inside 
than on outside lobbying (Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 5). Thirdly, strategy selection might 
be constrained by a group’s status. Groups with the insider status will often restrain 
from using outside strategies - especially confrontational outside strategies (e.g. 
protests) - because this type of strategies could jeopardise the groups’ relationship with 
the policy-makers (Grant, 2001, p. 343). Still, as noted by some authors, the lack of 
the insider status does not mean that a group will automatically turn to outside 
strategies (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 694). Also, varying strategies are not necessarily 
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mutually exclusive and interest groups often use different types of strategy 
simultaneously (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 703; Beyers, 2004, p. 234; Page, 1999, p. 212).  
Fourth, which strategy will be chosen also depends on a policy issue under 
consideration – its type (Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 75), the level of politicisation 
(Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 709), and the popularity of considered policy measures and 
alternatives (Kollman, 1998, p. 12). Thus, business groups that are active in 
distributive policy domains use insider strategies more often than those active in 
regulatory sectors (Dür and Mateo, 2013, p. 665). In policy areas that are highly 
politicised interest groups tend to resort to both types of strategies (the insider and 
outsider) (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 709). If a group favours policy measures that are 
popular, or comparatively more popular than the alternatives, it will likely employ 
outside strategies (Kollman, 1998, p. 12-13).  
Fifth, strategy choices depend on the institutional setting (Beyers, 2004; Dür and 
Mateo, 2016, p. 5). For attempts to access executive institutions, resource-rich 
business groups tend to employ insider strategies (Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 5). To 
influence Commissioners’ cabinets, interest groups often use both types of strategies 
though insider strategies are prioritised when DGs are being approached (Beyers, 
2004, p. 233).    
To sum up, while Grant (1978), who first came up with the insider/outsider 
distinction, treated a group’s status and strategy as one variable, other authors have 
suggested their separation (Binderkrantz, 2008; Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin, 
1994). The argument has been that status is granted by policy-makers, while strategy 
is a matter of interest groups’ choice of action. There has been a recognition, though, 
that interest groups are not completely free when making strategy choice, as they may 
be constrained and influenced by various factors: group type, resources, the nature of 
an issue under consideration, and the institutional setting. Further, it has been shown 
that inside and outside strategies are not mutually exclusive – both insiders and 
outsiders can use either type of strategy.  
The focus of the thesis will be on the status, rather than strategies of foreign groups. 
It embraces the call to treat status and strategy as analytically separate aspects, though, 
of course, in reality they are not fully insulated from each other. Later in this section, 
this issue of analytical separation will be discussed in more detail. The section will 
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now proceed to discuss interest groups’ status, the thesis’ main focus in relation to the 
insider/outsider typology.   
One of the main characteristics of groups enjoying the insider status is their 
willingness to provide objective information that would be “neither exaggerated nor 
untruthful” (Grant, 2004, p. 408). To do so, interest groups have to make “a trade-off” 
between presenting biased information that would maximise their interests (“cheap 
talk”) and objective and useful information that would improve the policy (Broscheid 
and Coen, 2003, p. 167). But why would an interest group decide to provide objective 
information, especially when it contradicts its interests?   
Firstly, interest groups will provide objective information if they can receive a 
reward for providing such information (Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 350). To 
stimulate lobbyists to provide objective, instead of biased information, the 
Commission has created a reward mechanism for providers of useful information – 
privileged access to its forums, events, and other important fora discussing policy 
proposals (Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 350) and privileged access to information 
about Commission’s plans, decisions, and grants (Broscheid and Coen, 2003, p. 171). 
Outsiders, on the other hand, often present biased views (“bubble”) – they make 
recommendations and present their positions regardless of Commission’s positions 
and its preferences (Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 350). Hence, interest groups will 
provide objective information in exchange for a reward – access to the EU policy-
making process.   
Secondly, interest groups have incentives to provide reliable and truthful 
information because they are interested in building a positive reputation in Brussels 
(Coen, Grant, and Wilson, 2010). Lobbying in the EU, as in other places, is “a 
marathon, not a sprint”. The impact that most interest groups would prefer to make 
would not be one-off, but repeated. Hence, an immediate success is important, but so 
is the ability to make influence in the long run (Coen, Grant, and Wilson, 2010, p. 13). 
That is why many lobbyists will be motivated to establish the reputation as suppliers 
of objective - not biased - information. As one interviewee said:  
“(…) So credibility is big (…) we have established long-term credibility. We 
never cheated, we never failed to deliver. When we say this, we mean this” 
(Interview 4).  
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Besides providing reliable and truthful information, an insider should develop “a 
broad political profile across a number of issues”, in order to have better access to the 
policy-making process at later dates when issues that are of crucial importance for the 
insider will be put on the policy agenda (Coen, 2010, p. 291). Insiders also should 
participate in collective actions through participation in EU business associations 
which could improve their “European credentials” (Coen, 2010, p. 299). Also, firms 
can gain insider status due to “their cross‐border production, size, and length of time 
in Brussels” (Coen, 2010, p. 296). Finally, an insider should create a relationship with 
policy-makers based on “an element of ‘give and take’” on behalf of both - lobbyists 
and EU policy-makers (Coen, 2010, p. 297). 
The above has discussed interest groups’ motivation to provide useful information. 
But, what about the demand side? Why would the Commission allow privileged access 
to some groups (insiders)? Why had the division between insiders and outsiders been 
established in the first place? As shown by some authors (Broscheid and Coen, 2003; 
Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 359; Coen, 1997, p. 96), the restriction of interest 
groups’ access was a reaction to the “access overload” at the beginning of the 1990s, 
when the number of groups seeking to shape EU laws soared.  
Broscheid and Coen (2003) present a formal model based on a complex set of 
factors including the number of lobbyists, lobbying costs and benefits, as well as 
policy-makers’ decision to choose insiders. One of the main findings is that, if 
lobbying costs are high (if the technical expertise that the policy-makers need is 
costly), the number of lobbyists seeking to participate in the policy-making process 
will be low (Broscheid and Coen, 2003, p. 178). Hence, all interest groups 
participating in such policy-making processes should be considered insiders. If, on the 
other hand, the costs are low, the number of lobbyists will increase (Broscheid and 
Coen, 2003, p. 179). Consequently, the policy-makers will decide to separate the 
insiders and outsiders, i.e. they will enable access only to some interest groups (the 
insiders). Why? Value of rewards granted to insiders for providing objective and 
truthful information (e.g. privileged access) depends on a number of lobbyists (which 
in turn depends on lobbying costs); hence, a reward loses its value as a number of 
interest groups grows (Broscheid and Coen, 2003, p. 167). Consequently, the interest 
groups will not have strong incentives to provide useful information, so the 
Commission will be given biased information. To prevent this situation – having too 
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many interest groups doing “cheap talk” instead of giving useful information - the 
Commission has created a system which distinguishes between insiders and outsiders 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003, p. 177-179). 
The fact that the Commission had managed to establish “informal rules of game” 
(Grant, 2004, p. 409), which have in practice restricted access to the policy-making 
process to some interest groups (insiders), has led scholars to describe the EU system 
of interest representation as “élite pluralism” (Coen, 1997, p. 98). Still, the number of 
insiders, the value of their relative benefits, the lobbying costs, and the value of 
information that insiders provide might vary among policy domains (Broscheid and 
Coen, 2007; Coen and Katsaitis, 2013).  
Namely, the regulatory policy domains, which mostly need the technical 
information (which increases the output legitimacy), have greater concentration of 
interest groups that mostly provide technical information (i.e. business groups) (Coen 
and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1109). On the other hand, in the distributive policy domains, 
where the need for technical information is lower and where the demand for input 
legitimacy is higher, the number of groups providing political information is larger 
(i.e. NGOs) (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1109). This supports the argument that, 
while the EU system of interest intermediation could generally be qualified as “élite 
pluralism” (Coen, 1997, p. 98), it takes various forms at the level of sub-systems, 
varying among policy domains and their respective demand for certain types of 
information (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1117).  
Furthermore, it is possible for an interest group to be seen as an insider when certain 
policy initiatives are discussed, while being assigned the status of an outsides when 
other initiatives are on the agenda (Page, 1999, p. 211). Page (1999, p. 211) provided 
an example where one of the interviewed interest groups which claimed to have a close 
relationship with the British Department of Health also stated that the group was ‘less 
happy’ when other departments are considered. Hence, caution is needed when 
judging who the insiders and outsiders are. This comes also with a note, mentioned 
above, that the value of information provided by insiders varies among policy domains 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Coen and Katsaitis, 2013) so does their status too. 
Besides, a long-standing relationship between an insider and policy-makers imply, 
among other things, the insider’s willingness to engage into debates on various policy 
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issues, not only those of her utmost interest but also those that she finds less important 
(Coen, 2010, p. 291). Therefore, a lobbyist can be granted with an insider status when 
certain policy initiatives are discussed, and at the same time, to be seen as an outsider, 
a group whose opinion is less important, when other issues are debated.  
Outsiders can be “outsiders by necessity” and “outsiders by choice” (Grant, 2004, 
p. 409). The former are interest groups which lack the skills and/or resources to 
become insiders, and the latter are groups which do not want to cooperate with 
governments’ officials because of ideological disagreements (Grant, 2004, p. 409). 
Grant’s typology was initially developed to explain interest groups’ status in Britain. 
In the EU context, one additional category of “outsiders by choice” could be identified, 
namely those holding that their interests are best advocated at the member state level. 
The literature on Europeanisation suggests that the growing transfer of competencies 
from the national to the EU level has triggered a shift of lobbying activities from 
member states to the EU institutions (Bache et al., 2014, p. 309-310). However, as 
shown by some studies, transfer of competencies from member states to the EU did 
not equally affect all interest groups – some groups have reoriented their lobbying 
towards the EU institutions but others retain their lobbying on the level of member 
states (see Beyers and Kerremans, 2012, and Klüver, 2010). It is, therefore, possible 
that at the EU level some interest groups represent “outsiders by choice”, not because 
of ideological differences with EU policy-makers, but simply because they believe 
that their interests could be better pursued at the national level.    
Returning to the question of status vs strategy, the thesis, as noted, embraces the 
view that status and strategy should be separated, especially because empirical 
findings indicate that interest groups tend to combine both inside and outside strategies 
(Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 695). Additionally, it has been shown that, even when interest 
groups employ outside strategies aiming to put pressure on the policy-makers, they 
usually choose “the least confrontational” strategies (Binderkrantz, 2005, p. 703). The 
latter indicates that outside strategies do not necessarily lead to the erosion in the 
relationships between the insiders and policy-makers, as suggested by Grant (2001, p. 
343). Also, strategy choices are constrained by numerous factors so the groups are not 
completely free when choosing a strategy. Finally, both inside and outside strategies 
can be used in various directions – to put pressure on law-makers, to mobilise support, 
to secure the group’s survival, to persuade the policy-makers, to shift the direction of 
68 
 
the debate, and so on. After all, strategies aiming to mobiles public can be used not 
only by interest groups but also by policy-makers. As President Franklin Roosevelt 
once said to a group of advocates: “You’ve convinced me. Now go out and make me 
do it” (in Dreier, 2011).     
On the other hand, status and strategy, as two aspects of the insider/outsider 
distinction, are not fully independent of each other. As explained earlier, insiders are 
those who provide objective information in return for a reward – privileged access to 
the policy-making process. This means that the insiders’ reward is the direct contacts 
they have achieved with the policy-makers. Put simply, there is a direct link between 
the insider status and the insider strategy. However, it is important to make a 
distinction here between the inside strategies (defined as direct contacts with policy-
makers through meetings, phone calls, etc.) and the privileged access to policy-
makers. Continuity and regularity, as well as the extent of access, are significant in 
this respect. Insiders do not have some or rare, but frequent and regular contacts with 
relevant policy-makers. This particularly applies to the EU context where the 
Commission regularly runs public consultations which are open to all interested 
parties. Thus, as a general principle, all interest groups can achieve some sort of access 
to the Commission, but only the insiders have regular access to Commission’s expert 
and advisory groups and the other forums where policy proposals have been discussed. 
Additionally, insiders enjoy the reputation as providers of accurate and reliable 
information and have to meet other criteria mentioned above. Hence, it is not important 
only to access the Commission, but also to be recognised as a provider of objective 
information, which in turn requires the existence of regular and long-term 
relationships.  
Still, as mentioned earlier, the status enjoyed by interest groups does not travel 
across all policy domains and issues. Instead, it depends on the number of lobbyists 
that are active in a policy domain and/or policy type. Following Broscheid and Coen 
(2007, p. 362) the domain that this thesis focuses on - the energy policy domain -  
belongs to the group of regulatory policies. Being a regulatory policy, energy, thus 
represents a policy domain where technical expertise and the related output legitimacy 
is mostly needed (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1117). In comparison to other policy 
domains, it has been shown to have a relatively large number of both, interest groups, 
and Commission’s advisory groups (Broscheid and Coen, 2007, p. 362).  
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However, Dür and Mateo (2016, p. 81) classify energy as a distributive policy. 
Their classification of policy domains follows Lowi’s typology (1964) which 
differentiates between distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies. Dür and 
Mateo (2016, p. 74) suggest that the level of conflict surrounding an issue under 
consideration is determined by its policy type. Distributive policy domains have been 
characterised by concentrated benefits and diffused costs (Lowi, 1964), which is why 
these domains attract mainly business actors with concentrated gains and little or no 
opposition from other groups (Dür and Mateo, 2016, p. 74). Hence, in the distributive 
policy domains, the thinking goes, business groups rely on inside rather than outside 
strategies because they want to avoid public attention (2016, p. 74).  
Thus, while Broscheid and Coen (2007) and Coen and Katsaitis (2013) classify 
energy policy as a regulatory policy, for Dür and Mateo (2016) energy policy is a 
distributive policy. This difference is understandable given the general difficulty to 
categorise one policy sector either as regulatory or (re)distributive (Freeman, 1985, p. 
483; Rasmussen, 2012, p. 16). It is, in fact, reasonable to suggest that the energy 
domain share certain features with each of the three policy types. Still, it is suggested 
here in the thesis that the energy policy domain is probably closer to the regulatory 
than distributive policy type. Dür and Mateo (2016, p. 74) make the assumption that 
energy, like the other distributive sectors, is characterised by concentrated gains and 
diffuse costs, but often time this has not been the case. The energy sector, namely, 
often sees policy initiatives implying concentrated benefits and concentrated costs 
(Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen, 2014, p. 882). This is why Binderkrantz, 
Christiansen, and Pedersen (2014, p. 886), similarly to Broscheid and Coen (2007) 
and Coen and Katsaitis (2013), classify energy-related legislation as part of the 
business regulation. 
To sum up, insiders are those who provide non-biased information by taking into 
account the Commission’s preferences as well. Secondly, insiders have to develop a 
portfolio that is broader than their specific, narrow interests. Thirdly, insiders should 
have a long-term presence in Brussels. Fourthly, they should be well integrated into 
broader business coalitions through participation in business associations. Fifthly, 
insiders are open to making a compromise between their own and the Commission’s 
position. Finally, the insider status may be granted to a company based on its structural 
power. The focus of this thesis is on interest groups’ status, but, at the same time, it 
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acknowledges that achieving direct contacts with policy-makers are the key strategy 
that insiders use. However, the privileged access to Commission’s advisory groups 
and other forums represents the reward that insiders seek to gain. 
In addition to the above criteria, the thesis examines one additional criterion 
explaining the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists which is related to 
the specific feature of foreign interest groups, their non-EU origin. Namely, insiders 
are foreign actors coming from countries which are strategically important for the 
achievement of EU policy objectives.  
The starting assumption of this argument is that many EU policies are aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of EU companies relative to non-EU companies. 
Having non-EU nationality, therefore, may be a drawback on the side of foreign 
companies when trying to make an impact in Brussels. For instance, Cowles (1996, p. 
342) describes how, in reaction to the “ ’threat’ of American firms” because of their 
relative size compared to European companies, the Commission has re-directed its 
“competition policies drawn up to prevent European cartels (…) towards American 
MNEs30”. For similar reasons, Japanese Toyota in Europe has been trying to portray 
itself as a European, rather than a Japanese, company (Interview 4).  
However, it would be wrong to assume that non-EU actors represent a 
homogeneous group of actors. There are companies and associations whose countries 
of origin have close economic and political ties with the EU. As a result, these interest 
groups may be strategically more important for the Commission than groups coming 
from “distant” countries. An insider, thus, may be important because the Commission 
wants to improve or maintain close relations with its country of origin. An insider 
could also be important because it comes from the country which shares the 
Commission’s values, especially concerning market liberalisation. The insider in that 
case may be considered a valuable partner, being on the forefront of complying with 
EU policy objectives both inside the EU as well as abroad. The assumption is in line 
with the findings of Rasmussen and Alexandrova (2012, p. 628-629), showing that 
participation in Commission’s public consultations of non-EU actors coming from 
                                                          
30 MNEs – Multinational enterprises.  
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resource-rich countries with close economic relationships with the EU is greater than 
those from non-resource rich countries. 
Overall, lobbying does not take place in a vacuum (Mahoney, 2004, p. 444). The 
Commission has a history of relations with particular interest groups. They might 
prove themselves as providers of reliable and useful information, solution-oriented 
actors whose preferences are either close to those of the decision-makers or open to 
adjustments in line with the Commission’s objectives (insiders). Others might oppose 
the decision-makers’ preferences without sufficiently absorbing the opinions of the 
other side (outsiders). This research project contributes to this strand of literature by 
introducing an additional criterion attached to the traditional insider/outsider 
distinction which concerns specifically non-EU interest groups – the importance of 
their particular non-EU origin for the achievement of the overall policy priorities of 
the Commission. The thesis, thus, suggests that those non-EU interest groups whose 
countries of origin are strategically important for the achievement of the EU energy 
aims are more likely to be granted the status of insider and, consequently, to be more 
effective in their lobbying efforts. 
How does a group’s status affect its prospect of lobbying successfully? 
As seen earlier, the literature around insiders/outsiders assumes that insiders have 
better access to the Commission than outsiders (Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Coen, 
2010; Grant, 2004). Though access to the EU institutions does not automatically 
“translate into influence” (Dür, 2008a, p. 1221), it still represents a necessary 
condition for making an impact (Bowen, 2002, p. 366). An outsider may be deprived 
of access to the Commission and its advisory and expert groups, and thus of a 
possibility to shape EU laws. It is important to note that, as explained earlier, an 
outsider may be an “outsider by choice” not only because its ideology and preferences 
do not match with the Commission’s (Grant, 2004) but also because it might want to 
focus its lobbying on the national level. However, regardless of whether a group is an 
outsider as a result of its own, or of the Commission’s choice, the thesis assumes that 
the outsider status affects her prospect of lobbying successfully because her access to 
the Commission is limited anyway.    
Secondly, a foreign group may be less successful if its interests run counter to the 
interests of domestic (EU) groups, in which case the Commission may choose to 
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protect the interests of the domestic groups, at the expense of the foreign group. The 
Commission’s primary responsibility is to protect the interests of EU citizens. Many 
EU policies are aimed at improving the competitiveness of EU businesses relative to 
non-EU businesses. Therefore, if there is a clash between domestic and foreign interest 
groups, the Commission may decide to follow the preferences of domestic, rather than 
foreign groups. 
However, as mentioned, there are companies and associations whose countries of 
origin have close economic and political ties with the EU. As a result, these interest 
groups may be strategically more important for the Commission than groups coming 
from “more distant” countries. An insider, thus, may be important because the 
Commission wants to improve or maintain close relations with its country of origin. 
An insider could also be important because it comes from a country which shares the 
Commission’s values, especially the ones on market liberalisation. Consequently, the 
Commission might grant access to all foreign group affected by a policy proposal, but 
it would eventually follow the preferences of stakeholders from a “close”, rather than 
a “distant” non-EU country. 
 
1.7.4. Framework for the analysis 
Based on the above assumptions, this section sets outs the framework for the thesis’ 
empirical analysis. As posited, the thesis suggests that Commission’s early preferences 
on issues under consideration decrease the likelihood of a lobbying success of groups 
that oppose the Commission. The absence of Commission’s strong views on policies, 
however, does not guarantee that an interest group will be successful. Instead, a 
group’s success also depends on its status enjoyed among the policy-makers: insiders 








Figure 1: Prospect of successful lobbying, depending on lobbyists’ status  
               and initial Commission’s’ preferences.  
 Insider Outsider 
Commission’s strong 
initial preferences for 
certain policy 
measures 
Low Very low 
No strong initial 
preferences for certain 
policy measures 
Very high High 
 
The matrix shows that insiders tend to be more successful than outsiders when the 
Commission does not have strong preferences on issues under consideration. 
However, when Commission’s early preferences are strong both – insiders and 
outsiders tend to be less successful. 
In order to identify Commission’s early preferences, each case study traces the 
preparation of legislative proposals from the appointment of Commissioners to draft 
a considered proposal through to its adoption. The aim of this approach is to explore 
early positions on policy measures taken by the Commission and/or Commissioners. 
They are labelled ‘early’ or ‘initial’ in order to emphasise that these are the 
Commission’s original preferences, formed independently of the subsequent 
information provided by lobbyists. 
However, defining the Commission’s initial position is a challenging task. Firstly, 
following the “faces-of-power debate” (Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 2005; Shapiro, 2003, p. 
53) interest groups can exert influence during different stages of the policy cycle, from 
agenda-setting to implementation (Dür, 2008a, p. 1220). Thus, whether something is 
on the Commission’s agenda or a list of priorities, it may already have been influenced 
by external stakeholders. It is possible to take a step further and argue that interest 
groups may shape the process of selection of decision-makers, and thus the content of 
policies as well. Indeed, how should we ever know “what the ‘genuine interests’ of an 
actor are?” (Dür, 2008a, p. 1221).  
This thesis shares the view that it is almost impossible to identify preferences that 
are deprived of any external influence. As a solution to this problem, the 
Commission’s preliminary position papers – such as a green paper or a strategy paper 
- are used to extract the Commission’s early preferences, following the similar 
approach used by Klüver (2013a, p. 66; 2013b, p. 94). This certainly is not a perfect 
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way to address challenges related to identifying Commission’s genuine preferences, 
especially given that Commission officials are in contact with interest groups from the 
moment they enter the office. For that reason, the thesis follows the preparation of a 
proposal from the appointment of a College of Commissioners to the adoption of that 
proposal. All available data sources that could reveal where a legislative idea comes 
from are included. Besides, as one Commission official said: 
“So we make a vision document, but with questions saying these are the issues, 
this is how we see them, do you agree, how would you do it, and so on. But we 
ask questions then. In order to develop a document which has questions you need 
to have a certain vision which you want to test. Otherwise, it goes in all directions, 
and no one knows actually what you are aiming for. We would never ask: 
‘actually we do not really know what to do, what would you propose’. Instead, 
we say: ‘this is what we think it would be a good way of doing it, do you agree, 
do you see alternative ways, reasons, can you give evidence why it would work 
or not work?’” (Interview 6). 
Commission’s preferences on issues under consideration might be expressed 
collectively – through the Commission’s strategies and policy priorities – or individual 
Commissioners might favour certain policy options over others. 
After identifying (the lack of) Commission’s early preferences, the analysis will 
proceed to gauge the interest groups’ preferences, or their ideal positions, related to 
particular policy measures. To trace the lobbying activities of non-EU groups, the 
framework presented in one of the previous sections examining the potential access 
points of foreign groups (section 1.7.1.) is used. As a reminder of this framework, 
interest groups will try to access the decision-makers within the Commission through 
bilateral meetings and the working with the Commission’s advisory groups. In 
addition, they can rely on lobbying through a member state, if they have provided 
investment and jobs in that state, or through national and European associations, if 
they have been granted membership. Interest groups can also use outside lobbying 
tactics – public events, media campaigns, and so on (Chalmers, 2013, p. 43).  
To differentiate between insiders and outsiders, besides their access to the 
Commission, the thesis also examines: (1) foreign groups’ economic power; (2) 
whether a group has a long-term presence in Brussels (e.g. offices in Brussels) prior 
to the adoption of a policy proposal; (3) whether a group is oriented towards building 
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a consensus or not; and (4) whether a group’s country of origin is strategically 
important for the EU.  
Foreign groups’ economic power is measured by their market share in the EU. 
Since foreign companies and associations operate not only in the European Union, but 
outside the EU as well, these actors’ market share in the EU seems as a suitable 
indicator of their economic power in the EU and a consequent relevance for EU policy-
makers. In order to examine whether a group’s country of origin is strategically 
important or not, documents issued by the Commission are analysed for each 
individual case: the strategies, the green paper, the Commission’s communications 
with the European Parliament and the Council, and the other relevant documents. The 
group will be considered as strategically important for the EU, if its country of origin 
is mentioned in those documents as “strategically important”, “significant” for the 
accomplishment of EU objectives, or if improvement of EU relations with its country 
is explicitly mentioned by the Commission as an objective of the EU energy policy. 
As for foreign groups’ access to the Commission, it would be difficult, almost 
impossible, to obtain data about the exact number of the meeting that the analysed 
stakeholders held with Commission’s officials between 2006 (when the debate on the 
first examined proposal launched) and 2016 (when the last of the analysed proposals 
was tabled). Instead, a qualitative approach based on the analysis of various sources 
will be used to provide approximate estimation of the groups’ access to policy-makers 











Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
This chapter presents the research design of the thesis. It starts with definitions of the 
main concepts, such as lobbying, interest groups, and foreign interest groups. 
Thereafter, the chapter turns to the definition of lobbying success and how it differs 
from other related concepts, such as influence and access. The following section 
provides justification for the case selection. The chapter then turns to data sources, and 
then the methods that are employed for the analysis of the case studies.   
 
2.1. Main concepts  
This section provides definitions of the main concepts that are relevant for the present 
research project. It starts with the definitions of lobbying, interest groups, and foreign 
interest groups, and subsequently it discusses the definition of lobbying success and 
its comparison with the other related concepts – access and influence.  
 
2.1.1. Lobbying, interest groups, and foreign interest groups 
The thesis uses the Commission’s definition of lobbying according to which “lobbying 
means all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation 
and decision-making processes of the European institutions” (European Commission, 
2006a, p. 5). Accordingly, lobbyists are “persons carrying out such activities” through 
a number of organisations (European Commission, 2006a, p. 5). Thus, all activities 
carried out by lobbyists, through different organisations, with the purpose of shaping 
the decision-making process, throughout the whole policy-cycle, are considered as 
lobbying. 
According to Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008, p. 1106), for an actor to be 
qualified as an interest group three components must be present: an “organised form 
of political behaviour”, the objective to shape policy outcomes, and a waiver of the 
intention to hold public office. Among those actors who satisfy the three conditions 
above, the variation can be significant (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney, 2008, p. 1107). 
The Transparency Register of the European Union differentiates between the six types 
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of interest groups: (1) consultancy firms (e.g. PR firms);  (2) companies, trade and 
business associations; (3) non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (4) think tanks 
and academic institutions; (5) groups representing religious communities; and (6) 
associations representing regional and other sub-national public authorities.31 
This thesis focuses on companies and business associations, as well as consultancy 
firms if their services are used by non-EU interest groups to advance their interests in 
Brussels. Since NGOs, think tanks and research institutions, and religious 
communities usually represent interests that are not related to actors from one specific 
non-EU territory, they are omitted. Also, the majority of the extant literature on foreign 
interest groups has focused on non-EU companies and business associations, but not 
on other types of interest groups. Finally, foreign business groups make the largest 
share of groups representing foreign interests32. 
The apparent feature distinguishing foreign from domestic interest groups is their 
country of origin – while the former come from non-EU countries, the latter have EU 
origins. However, the difference between domestic (EU) and foreign (non-EU) interest 
groups is not always straightforward. As suggested by Korkea-Aho (2016, p. 50-51), 
many companies are actually multinationals and transnationals, with head offices 
outside the EU and subsidiaries and joint ventures within the European Union. For 
example, American multinational corporation Facebook has its registered head office 
in the US, but it also has a subdivision registered in Ireland. In contrast, some 
organisations representing foreign interests have registered offices in the EU. For 
instance, the American Chamber of Commerce EU represents the interests of US 
companies, but its office is registered in the EU. Additionally, some interest groups 
have mixed membership - they represent both foreign and domestic companies. For 
example, Hungarian MOL and the Kuwait Oil Company are both members of the 
International Association of Oil and Gas, a business association actively involved in 
debates on the EU energy policy. Finally, some consultancy firms represent EU and 
                                                          
31 Transparency Register. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do?locale=en&reset=. [Accessed 
on 07/07/2019]. 
32 See the Transparency Register. Available at: 




non-EU clients all together. An example is the consultancy firm Fleishman-Hillard, 
which represents the interests of South Korean Hyundai and the British bank Barclays. 
For the purpose of this research project, non-EU interest groups are defined as 
companies and associations who seek to exert political influence in Brussels, but 
whose countries of origin are outside the EU. The definition, thus, excludes business 
associations with mixed membership (EU and non-EU), joint ventures with mixed 
ownership (EU and non-EU), and consultancy firms representing both domestic and 
foreign clients. The activities of consultancy firms are analysed only if their services 
are used by non-EU interest groups in particular cases. As for multinationals, even 
though they might have branches and subsidiaries in the EU, they are considered 
foreign as long as they have registered head offices outside the EU. Prior studies have 
also analysed multinationals with a foreign origin. Coen (1999) and Cowles (1996), 
for instance, have explored American multinationals, while Hamada (2007a) has 
examined the Japanese multinational, Toyota.  
Domestic or EU interest groups, on the other hand, are those who are organised 
either at the level of a member state (e.g. the French Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association and the German BMW) or at the EU level - groups that are active across 
more than one EU state (e.g. the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association). 
Sometimes, as mentioned earlier, foreign companies have seats in these domestic 
(national and wider EU) associations. They, nevertheless, remain predominantly 
European and they have been analysed only as a channel through which foreign groups 
may seek to exert political influence. 
 
2.1.2. Measuring lobbying success  
How is lobbying success defined and measured? Before turning to this definition, it is 
important to clarify the differences between lobbying “access”, “success”, and 
“influence”.  
Influence can be defined as an interest group’s ability to shape a policy outcome in 
line with her preferences (Dür, 2008b, p. 561). It assumes a causal relation between 
the groups’ preferences regarding a policy decision and the policy decision itself 
(Dahl, 1957, p. 202-203; Dür, 2008b, p. 561; Nagel, 1975, p. 29). Therefore, an actor 
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is influential if her preferences are satisfied by a policy outcome (Bernhagen, Dür, and 
Marshall, 2014, p. 203). Similarly, an actor is successful if her ideal position is 
reflected in an outcome. In both cases, the distance between a group’s preferences and 
an outcome is measured (Dür, 2008b, p. 566). Still, an important difference remains. 
When a group’s lobbying success is measured, the key task is to measure the extent to 
which its preferences are satisfied by an outcome. When influence is measured, the 
aim is not only to identify the extent to which a group’s preferences are reflected in a 
policy outcome, but also to attribute the intended outcome to the groups’ resources 
and/or strategies (Bernhagen, Dür, and Marshall, 2014, p. 203). 
Some authors use interest groups access to EU institutions as “a proxy for 
influence” (Dür, 2008a, p. 1221). The rule “the more, the better applies” in this case - 
the more access a group has, the more influential it will be. Although access to EU 
policy-makers represents a necessary condition for making an impact (Bouwen, 2002, 
p. 366), it does not automatically “translate into influence” (Dür 2008a, p. 1221). 
Access, therefore, should not be equated with influence.  
Despite its central position in the academic research on interest groups, interest 
groups’ influence has been sought to be measured only in a small number of studies 
(Bernhagen, Dür, and Marshall, 2014, p. 202; Dür, 2008b, p. 561). Methodological 
challenges related to measuring influence include difficulties in defining the concept 
of influence as well as the complexity of EU policy-making. Lobbying in the EU takes 
place at several territorial levels (e.g. supranational, national, sub-national). Lobbyists 
can exert influence during different phases of the policy-making process (Dür, 2008b, 
p. 561). A number of actors are simultaneously trying to shape a policy proposal 
(Klüver, 2013b, p. 59). Finally, interest groups lobby and, at the same time, if 
necessary, they seeking to counter the lobbying activities of the groups on the opposite 
side of a debate (Dür, 2008b, 561). Therefore, it is extremely challenging to attribute 
a policy decision to a groups’ lobbying efforts, which is why a lobby group’s influence 
often leads to “methodological dead-ends” (Chalmers, 2011, p. 471). 
The choice of this thesis is to measure lobbying success rather than lobbying 
influence. As suggested by Klüver (2013b, p. 59), lobbying is “a collective enterprise”; 
each policy proposal mobilises simultaneously a number of interest groups who, in 
parallel, try to shape EU policies. Hence, as mentioned above, it would be particularly 
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challenging to attribute a policy outcome to a single foreign group’s lobbying efforts 
(influence). This is particularly the case given the fact that the thesis examines foreign 
groups only, instead of all the groups participating in the preparation of the observed 
policy proposals (though, for each case study, the thesis provides - in addition to the 
positions of the involved foreign groups - an overview of the positions of all the 
domestic (EU) stakeholders). 
The thesis, therefore, measures foreign groups lobbying success as the distance 
between a group’s ideal position and a final policy proposal (Dür, 2008b, p. 566). 
Following Mahoney (2007, p. 37), an ordinal scale measuring lobbying success is 
used: a group achieved none of it goals, achieved some of its goals, or the group 
reached all of its objectives. This approach allows for taking into account the fact that 
policy-making in the EU is based on consensus building, rather than on the “winner 
takes all” mode (Mahoney, 2007, p. 37).  
Still, even if a policy proposal matches an interest groups’ preferences, this does 
not mean that the proposal was made as the result of the lobbying efforts of that 
particular group. Process-tracing is a useful method for addressing this problem since 
it allows for tracing the causal mechanism between groups activities and a policy 
outcome (Dür, 2008b, p. 562). As mentioned earlier, it is hard to attribute a policy 
proposal to a single interest group. Still, if an interest groups lobbying activities can 
be identified, then it would be possible to attribute a policy proposal to the group’s 
activities, in addition to other involved groups’ efforts. Hence, instead of attributing a 
Commission’s policy proposal to a single foreign group, the thesis investigates the 
group’s contribution to “a collective success” of interest groups with similar positions. 
On the other side, even if a policy proposal does not match a group’s ideal position, 
this does not mean that the group has not being successful because it may have 
succeeded in avoiding the worst case scenario (Dür, 2008b, p. 561). Using an ordinal 
scale to measure lobbying success provides as a useful strategy in this respect, because 
it allows “room for degrees of success” (Mahoney, 2007, p. 37). Besides, if a group’s 
ideal position is not reflected in the final proposal, it would not be assumed 
automatically that the group has not been successful; instead, further analysis will 




2.2. Case selection 
This thesis provides an analysis of four case studies – policy proposals - covering the 
main aspects of EU energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability, and security. In 
particular, the following proposals are examined: 
(1) Proposal for the Directive concerning common rules for the internal gas market, 
adopted in 2007. This case explores lobbying by non-EU groups over the most 
important segment of this directive: the ownership unbundling (separation) of 
vertically integrated gas companies, as well as the same obligation being imposed on 
foreign companies (the so-called ‘Gazprom clause’);   
(2) Proposal for the Regulation on conditions for access to natural gas transmission 
networks and related amendments to this Regulation, adopted in 2007. This case 
examines non-EU group lobbying over provisions on the third-party access (TPA) 
regime to gas networks (pipelines and storage). The Commission’s proposed 
amendments to the Regulation, adopted in 2017, are also examined. The aim of the 
proposed amendments was to extend EU energy regulation to offshore import 
pipelines - those bringing gas from third (non-EU) countries to the EU;   
(3) Proposal for the Directive amending Directives relating to the quality of petrol and 
diesel fuels and the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, adopted 
in 2012. This case examines non-EU group lobbying over provisions concerning 
indirect land-use change related to biofuels production; and 
(4) Energy Security Package, drafted by the Commission in 2016. This case examines 
non-EU group lobbying over a wide range of measures proposed as part of the so-
called SoS Regulation, Decision on intergovernmental agreements, and Strategy on 
LNG, which all together had made the Energy Security Package.  
The thesis, therefore, explores energy-related legislation. Since the energy domain 
has been attracting a considerable number of lobbyists, it seems a suitable domain for 
analysing the activities of non-EU interest groups in Brussels. However, it is fair to 
note that by focusing on a single policy domain, the external validity of the empirical 
findings might be challenged. One could rightly question whether the findings 
obtained through the analysis of the energy domain can be generalised and applied to 
other domains. This is especially since the energy domain has been often described as 
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a “highly politicised” sector (Talus, 2013, p. 4). The EU’s dependence on external 
energy suppliers brings to the fore the political intricacies of energy-law making, 
which might affect foreign groups’ lobbying patterns. A question arises then whether 
the energy policy domain is so unique that the lobbying logics observed in this domain 
might not be generalised to other domains?  
Energy is often seen not as “a regular trading good”, but instead as “a strategic 
commodity” (Mayer, 2008, p. 252). Indeed, the energy domain has been often 
described as a “highly politicised” sector (Talus, 2013, p. 4) given its critical 
importance for the security and “the well-being” of EU citizens (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 2). Some scholars hold that in highly politicised sectors, the 
role played by interest groups “is almost peripheral, or absent”, and that national 
governments take the front seat (Greenwood, 2003, p. 20). In such policy areas, 
political information that foster consensus building is more needed than in the “low 
politics” areas (Coen and Katsaitis, 2016, p. 1116). Additionally, EU energy law-
making features high salience, its debates attracting considerable public attention and 
lobbyists’ interest. All these factors – increased involvement of national governments, 
policy-makers’ need for political information, and salience, are expected to hinder 
business groups’ prospects to influence Commission’s proposals.   
On the other hand, recent data illustrates that 53% of the EU energy needs has been 
satisfied from external (non-EU) sources (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The 
EU’s energy dependence on foreign actors might produce a moderating effect on 
interest groups’ success, especially if the latter lack EU citizenship. It could be argued, 
therefore, that foreign companies and associations enabling the EU to meet its energy 
needs should be successful precisely because of the EU’s dependence on their energy 
supplies. In other words, these groups have “structural power” (Dür, 2008b, p. 561). 
But it could equally be hypothesised that for the same reason - their economic weight 
- foreign companies might be less successful. Namely, they can be seen as a sort of 
“threat” due to their relative size in comparison to EU firms, as shown by Cowles’s 
study (1996, p. 343). The thesis takes into account those concerns, in the way outlined 
below.  
Firstly, the thesis shares the view that the energy domain is one of “high politics”, 
but is likewise mindful that it also includes “low politics” initiatives. Two concepts 
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related to the energy sector reflect its strategic and political importance, namely: (1) 
energy security: policy-makers’ concern to obtain a sufficient amount of energy from 
external sources; and (2) public service:  policy-makers’ concern to meet the 
expectation that the states are the “controllers of last resort”, i.e. the ultimate 
guarantors of energy supplies for all citizens (Talus, 2013, p. 272). This is a classical 
paradigm of the energy sector which has dominated the energy sector until the end of 
1980s.  
However, a new paradigm replaced the old vision during the 1990s, when the 
principle of competitiveness and the creation of an EU internal energy market were 
put at the core of EU energy law-making (Talus, 2013, p. 273-276). Competitiveness 
was seen as an effective solution to concerns related to the security of supply 
(Andersen, Goldthau, and Sitter, 2017, p. 6). But still, this did not lead to the vanishing 
of the “old paradigm”. The creation of an internal EU energy market has faced many 
obstacles including those related to interventions aiming to preserve the security of 
supply (Talus, 2013, p. 286). Nonetheless, the EU has managed to develop a set of 
legislation which advances a market-based approach to the energy sector. One of the 
most significant changes in that respect has been a shift in power from the member 
states to the supranational institutions. While the pre-liberalisation era and agenda 
were driven by the member states, the emergence of the new era and paradigm have 
been driven by the Commission (Talus, 2013, p. 287).  
Hence, a suitable depiction of the energy sector is neither the one based on the old 
paradigm dominated by national governments and energy monopolies, nor the one 
focusing only on market-driven changes. Perhaps the best depiction of the energy 
sector today is one suggesting that it is a policy domain which oscillates between the 
“markets” and “empires” (Youngs, 2009, p. 6). It involves a lot of “high politics”, 
which features policy initiatives aiming to advance energy security and political 
objectives, but it consists of “low politics” initiatives too– those aiming to regulate the 
conduct of market participants and to advance the liberalisation of the EU energy 
market (Andersen, Goldthau, and Sitter, 2017, p. 4). 
Secondly, extant literature assumes that business groups tend to be less influential 
in “highly politicised” debates because the influence of member states prevails 
(Greenwood, 2003, p. 20). The higher intensity of member states’ lobbying indicates 
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the importance that national governments give to policy initiatives (Rasmussen, 2014, 
p. 4), so the technical information that business groups losses some of its value (Coen 
and Katsaitis, 2013, p. 1116). Still, the energy sector attracts a considerable number 
of lobbyists, both in absolute (see section 1.2.) and relative terms (see Broscheid and 
Coen, 2007, p. 362). It involves many policy issues that are highly complex and 
technical, even when they are politicised attracting high public attention. In addition, 
the energy policy domain has seen a relatively large number of Commission’s advisory 
groups as well as prevalence of business groups over citizen groups (Broscheid and 
Coen, 2007, p. 362). All these reasons lend credence to the assumption that the 
Commission values expertise provided by business groups.  
Furthermore, even if member states are “heavily” involved in discussions on 
energy-related laws, they can still benefit from interest groups’ input. Similarly, the 
Commission can also use the input provided by business groups to defend its case vis-
à-vis member states. Therefore, the thesis acknowledges the importance of member 
states’ interest in the energy policy domain, whilst also recognising the significance 
of interest groups’ input. 
It is noteworthy that the Council makes energy-related decisions by qualified 
majority voting. In particular, decisions related to the EU energy market, energy 
security, energy efficiency, and cross-border infrastructure are decided by qualified 
majority (Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty). The Lisbon Treaty also defines energy as 
an area of shared competence between the member states and the EU (Article 4), 
subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 194). This provides additional 
support for the notion that the role of member states in the energy sector is weakened 
in favour of the supranational institutions. 
Thirdly, while the energy policy sector has certain sui generis features, it also has 
some shared characteristics with other policy domains. As mentioned, the EU is 
heavily dependent on energy imports. However, it also imports large amounts of other 
goods. For instance, the EU depends on the importation of raw materials and, similarly 
to energy, supplies of raw material are concentrated in several producing countries. 
Bolivia supplies to the EU almost 80% of antimony, South Africa provides 60% of 
EU’s platinum, and China provides around 75% of EU’s graphite and 80% of EU’s 
indium (European Commission, 2011c, p. 21). Although concerns about energy 
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security often politicise energy-related debates, other policy domains are not immune 
to debates on security issues either. For instance, the security of food supply has been 
seen as an important issue in the sector of agriculture (European Commission, 2011d, 
p. 6). Cybersecurity issues are crucial in the digital market.33 So, the high salience of 
debates that is observed in the energy sector is observed in some other sectors too. 
Finally, the thesis addresses the issue of external validity by examining legislation 
that covers different aspects of EU energy policy: sustainability, security, and 
competitiveness. EU energy policy is driven by these three main objectives (see for 
instance European Commission, 2006b). A diversity of topics might enhance the 
external validity of the findings since covering each of the topics separately, as well 
as the complex relationships between the three objectives, might provide some insights 
that could be applied to other domains (portfolios) covered by EU policy-making. The 
aspect of sustainability could be related to the environmental and climate change 
portfolio, security to the foreign affairs and security policy, while competitiveness 
could be applied to all other portfolios, especially the portfolio covering 
competitiveness. 
Overall, a high degree of politicisation and the EU’s dependence on imported 
energy make the energy policy distinctive from other policy domains. These 
characteristics might affect foreign groups’ lobbying prospects in two directions: they 
can be more successful because the EU is dependent of external energy suppliers, but, 
vice versa, this circumstance can also make it harder to lobby successfully because of 
the greater involvement of members states. To engage with this issue, the thesis starts 
from the view that the energy domain is rife with “high politics” but also consists of 
“low politics” initiatives. Secondly, the thesis argues that, when trying to shape EU 
energy laws, the Commission will value business groups’ technical information 
because the energy domain involves many highly technical issues. Thirdly, the thesis 
takes into account the fact that the role played by member states in the energy sector 
has been weakened in favour of the supranational institutions. Fourthly, it recognises 
that the field of energy shares some characteristics with other policy domains. Finally, 
to enhance the external validity of its findings, the thesis examines cases that cover 
different aspects of the energy policy, namely competitiveness, environment, and 
                                                          
33 See the European Commission’s website. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/policies/75984/3587. [Accessed on 07/07/2020].      
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security, which share some of the characteristics of other policy domains (e.g. the 
internal market, climate policy, and foreign policy).  
Of course, in any study that examines lobbying in a single policy sector, the 
problem of limited external validity can hardly be fully dispelled. Contextual factors, 
including those related to a policy domain (see section 1.6.), do affect interest groups’ 
lobbying prospects and this might reduce the generalisability of the thesis’ findings to 
other sectors. Two elements mitigate this problem though.  First, the energy policy 
domain attracts a vast portion of interest groups; this requires more academic research 
in the domain, which has so far been scarce. 
Second, the thesis recognises the significance of contextual factors, but, its main 
focus is to examine foreign groups’ lobbying success, rather than other factors that 
affect groups’ lobbying success regardless of their nationality (EU or non-EU). 
Clearly, foreign business groups’ lobbying success in the energy domain is affected 
by the specific context, i.e. high politicisation of the energy sector, which, following 
the literature, is expected to constrain business groups’ lobbying effectiveness. 
Similarly, given the EU’s energy dependence on external suppliers, it could be argued 
that this limits foreign business groups’ lobbying prospects because EU policy-makers 
would try to reduce the formers’ control over the EU energy market. In that sense, the 
energy domain might constitute the least-likely case for foreign groups to make an 
impact. At the same time, however, it could be hypothesised that for the same reason 
(their economic weight), foreign business groups should be more successful than in 
other policy areas where the EU is self-sufficient. If foreign business groups can be 
successful elsewhere, it will likely be the case in a policy domain where the EU is the 
most dependent on foreign actors, especially if the latter supply “a strategic good” 
(which energy is). From this perspective, the energy domain could make for the most-
likely case for foreign groups to make an impact. Having most-likely and least-likely 
cases in an analysis can significantly advance external validity of its findings (Dür, 
2008b, p. 565; George and Bennett, 2004, p. 121).  
The thesis examines four case studies which overall cover more than 20 individual 
policy measures. Several case studies – of foreign business groups - are analysed 
within these four cases of EU energy legislation. The selection of particular case 
studies is based on the following.  
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Firstly, the thesis explores ‘effects-of-causes’ (the effects of the Commission’s 
preferences on the success of foreign groups), meaning that it seeks to analyse effects 
of a cause “across a population of cases” (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, p. 230). 
Therefore, it was important to select cases that provided variations on the explanatory 
variable - Commission’s prior preferences on issues under consideration and involved 
interest groups. This type of case selection “causes no inference problems” (King, 
Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 137). Instead, the case selection that provides variations 
on an independent variable increases the generality of findings and limits the selection 
bias (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p. 137). Each of the examined cases provides 
variations on both – the Commission’s preferences on issues under discussion, as well 
as involved interest groups.  
Table 3 below reviews the variations in the Commission’s prior preferences on 
policy measures, across the observed cases. The four cases, overall, cover more than 
20 individual policy measures. Besides, the cases have seen the alteration of three 
Commissions, i.e. three Commission mandates. As table 3 shows, each case study 
involves a leading Commissioner (Energy Commissioner) and a joint leading person 
on a policy proposal under consideration. Preferences of Commissioners in charge of 














Table 3. Variations on the explanatory variables across cases. 
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European grid, 
harmonization of powers 
and independence of 
national regulators, as well 
as cooperation among 
them. 
 
(b) Amendments (2017) 
Strong preferences for the 
amendments - the Third 
Energy Package is 
applicable to offshore parts 
of import pipelines.   
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(ILUC).  
No strong early position 
on joint purchasing 
mechanism. 
 
Strong preferences for 
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ante assessment of both 
intergovernmental as 
well as commercial 
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compatibility with the 
EU market rules, and 
diversification of 
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The present case selection also features variations within the cases. The following 
foreign groups are analysed: Russian energy company Gazprom, Norwegian energy 
company Equinor, the US energy company ExxonMobil (Exxon), the Ukrainian 
company Naftogaz, Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC) – trade and business 
associations which represents Malaysian palm oil,34 and Brazilian Sugarcane Industry 
Association (UNICA) - trade association for the Brazilian sugarcane industry35. 
 
Table 4. Variations in the explanatory variables within the cases. 
  Source: EU Transparency Register. Last time accessed on 1 June 2019. Available at:             
  http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false&locale=en. 
  * Source: International Energy Agency (2008, p. 62). 
  ** Source: Adapted from International Energy Agency (2014, p. 175). 
  *** Source: ExxonMobil (2008, p. 2); ExxonMobil (2012, p. 2).  
  **** Source: Adapted from Ecofys (2014, p. 189-190) and UNICA’s position paper.  
  ***** Source: Interest groups’ websites.  
                                                          
34 See the Transparency Register: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=390816633798-09.  
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
35 See the Transparency Register: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=868501130379-95.  
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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overall gas/ 
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13% of gas 
consumption in 2005 
* 
20% of gas 
consumption in 2012 
** 
2002 13 8 2 / 
Exxon (US) 7% of gas 
consumption in 2005  
10% of gas 
consumption in 2010 
*** 




17 7 1 1 
Gazprom 
(Russia)  
24% of gas 
consumption in 2005 
* 
20% of gas 
consumption in 2012 
** 
2013 13 2  / 
Naftogaz 
(Ukraine) 
Transit country for 
Russian gas to the EU 
2015 5 4 1 / 
MPOC 
(Malaysia) 
2% of biodiesel 
consumption in 2012 
**** 
2008 10 / / / 
UNICA 2.8% of bioethanol 
consumption **** 
2008 6 / / / 
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Table 4 shows variations among groups when it comes to their structural power, 
presence in Brussels, fields of interest, and their membership in the EU institutions’ 
advisory groups and EU business associations. It should be noted that the table 4 
provides data on membership in EU industry associations and in the Commission 
expert group for 2019. Since the four cases cover the period between 2005 and 2016, 
foreign actors’ membership in forums, groups, and associations will be analysed for 
each case individually, within the given period. Also, each case study will consider in 
more detail the groups’ access to the Commission, as well as the strategic importance 
of their countries of origin. 
Besides being led by variations in the independent variable, the within-case 
selection was also led by data availability. The thesis has chosen the above foreign 
groups because the available data enables analysing their lobbying activities, positions 
and related (lack of) success. The initial idea was to expand the sample and add 
companies from some other foreign countries, for instance SOCAR from the 
Azerbaijan Republic and Sonatrach from Algeria. However, publicly available data 
about these companies’ lobbying activities were scarce. Neither the companies, nor 
other stakeholders (including EU institutions, NGOs, and media) were publishing data 
about these companies’ lobbying activities in Brussels. This is surprising given their 
importance for the EU. Algeria is the third energy supplier to the EU, after Russia and 
Norway. Sonatrach plays a significant role in the development of the Southern Gas 
Corridor, one of the largest energy projects aiming to bring gas from the Caspian 
region to the EU. Early interview requests were sent to the two companies, but none 
responded.  
In general, there have been varying levels of transparency among energy 
companies. Some are more transparent in relation to their lobbying in Brussels. For 
instance, on their websites usually in the section “news”, Gazprom and UNICA 
publish information about their meetings with EU officials, though probably the 
published ‘lists’ of meetings are not complete. Exxon, on the other hand, does not 
publish this sort of information. Equinor and MPOC are somewhere in between. 
Lacking data on foreign groups’ lobbying activities, coupled with the fact that some 
of the analysed cases date back to 2005 when lobbying in Brussels was even less 
transparent, has in itself poses serious challenges for an empirical analysis.  
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Hence, it was necessary to select cases that satisfy two criteria: (1) have variations 
in the independent variable; and (2) enable a sufficient amount of reliable data. Here 
examined are policy proposals lobbied by at least three foreign interest groups with 
variations on the independent variable, of course where it was possible to trace the 
lobbying activities. The other cases were omitted. For instance, a policy initiative on 
environmental concerns related to shale gas extraction was explored during the early 
phase of this research, but it was eventually omitted because the companies that it has 
attracted come mainly from a single non-EU country – the US.  
Finally, as mentioned in section 1.6., interest groups’ lobbying activities can be 
affected by policy-related factors such as the policy type, the level of complexity of 
an issue under consideration, its salience, and the amount of conflict that the issue 
generates (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 450). To address this issue, the thesis 
analyses policy proposals with varying degrees of complexity, salience, and conflict. 
The only constant policy-related factor is policy type, given that the thesis studies 
lobbying in the energy policy domain only. 
The literature on interest groups provides evidence showing that low issue salience 
(“quiet politics”) makes a favourable condition for business groups to make an impact, 
due to their expertise and low stakeholders’ involvement (Culpepper, 2011, p. 4). 
Conversely, high issue salience (“noisy politics”) makes it harder for business groups 
to shape policy initiatives because of the involvement of multiple actors trying to 
influence policy outcomes (Culpepper, 2011, p. 146). This does not mean that business 
interest groups will lose each time when faced with an issue of high salience, but it 
implies that their influence might weaken (Culpepper, 2011, p. 146). While, in general, 
energy constitutes a policy domain of high salience, across particular energy policy 
initiatives variations can be observed. Some policy measures attract considerable 
public and media attention. Others do not.  
To control for the impact of issue salience, the thesis examines policy measures 
featuring varying degrees of salience (for a similar approach see Klüver, 2013b). 
Ownership unbundling, whose provisions are examined as part of the first case study 
is an example of a highly salient issue. Ownership unbundling was mentioned in more 
than 100 articles published by the EurActiv since 2006. The N-1 infrastructure 
standard, which is analysed within the fourth case study, is an instance of a low 
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salience issue. Only one article on this policy measure was published by the EurActiv. 
Scholars sometimes use the number of interest groups involved in a policy debate as 
a proxy for issue salience (Klüver, 2013b, p. 119). The policy measures that are 
analysed in the thesis afford variations in this aspect as well. For instance, the number 
of stakeholders’ responses to Commission’s consultations on the indirect land use 
change was 145 (the third case study), whereas only 37 stakeholders engaged with the 
Commission’s consultations on amendments to the third energy package (the second 
case study).  
Scholarship on lobbying assumes that business groups tend to be more successful 
when highly complex and technical policy proposals are being made and when the 
policy initiative on the table does not generate conflict (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 
2015, p. 450-452). In this thesis, issue complexity and level of conflict vary among 
the examined policy proposals. Some of the examined issues are less technical and 
relatively simple to understand. The ‘Gazprom clause’ - a provision prohibiting 
foreign companies from acquiring control over a transmission system operator in the 
EU, unless otherwise permitted by an international agreement – is one such example. 
Provisions on indirect land use change related to biofuel production, are, on the other 
hand, highly technical and more complex. The degree of conflict also varies among 
the examined policy measures. For instance, while most stakeholders opposed the 
establishment of the European Centre for Energy Network, they were divided on 
provisions concerning third party access to storage (the second case study). 
Therefore, there could be a potential intervening effect of an issue’s characteristics 
on foreign groups’ lobbying success, and to address this, the thesis includes cases with 
varying degrees of salience, complexity, and conflict. It is also important to remind 
that the thesis examines business groups only. This means that if there is an intervening 
effect of the policy-related factors, this will affect equally all the business groups 
analysed in the case under consideration. If for instance, Equinor supports the 
establishment of the European Centre for Energy Network, and if Exxon opposes the 
proposal, they will try to make an impact under the equal policy-related context – e.g. 
low issue salience. 
In sum, alongside data availability, the main case selection criterion has been to 
maximise variations on the explanatory variable. The thesis also provides variations 
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on policy-related determinants – issue salience, issue complexity, and degree of 
conflict, whereas policy type has been held constant.  
  
2.3. Data  
Gathering data on interest groups’ lobbying activities, their access to the policy-
making process, and the related lobbying success/influence is a challenging task. 
Despite the tools put in place to advance lobbying transparency in Brussels, a large 
part of interest groups’ activities in the EU (as probably elsewhere) occurs beyond 
public scrutiny. Though the EU Transparency Register was set up to advance the 
transparency of interest groups’ activities and to improve the accountability of EU 
officials in that respect, interest groups’ registration is still voluntary. Thus data about 
many interest groups that are active in the EU is still missing. Further, although since 
2014 the Commission publishes lists of meetings with stakeholders, it does this only 
at the level of Commissioners and their cabinets. Interest groups’ meetings with policy 
officers at the working level, still take place under the radar. To complicate matters 
further, lobbying in the EU occurs at different levels (EU, national, sub-national) and 
also at different stages of the policy-making process. Such a complex and multi-
layered structure of the EU, combined with a lack of transparency, poses challenges 
to data collection on interest groups’ activities. This thesis has sought to mitigate this 
problem by expanding its search of sources to maximise the amount of relevant data 
that can shed light on the analysed processes.  
In general, the research project rests on the analysis of official documents issued 
by the EU institutions and usually available on their official websites, as well as 
information that could be found on official websites of the analysed foreign actors. 
Specifically, the thesis uses information obtained from the European Commission’s 
website. The European Union Transparency Register, which contains information 
about interest groups registered in Brussels, was another important source of 
information. The websites of companies/associations have also provided data used 
here. The websites of NGOs who monitor lobbying in Brussels - Transparency 
International EU, Integrity Watch, Corporate Europe Observatory, and AsktheEU.org, 
- have provided relevant insights about the interest groups’ activities in Brussels. 
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Finally, media reports and academic research have been valuable for this research 
project.   
Eight semi-structured interviews conducted with Commission officials and interest 
groups’ representatives have been used to complement the findings obtained through 
the analysis of other empirical materials. Seven interviews were held in person in 
Brussels during 2019. One was held via Skype call in the same year (appendix II). The 
interviews are anonymised, as granted during the initial contact with the interviewees. 
Five interviewees are former or present Commission officials – two Commissioners, 
a Head of a Unit in DG Energy, and two policy officers. Four of them were involved 
in the preparation of the discussed policy proposals. The other three interviewees are 
representatives of big foreign interest groups based in Brussels, two of which are part 
of the thesis’ sample, and the third one being a non-EU company outside the thesis’ 
scope. In addition, an interview was conducted with a representative of one more 
analysed group. However, since a consent form has not been signed by the 
interviewee, this interview was not used in the present research project. Three 
remaining analysed foreign groups refused to be interviewed.   
Having both comparative advantages and disadvantages for studying interest 
groups, all the mentioned data sources have been cross-validated. The most important 
advantage of so-called “observational data” - for instance Commission’s documents 
or interest groups’ position papers - is that they cannot be misinterpreted by a 
researcher (Beyers et al., 2014, p. 175). But, at the same time, they are often limited 
and incomplete. Unlike observational data, interviews allow for capturing contextual 
details and less formal aspects of interactions between policy-makers and interest 
groups (Beyers et al., 2014, p. 176), thus complementing the publicly available data 
and shedding some new light on the cases under consideration (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). 
Interviews, however, are often seen as non-reliable sources given interviewees’ 
tendency to “consciously or unconsciously misrepresent a situation” (Dür, 2008b, p. 
563). The best way to overcome the respective pitfalls of the two methods is to 
combine their data with an eye to maximising their respective strengths.   
To process-trace the Commission’s preferences, the thesis has analysed different 
sorts of Commission documentation that could be found on its official website – 
roadmaps, working programmes, policy priorities, strategies, green papers, reports, 
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proposals, and other similar documents. In addition, relevant memos, speeches, and 
statements given to the media and before other institutions were used as well. These 
observational data sources have been coupled with interviews. Four semi-structured 
interviews with officials that were involved in the preparation of the examined 
proposals were conducted. The interviewees were asked about the Commission’s 
preferences on the examined issues before consultations with interest groups, about 
lobbying activities of examined interest groups during the preparation of proposals, 
and the Commission’s preferences after consultations that had been held with these 
groups (see appendix II). The similar approach was followed by other scholars as well 
(e.g. Rasmussen, 2012). 
The main challenge in this respect was to obtain data on the Commission’s 
preferences related to the policy proposals tabled in 2007. Interviewees’ recollection 
of past lobbying activities and lobbying success/influence might be biased, leading to 
misinterpretations of what actually happened (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). Gathering public 
data on lobbying which took place a long-time ago is further complicated because 
interest groups’ activities were less transparent back at the time. Besides, the 
Commission’s website was changed several times during the observed period - 
between 2006 to 2016.  
Several research strategies have been employed here to address this challenge. 
First, the examined companies that were active when the Commission’s proposals 
were adopted in 2007 are all prominent, so the interviewees were able to recollect, at 
least partly, their lobbying activities. Second, a search was performed not only of the 
current Commission’s website but also of its prior versions and the archived pages 
which are no longer available in the current version. This includes archived media 
reports containing statements made by Commission’s representatives. Finally, 
academic research on the examined policy initiatives, especially those studies based 
on interviews with involved interest parts, which were carried out immediately after 
the adoption of policy proposals in 2007, have proved particularly valuable (e.g. 
Eikeland, 2008).   
Interest group preferences were identified through the analysis of a number of 
sources. Foreign actors’ position papers submitted during public consultations 
organised by the Commission have been the most relevant source in this respect since 
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these papers usually cover all relevant questions discussed during the preparation of a 
Commission’s proposal. The Commission publishes documents featuring the stances 
of the public and private actors who take part in public consultations. Only position 
papers submitted during public consultations in 2006 are no longer available at the 
Commission’s website; hence, these papers were obtained through a request sent to 
the Commission. In addition, other sources have been used: a company’s annual 
reports, documents containing data about their strategies and goals and other relevant 
information which could be found on their official website; foreign actors’ public 
statements; interviews; and secondary sources. 
When it comes to interest groups’ lobbying activities, since the end of 2014, the 
Commission publishes a list of bilateral meetings with stakeholders, as well as 
information about the topic of each meeting. The same data can be found on the EU 
Transparency Register, together with other relevant information: lobbying budgets, 
policy domains where groups are active, particular pieces of legislation they are 
interested in, the people in charge of lobbying on behalf of various groups, 
membership in other organisations, individuals with accreditation for access to the 
European Parliament, and so on36. Also, the thesis benefited from using the website 
“EU Integrity Watch”37, which combines data about lobbying meetings obtained from 
the Commission’s website with data obtained from the EU Transparency Register. 
For a list of meetings before 2014, a number of sources were employed. 
Companies’ websites containing information about their meetings with the EU 
officials, usually in the “news” or “news archive” sections, were checked. Hundreds 
of news have been analysed for this purpose: all available online news from 2005 for 
Equinor, Gazprom, and Exxon, all news from 2010 for UNICA and MPOC, and all 
news from 2014 for Naftogaz. Another important source of information in this respect 
were reports issued by NGOs, as well as their websites containing information about 
lobbyist meetings. Furthermore, media reports and other secondary sources were also 
used in this respect. Concerning multilateral meetings, those organised through the 
Commission’s advisory and expert bodies, the Commission’s website usually 
contained information about agendas, participants, and the conclusions of such 
                                                          
36 The Transparency Register. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
37 EU Integrity Watch. Available at: https://www.integritywatch.eu/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
97 
 
meetings. For the energy policy, the most important forums for discussion were: the 
Madrid Forum, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), 
European Energy Forum, the Gas Coordination Group, and so on. Also, the lobbying 
activities of interest groups were examined through their membership in EU industry 
associations, whose websites provide relevant data. Since the thesis examines not only 
the recent Commission’s proposals but also two proposals made in 2007, membership 
in EU business associations was analysed for the respective years, as part of each 
individual case study.    
Finally, some data about interest groups’ lobbying activities were obtained through 
interviews with their representatives. Two out of six examined interest groups agreed 
to take part in interviews. In addition, a representative of one foreign company which 
has not been analysed as a part of this study was also interviewed. The interviewees 
were asked to provide their views on the interest groups’ preferences concerning the 
analysed cases, their lobbying activities, as well as a self-assessment of their 
companies/associations’ lobbying success (see appendix II). Data provided by 
interviewed Commission officials were also used in this respect.  
It is important to acknowledge that publicly available data usually contain 
information about interest groups’ bilateral meetings with Commissioners, members 
of their cabinets and senior officials. Interest groups are supposed to have more 
contacts with officials at the working level (civil servants) than with senior officials 
and Commissioners (Bouwen, 2009, p. 25). To address this issue, namely the lack of 
publicly available data on bilateral meetings between interest groups and civil 
servants, the interviewed interest groups were asked about their lobbying activities. 
The interviewed Commission’s officials were asked too about interest groups’ 
activities. Additionally, the length of a group’s presence in Brussels (how long it has 
had an office in Brussels) could be considered an indicator of the frequency of contacts 
between the group and civil servants. If a group has an office close to the Commission 
building, it is reasonable to assume that its contacts with Commission’s officials are 
more intensive than if it does not have an office in Brussels. Finally, most data about 




In the end, it is difficult, virtually impossible, to obtain data about the exact number 
of the meeting that the analysed stakeholders held with Commission’s officials 
between 2006, when the debate on the first examined proposal launched, and 2016, 
when the last of the analysed proposals was tabled. The alternative approach that has 
been taken here is a qualitative analysis based of various sources which has served to 
provide an approximate estimation of the groups’ access to policy-makers in Brussels. 
Given that quantifying the number of contacts and comparing them between groups 
has not been possible, the aim of this approach has been to reveal whether a group had 




Following Dür (2008b), in order to analyse foreign groups’ lobbying success, the 
thesis employs process-tracing and cross-case comparison as its key methods. In 
addition, preference attainment degree assessment and attributed influence methods 
are used, as well.  
Since the aim of the research is to trace how Commission’s preferences affect 
prospect of foreign lobby groups to lobby successfully, the most adequate method is 
process-tracing. This method allows for the identification of a causal link between an 
explanatory variable and an outcome (George and Bennett, 2004, p. 6). It also allows 
for a “complex interaction” - such as the interaction between interest groups and 
policy-makers - to be documented (George and Bennett, 2004, p. 22). Thirdly, process-
tracing is suitable for studies exploring ‘effects-of-causes’ (George and Bennett, 2004, 
p. 207; Dür, 2008b, p. 563). Since the thesis examines effects of the Commission’s 
preferences on the success of foreign groups, process-tracing represents an appropriate 
method in this respect. Finally, process-tracing is particularly beneficial for studies 
exploring the success and/or influence of interest groups in the EU. As mentioned 
earlier, interest groups can exert influence during different stages of the policy-making 
process and through different channels (Dür, 2008b, p. 561). Hence, without process-
tracing, examining the different paths through which interest groups try to shape EU 
decision-making would be challenging.  
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Nevertheless, while enabling acquisition of detailed knowledge about the examined 
cases, process-tracing, as a method, does not provide a guarantee that all alternative 
explanations are eliminated, especially when there is a fit between various causal 
mechanisms and the evidence produced through the process-tracing (George and 
Bennet, 2004, p. 222). Process-tracing, as a method, suffers from an additional 
problem – namely, it can provide only internal validity (George and Bennet, 2004, p. 
22). Although it allows for in-depth knowledge about a case under consideration, the 
potential to generalise findings about the considered case to other cases of the same 
type are limited.  
There are also difficulties in the applicaiton of process-tracing to studying interest 
groups’ lobbying influence, which, according to some authors, „can not be overcomed 
even in well-designed studies“ (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). As explained earlier, some data  
about interest groups’ lobbying activities in the EU will inevitably be missing and this 
can lead to gaps in knowledge about a causal mechanism, which consequently, might 
lead to an overestimation or underestimation of the interest groups’ influence in the 
given case (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). It is also hard to provide an accurate estimate of the 
extent of a group’s influence because „a  yardstick is lacking“ (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). 
Finally, studies using process-tracing might overestimate the significance of lobbying 
activities and, failing to recognise that sometime an interest group can achieve more 
with less lobbying effort (Dür, 2008b, p. 563).  
In response to those challenges in the use of process-tracing, several caveats are in 
order. First, as a reminder, the thesis looks into lobbying success rather than lobbying 
influence. As explained (see section 2.1.2.), when a group’s lobbying success is 
measured, the key task is to measure the extent to which its preferences are fulfilled 
by the observed outcome. The difference with measuring influence is that the aim is 
not only to identify the extent to which the group’s preferences are reflected in the 
given policy outcome, but also to attribute the intended outcome to the group’s 
resources and/or strategies (Bernhagen, Dür, and Marshall, 2014, p. 203). The  
problem of overestimation or underestimation of groups’ impact is thus less 
pronounced when lobbying success is being measured. Also, following Mahoney 
(2007, p. 37), the thesis applies an ordinal scale for measuring lobbying success. This 
approach allows a “room for degrees of success” (Mahoney, 2007, p. 37) which might 
mitigate the problem of a missing „yardstick“.  
100 
 
The third problemm that more access and greater lobbying effort do not necessarily 
mean more influence (Dür, 2008b, p. 563), is a serious one. What makes a key impact 
on a policy-maker – a useful message or frequent contacts with a messenger (an 
interest group) or another, third factor? This is hard to claim with certainty. The thesis 
embraces Dür’s (2008b, p. 563) view that this methodological issue cannot be 
completely resolved. However, it also takes the view that it could be mitigated by 
combining different methods and data sources, which the present research project has 
done.    
The thesis, therefore, couples process-tracing with the method of cross-case 
comparision for checking findings obtained through process-tracing. Qualitative 
studies usually tend to combine „cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis“ 
(George and Bennet, 2004, p. ix). The thesis makes no exception in this respect.  
Comparison of case studies is based on „a most-similar case design“ (George and 
Bennet, 2004, p. 81). This research design implies that selected cases are similar in all 
aspects except for an independent variable whose variance then accounts for the 
differences in the dependent variable (George and Bennet, 2004, p. 81). Case studies 
examined in the thesis cover the energy policy domain and policy proposals adopted 
by the Commission. This excludes some of the variables that might affect interest 
groups’ lobbying success, but which are beyond the focus of this resaerch, such as 
institutional variations and  policy type. Within-case studies (foreign interest groups) 
consist of resource-rich foreign business groups which excludes the effect of factors 
such as group resources and group type. This enables drawing conclusions about the 
effects of the independent variable (Commission's preferences) on the explanatory 
variable (foreign groups’ lobbying success). 
Nevertheless, as explained earlier (see section 2.2.) the thesis examines policy 
initiatives with varying degree of salience, complexity, and conflict arising from a 
considered policy. These factors might affect interest groups’ lobbying success. 
Namely, business groups are supposed to be less successful if an issue is highly salient, 
less complex and if it generates less conflict, and vice versa (Culpepper, 2011, p. 146; 
Klüver, Braun, and Beyers, 2015, p. 450-453; Rasmussen, 2014, p. 3-6). Applying this 
to the thesis, if a group is less successful on issue X, it is possible that this is the case 
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not because of the thesis’ independent variable (Commission’s preferences) but 
because of an issue’s characteristics. This might create an inference problem.  
The thesis addresses this problem by acknowledging the relevance of the policy-
related factors. While an issue’s characteristics might affect interest groups’ prospect 
to lobby successfully, it is also worth reminding that, firstly, the thesis examines 
business groups only, and, secondly, it provides a within-case analysis in addition to 
a cross-case analysis. This means that if there is an intervening effect of the policy-
related factors, this will equally affect all the business groups that are analysed in a 
given case. If for instance, Equinor supports the establishment of the European Centre 
for Energy Network, while Exxon opposes the proposal, they will try to make an 
impact under an equal policy-related context – e.g. low issue salience. Besides, since 
both are business actors, the issue salience should affect them in the same direction – 
both should be more successful if the issue is less salient. In other words, while policy-
related factors vary among policy proposals, they are held constant within each 
individual policy proposal. Also, they should have an equal effect on all the analysed 
interest groups given that those groups represent business interests.  
In order to estimate whether a foreign group has been successful in a particular 
case, the thesis employs an additional method - preference attainment degree 
assessment. This method compares a policy outcome with a group’s preferences (Dür, 
2008b, p. 566), as already explained in one of the previous sections. The distance 
between the final decision and the group’s favoured position reveals the degree of the 
group’s influence (Dür, 2008b, p. 566). Finally, one way to deal with the problem of 
‘counter’ lobbying is to employ the attributed influence method by asking interest 
groups to assess their own influence (Dür, 2008, p. 565). Still, since only two of the 
examined groups were interviewed, information about the self-assessment of groups 
not being interviewed has to be found in other data sources: public statements and 






Chapter 3: Ownership Unbundling and the Gazprom clause 
 
This chapter examines the (lack of) lobbying success of non-EU interest groups during 
the preparation of the Commission’s proposal on ownership unbundling, i.e. 
separation of vertically integrated gas companies. The question of unbundling took on 
an ‘external’ dimension too - the proposal contained a provision prohibiting foreign 
companies from acquiring control over a transmission system operator in the EU 
unless otherwise is allowed by an international agreement (European Commission, 
2007c, p. 7). The provision has become known as the ‘Gazprom clause’, by the name 
of its supposed target (Youngs, 2009, p. 38; Van Vooren and Wessel, 2014, p. 450).  
The considered policy measures have not been part of the Commission’s priorities 
defined at the beginning of its mandate. The Commission did not express at the outset 
strong early preferences for ownership unbundling. Andris Piebalgs, the Energy 
Commissioner at that time, first hesitated to propose ownership unbundling as a policy 
measure, but he started to change his position during 2006, despite bitter opposition 
from member states and the biggest industrial actors. Unlike the Energy 
Commissioner, the Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, was backing the 
introduction of ownership unbundling since the early days of the Commission’s 
mandate. Next, when it comes to the Gazprom clause, the long-term Commission’s 
objective, even before its appointment in 2004, has been to create a framework for 
energy cooperation with external suppliers, which would be based on “fair and 
reciprocal access to markets and infrastructure” (European Commission, 2006b, p. 
15). This was the rationale behind the proposed Gazprom clause. Thus, although the 
Gazprom clause was not part of the Commission’s policy priorities defined at the 
beginning of its mandate in 2004, the Commission’s support for the key element of 
the clause - cooperation with external suppliers based on reciprocity - can be traced 
back to the mid-1990s. This chapter examines the lobbying success of the four interest 
groups - Gazprom, Equinor, Exxon, and AmCham, which have had different 
characteristics related to the status distinction between insiders and outsiders. 
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3.1. Background  
Already, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Community legislator recognised the need 
to transform the European gas market (Lowe et al., 2007, p. 23). At that time, the EU 
energy market was nationally divided and controlled by a few vertically integrated 
companies, with little or no gas trade among member states (Talus, 2013, p. 16). The 
liberalisation process that started during the 1990s was aimed at removing national 
monopolies, fostering competition within the gas sector, and stimulating gas trade in 
Europe (Scholz and Vohwinkel, 2016, p. 56; Scholz and Purps, 2012, p. 76). The 
underlying intention of the gas market liberalisation process was the creation of an 
internal European-wide energy market that would allow for sufficient levels of market 
competition, not only within member states but also among them. One of the main 
obstacles that emerged during the liberalisation process was the possibility of 
vertically integrated companies using their monopolies over the gas infrastructure to 
obstruct fair competition in the sector (Talus, 2013, p. 78; Lowe et al., 2007, p. 23). 
Thus, the separation (unbundling) of these energy companies was seen as a necessary 
step towards enabling competition in the gas market.  
Vertically integrated gas companies perform at least one of the functions of 
transmission, distribution, or storage (midstream), and at least one of the functions of 
production (upstream) or supply (downstream) (Article 3 of the Directive 
2009/73/EC38) (see Figure 2). Since these companies control the transmission 
infrastructure and, at the same time, produce or sell gas, it was assumed that they 
would obstruct other firms’ access to the transmission infrastructure. The aim of 
unbundling was, therefore, to separate the competitive (gas production and supply) 
from the non-competitive (e.g. gas transmission) segments of the gas network, and to 
allow new entrants access to the non-completive parts of the gas network (Talus, 2013, 
p. 78-79).  
 
 
                                                          
38 European Parliament and the Council (2009a). 
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 Figure 2. The constellation of pipelines in the natural gas business. 
Production  Upstream 
Upstream pipelines  
Pipelines that are part of a gas production field. 
Transmission pipelines 
Pipelines transporting gas from production fields to distribution companies. 
Midstream 
Distribution pipelines 
Pipelines used to convey gas through local or regional pipeline networks.  
Storage facilities  
Facilities used for the stocking of natural gas. 
Supply  
Sale and resale of gas to customers. 
Downstream 
Source: Adapted from the Directive 2009/73/EC (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a).  
Provisions on unbundling were initially introduced in 1998 when the First Energy 
Package39 was adopted. The Gas Directive, which was a part of the First Package, 
contained an obligation for vertically integrated enterprises to establish separate 
accounts for different activities: transmission, distribution, and storage (Article 13 of 
the Directive 98/30/EC). The so-called account unbundling, however, did not foster 
market competition. Instead, it established a sort of “quasi-independence” of different 
entities within the vertically integrated companies (Talus, 2013, p. 80).  
As a result, provisions on unbundling were reinforced by the Second Energy 
Package40, adopted in 2003. The new Gas Directive set the requirement for integrated 
companies to create not only separate accounts but also separate legal entities for their 
transmission and distribution activities (Article 9 and Article 13 of the Directive 
2003/55/EC). Distribution and transmission system operators were now obliged to be 
independent “at least in terms of their legal form, organisation, and decision-making” 
from other activities that were not related to distribution and transmission, respectively 
(Article 9 and Article 13 of the Directive 2003/55/EC). It was assumed that by creating 
                                                          
39 The First Energy Package consists of 2 directives adopted in 1996 and 1998: (1) Directive 98/30/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (the First Gas Directive) (European 
Parliament and the Council, 1998).; and (2) Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity.  
40 The Second Energy Package consists of 4 directives adopted in 2003 and 2005: (1) Directive 2003/55 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (the Second Gas Directive) (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2003).; (2) Regulation 1775/2005 on conditions for access to the natural 
gas transmission network (European Parliament and the Council, 2005); (3) Directive 2003/54/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; and (4) Regulation 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. 
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legally separated entities, these would operate independently of the parent enterprise 
(Talus, 2013, p. 80).   
However, rules on legal unbundling did not create the intended outcome either, i.e. 
sufficient separation of the different gas network activities that would enable new 
entrants to access the gas market (Talus, 2013, p. 81). The issue of unbundling – 
whether the provisions on unbundling requested by the Second Gas Directive are 
sufficient (legal unbundling, if fully implemented) or further legislation in this regard 
(introduction of ownership unbundling) is necessary - triggered one of the most heated 
energy-related debates in Europe. Unlike legal unbundling, introduced by the Second 
Gas Directive, ownership unbundling assumed the separation of ownership in different 
parts of the gas infrastructure. The question of unbundling took on an ‘external’ 
dimension too – a provision prohibiting foreign companies from acquiring control 
over a transmission system operator in the EU (under the same rules as EU 
companies), unless otherwise allowed by an international agreement (European 
Commission, 2007c, p. 7). This proposal has become known as the Gazprom clause. 
The debate ended up with the adoption of the Third Gas Directive in 2009. The 
Directive was a part of a wider set of gas and electricity-related legislation known as 
the Third Energy Package41.   
The leading Commissioner on the issue of ownership unbundling was 
Commissioner for Energy, Andris Piebalgs. Another important person involved in 
drafting the Commission’s proposal was Commissioner for Competition, Neelie 
Kroes.  
 
                                                          
41 The Third Energy Package consists of 5 legislative acts adopted in 2009: (1) Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (European Parliament and the Council, 
2009a); (2) Regulation 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2009d); (3) Directive 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity; (4) Regulation 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 




3.2. Early positions 
3.2.1. The Commission’s early position 
3.2.1.1. Hearings before the European Parliament 
In 2004, José Manuel Barroso was nominated for the position of Commission 
President. Whereas his nomination was approved by the European Parliament, the 
proposed College of Commissioners, including the Hungarian candidate for Energy 
Commissioner, László Kovács, as well as Neelie Kroes, the Dutch candidate for 
Commissioner for Competition, met with opposition from the European Parliament. 
László Kovács was criticised for the lack of considerable experience in the energy 
policy domain (EurActiv, 01 October 2004). Neelie Kroes, on the other hand, faced 
criticism for having too much experience in the business sector (earlier membership 
in a number of companies’ supervisory boards) that supposedly could impede her from 
acting independently from the business community in Brussels (the New York Times, 
28 September 2004). While Neelie Kroes managed to defend her nomination, arguing 
that she would continue to demonstrate her “personal commitment to applying the 
highest ethical standards” (Kroes, 2004), László Kovács’ candidacy for Energy 
Commissioner was withdrawn. Instead, the position of Energy Commissioner was 
given to another Latvian candidate, Andris Piebalgs.  
On his appearance before the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy, Andris Piebalgs, did not show a preference for any new measure 
with regard to unbundling. Instead, he stated the following: 
“We must ensure better competition in the market. At present, it remains 
dominated by the historical operators and few consumers ever change their 
supplier. If we are to guarantee that the real benefits of the internal market reach 
citizens in terms of jobs and lower prices, then difficult decisions have to be taken. 
However, I think we must await the results of the implementation of the second 
electricity and gas package to determine which, if any, further EU measures are 
necessary” (Piebalgs, 2004). 
Thus, although acknowledging that the energy market was still dominated by a 
few vertically integrated enterprises, the Commissioner believed that priority should 
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be given to the full implementation of the measures introduced by the Second Gas 
Directive. The Directive was adopted only one year before the new Commission, 
under Barroso, took office; therefore, it was decided that the future measures should 
wait for the full and proper implementation of the Second Package. Also, at that time, 
the member states were not of the opinion that the energy domain necessitates a wider 
action at the EU level (Interview 3).  
The Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, however, was determined to 
push for a more proactive application of the EU competition law in the energy sector. 
In her statement made before the European Parliament in 2004, she proposed 
screenings of obstacles to competition in telecommunications, postal services, 
transport, and the energy sector (Kroes, 2004). The idea was accepted by other 
Commissioners, including Andris Piebalgs (European Commission, 2005a, p. 8).   
Under Regulation 1/2003, following indications that competition in a sector may 
be restricted, the Commission has the right to conduct investigations by collecting 
information from stakeholders and carrying out inspections, if necessary (Article 17). 
Warnings suggesting that competition in the gas market might be distorted were gas 
price increases, new entrants’ complaints of difficulty in getting access to gas 
networks, limited cross-border trade, and a lack of transparency (European 
Commission, 2005b, p. 2-3). As a result of these warnings, Neelie Kroes, in 
agreement with Andris Piebalgs, opened up a sectoral investigation aimed at 
revealing the suspected malfunctioning of the gas market. In May 2005, the 
Commission sent out over 3,000 questionnaires to stakeholders with the aim of 
establishing “the facts for a solid competition analysis” in the energy sector, making 
this inquiry “one of the most thorough investigations in the Commission’s history” 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 19).    
At this early stage, therefore, Andris Piebalgs did not express strong preferences 
with regard to ownership unbundling. When Commissioner for Energy took office, 
there was a perception within the DG Transport and Energy (DG TREN) that the 
Second Package was good enough, and that the reason why the internal market faced 
obstacles was the insufficient implementation of this legislative package (Interview 
3). DG Competition (DG COMP), on the other hand, took a more pro-active position. 
In her communication on the opening of the sectoral inquiry, Neelie Kroes stressed 
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the complaints concerning the ineffectiveness of the unbundling provisions 
(European Commission, 2005b, p. 3). While stating that the sector inquiry would look 
into a potential breach of the competition law, she added that “the design of network 
rules appears not always to take into account in a sufficient manner the needs of a 
competitive market at a European level” (European Commission, 2005b, p. 3). Even 
though it was not clear from her statement which network rules she was referring to, 
it seems that she did not share the opinion of DG TREN that the market rules laid 
down in the Second Gas Directive were sufficient enough to create competition in 
the energy market.     
 
3.2.1.2. Preliminary reports on the sector inquiry 
In November 2005, DG COMP published the initial findings of the energy sector 
inquiry. The preliminary findings were that, despite the legal unbundling that was put 
in place by the Second Gas Directive, the vertically integrated companies still 
favoured related firms (European Commission, 2005c, p. 16). These initial findings 
were presented to the Council by Neelie Kroes in December 2005, when again 
concerns related to vertically integrated companies and insufficient unbundling were 
raised by the Commissioner. On the same occasion, Commissioner Kroes stressed 
her intention to use the competition powers to deal with market malfunctions under 
the current regulation, whilst at the same time calling for the launch of a debate on “a 
future regulatory framework” for energy markets in the EU (European Commission, 
2005d, p. 2).  
In February 2006, a preliminary report on the inquiry was published confirming 
the initial findings: the “systematic conflict of interest” triggered by the inadequate 
separation of vertically integrated companies (Interview 3; European Commission, 
2007a, p. 14). While acknowledging the importance of this issue, Andris Piebalgs 
again noted that the question regarding whether ensuring the implementation of the 
Second Gas Directive would be sufficient to guarantee competition or whether further 
legislative action – the revision of the Second Directive and introduction of 
ownership unbundling - would be needed was still open for discussion (Piebalgs, 
2006). However, he added, firstly, that the Commission would launch infringement 
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procedures against countries that had not ensured compliance with the Second Gas 
Directive. Secondly, he announced that in a period to come, DG TREN would 
examine a number of areas, including “the adequacy of the unbundling measures” 
(Piebalgs, 2006, p. 4).    
Neelie Kroes, however, was certain that the provisions on legal unbundling set by 
the Second Package were not sufficient for the development of the gas market, even 
if fully implemented, and that ownership unbundling would be the right solution for 
the lack of market competition.  
“[…] Finally, market structure is a real concern. I’m talking about the bundling 
of generation, supply, pipelines and grids, and distribution. Owners and operators 
of critical networks often compete with companies that need to have access to 
these same networks. Can we expect such integrated companies to treat 
competitors in a fully fair manner? Their own self-interest would suggest not. In 
this respect, I very much welcome the move that is being made in the country I 
know best towards full structural unbundling. Personally, I believe that this will 
allow a more efficient market to develop” (Kroes, 2006). 
Since the Netherlands, her home country, had already introduced ownership 
unbundling (in her speech referred to as ‘full structural unbundling’), Neelie Kroes 
believed that, given the positive Dutch experience in this, the European Union should 
follow this example. At that time, only a few countries - Denmark, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden - had already introduced ownership unbundling of vertically 
integrated gas companies in their markets, thus talking a step further than that required 
by the Second Gas Directive (European Commission, 2005e, p. 12). All other countries 
had lagged, with many delays in the implementation of the provisions regarding legal 
unbundling (the Second Gas Directive).  
Thus, after the first results of the sector inquiry arrived, Neelie Kroes openly stated 
that ownership unbundling would be the right solution for the lack of market 
competition. DG TREN also started to shift from the position that legal unbundling is 
sufficient (if fully implemented) towards the stance that the most appropriate solution 
lies in ownership unbundling (Interview 3), though it was still open for further 
discussion on this issue. 
110 
 
3.2.2 Interest groups’ early positions 
Even before the preliminary report on the inquiry arrived, DG TREN had organised 
initial consultations with stakeholders on the internal gas market in 2005. Firstly, in 
2005, DG TREN published a “Report on progress in creating the internal gas and 
electricity markets” (European Commission, 2005e). Stakeholders were asked to 
provide their positions on the considered issues. Approximately 50 responses arrived, 
including those made by Equinor (European Commission, 2005f, p. 180). Network 
users took the position that ownership unbundling might be necessary, whereas 
network operators took the view that the Second Gas Directive and legal unbundling 
were sufficient to ensure the independence of different parts of the gas network 
(European Commission, 2005f, p. 14). The Commission summarised the debate by 
urging member states to fully implement provisions concerning legal unbundling 
(since implementation had been delayed in many member states).  
In addition, the issue of unbundling was also discussed by the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). ERGEG was an advisory group 
to the Commission, comprised of national regulators.42 In 2005, the ERGEG 
presented “A roadmap towards a single European Gas Market”, explaining the 
European regulators’ positions on the gas market regulation (ERGEG, 2005a). 
Stakeholders were asked to comment on the paper in November 2005. Overall, 26 
responses were received, including comments made by Exxon (ExxonMobil, 2006a). 
In 2006, the ERGEG organised another round of consultations concerning the 
‘Guidelines for Good Practice on Regulatory Accounts Unbundling’.43 Seventeen 
responses were received from stakeholders, including Exxon’s re-submitted position 
paper (ExxonMobil, 2006b). The analysed documents show that the national energy 
regulators favoured ownership over legal unbundling. As for the companies and 
associations that took part in these consultations, most of them, including Exxon, 
opposed any further measures regarding unbundling.  
                                                          
42 See the CEER’s website: https://www.ceer.eu/eer_about. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
43 Available at: 
https://www.ceer.eu/eer_consult/closed_public_consultations/crosssectoral/ggp_account_unbundling. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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To sum up, at the beginning of the Commission’s mandate, DG TREN believed 
that the Second Gas Directive provided an adequate regulatory framework and that 
all the challenges facing new entrants were the result of delays in the implementation 
of the Second Directive. However, when the first results of the sectoral inquiry 
arrived, DG TREN started to question its previous position (Interview 3). DG COMP, 
on the other hand, took a clear position: the rules concerning gas infrastructure should 
be reinforced. In February 2006, after the preliminary report on the inquiry was 
published, Neelie Kroes openly expressed her support for ownership unbundling. 
National regulators also favoured this position through the ERGEG. Companies were 
divided over the issue; while new entrants started to advocate in favour of ownership 
unbundling, most of the established energy companies, including Exxon, opposed 
further regulation in this respect.  
 
3.3. The Commission’s preliminary position paper 
In March 2006, DG TREN published a green paper: “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, putting forward suggestions and policy 
measures that could form the basis for new energy policy (European Commission, 
2006b). This document confirmed the previously expressed position of the Energy 
Commissioner:  the provisions on the unbundling of the Second Gas Directive needed 
to be implemented. However, it was added and highlighted in bold, that if progress 
towards a more competitive market did not result, further policy measures would be 
considered (Europe Commission 2006b, p. 7). One of the measures put forward for 
further discussion was the possible introduction of “more effective unbundling” 
provisions (European Commission, 2006b, p. 18).  
During the same month (March 2006), the Commission opened infringement 
procedures against those countries that have not transposed the Second Gas Directive 
(European Commission, 2006h). Besides this, following an earlier announcement by 
Neelie Kroes that the Commission was planning to launch individual antitrust 
investigations (Kroes, 2006), DG COMP carried out “unannounced inspections” of 
gas enterprises in five countries - Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and France 
(Europen Commission, 2006e). The investigations resulted in the opening of antitrust 
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proceedings against two companies: E.ON (Germany) and Gaz de France (European 
Commission, 2007d). Thus, under the leadership of Neelie Kroes, DG COMP had 
extended its role in the internal energy market in a way that had not been seen in the 
past (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 253; Riley, 2006, p. 6).   
In addition, the question of unbundling developed an external dimension. Namely, 
when it came to external energy suppliers, most notably Russia, the main objective of 
the Commission, which could be traced back to the past, was to create a framework 
for energy cooperation based on competitive market rules (Youngs, 2009, p. 80). The 
Energy Charter Treaty44 (ECT) was seen as the crucial instrument for the 
accomplishment of this objective (European Commission, 2006b, p. 15). Though 
having signed the ECT in 1994, Russia did not ratify it. Since then, the Commission 
had been seeking alternative ways to persuade Russia to embrace the EU market-based 
rules in the energy policy domain (Youngs, 2009, p. 81). Thus, the Commission’s 
green paper called for the development of common foreign energy policy in relation 
to major non-EU energy suppliers. It was indicated that partnerships with external 
suppliers, especially Russia, should be based on “fair and reciprocal access to markets 
and infrastructure” (European Commission, 2006b, p. 15). Simultaneously, it was 
stressed that energy relations with the US and Norway should be improved (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 16).    
The green paper indicated a shift in DG TREN’s position towards ownership 
unbundling. Even though it was not explicitly stated, the document put forward the 
possible reinforcement of unbundling provisions. Albeit, Andris Piebalgs, hesitated to 
propose ownership unbundling as a policy measure, he started to change his position 
during 2006 (Interview 3). In addition, the green paper emphasised that the energy 
partnership with Russia should be established on a reciprocal basis, while relations 
with the US and Norway in this policy domain needed to be improved.  Unlike Energy 
Commissioner, Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, backed the introduction 
of ownership unbundling since the early days of the Commission’s mandate.  
                                                          
44 The Energy Charter Treaty represents a legal framework aimed at improving energy cooperation 
between the EU and non-EU contracting parties. Available at: 
http://www.energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019].      
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3.4. Interest groups’ positions 
In March 2006, the Commission opened a public consultation on the green paper, 
aiming to survey stakeholders’ views on the proposed policy options. In general, the 
industrial consumers (energy-intensive industries) provided support for ownership 
unbundling, whereas the main energy companies opposed this option (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 25) (for the full list of interest groups’ positions, see appendix 
III).  
The role played by industrial energy consumers changed between 2003 and 2007, 
mostly thanks to the new role played by DG COMP in the European energy market 
(Eikeland, 2011a, p. 257). Before 2003, DG COMP did not want to get engaged with 
industrial actors, partly because it wanted to avoid being seen as dependent on business 
groups (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 257). However, later on, it established strong and regular 
contacts with energy-consuming industries (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 257). As a result, the 
associations representing industrial energy consumers - such as the Alliance of 
Energy-Intensive Industries, the International Federation of Industrial Energy 
Consumers (IFIEC), the Chemical Industries Association, VIK (German Association 
of. Industrial Energy Users), etc. - would present a joint position, urging the EU to 
adopt a legation on ownership unbundling45.  
The energy companies, conversely, created a huge opposing block. The only 
exceptions to this were the UK energy companies:  the BG Group, Centrica, and the 
National Grid. Still, while opposing any further measures on unbundling, the 
resistance of the energy companies “was not desperate”, probably because some of 
them underestimated what could be done (Interview 3). The energy domain, at that 
time, was still dominated by member states’ policies rather than wider EU actions. 
Companies, especially those representing national champions, believed that, with the 
support of their governments, it was highly unlikely that the Commission would make 
a move towards ownership unbundling if member states (especially Germany and 
France) disagreed. One of their strongest arguments referred to companies’ property 
rights (Interview 3). Arguably, an obligation forcing companies to separate ownership 
of gas infrastructure would constitute some sort of unlawful expropriation. While 
                                                          
45 Interest groups’ position papers submitted during the public consultations in 2006.  
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Andris Piebalgs, believed that this is a strong argument on the side of energy 
producers, Neelie Kroes rejected this argument, by stating that ownership unbundling 
does not represent an unlawful expropriation (Kroes, 2007).  
As for the member states, indeed, there was little backing for new legislation. 
Instead, they preferred full implementation of the existing Second Energy Package 
before considering further measures. Germany and France, together with a group of 
six other member states (Greece, Slovakia, Latvia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Luxemburg) 
comprised the most vocal opposition to the proposal. These countries complained that 
the idea of unbundling vertically integrated companies is “unconstitutional and could 
have negative social consequences” (European Parliament, 2009b).46 The UK, 
Denmark and the Netherlands were among the few member states arguing in favour 
of legislation on mandatory ownership unbundling (European Commission, 2006c, p. 
16).  
With respect to the relations with external suppliers, the proposal for the 
establishment of a more common external energy policy was supported by nearly all 
contributors (European Commission, 2006c, p. 34). Many stakeholders, including the 
UK, France, the Benelux countries, the Czech Republic, and Poland47, explicitly 
emphasised that priority should be given to the ratification of the Energy Charter by 
Russia, together with more transparent access conditions to non-EU markets for EU 
investors. 
 
3.4.1. Non-EU actors 
When it comes to Russia, the main Commission’s objective has been to promote 
energy cooperation based on competitive market rules (Youngs, 2009, p. 80). At that 
time, energy cooperation between Gazprom, Russian joint-stock energy company48, 
and EU companies was largely based on bilateral agreements. Through these 
                                                          
46 See also EurActiv (01 February 2008) and EWEA (17 March 2008).  
47 Interest groups’ position papers submitted during the public consultations in 2006. 




agreements, Gazprom provided its European partners with gas supplies in exchange 
for the access to the downstream sector in the EU (see for instance Youngs, 2009, p. 
86-91). These partnerships, nevertheless, were exclusive in a sense that only a limited 
number of EU companies were allowed to access the Russian market and purchase 
Russian gas. The Commission intended to force Russia to open up its domestic market, 
under fair conditions, to all EU companies, without discrimination. The Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) was seen as the key instrument for accomplishing this objective. 
However, Russia refused to ratify ECT. As a result, the Commission sought to reach 
a consensus among member states to “speak with a single voice” with Russia about 
opening up its market for all European companies, without discrimination (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 15). 
In the year preceding the start of negotiations on the third package, Gazprom’s 
strategy was to expand its presence in the EU (Gazprom, 2007, p. 60; Heinrich, 2008). 
Besides this, the company had important shares in several European transmission 
system operators (See table 5). Given the above, the proposed market reform and, 
especially, the rules on unbundling were seen as measures which could put at risk 
Gazprom’s expansion strategy as the company could be constrained from taking 
control over the EU infrastructure (Heinrich, 2008, p. 9). Commenting on the proposed 
gas market reform, the Wall Street Journal (21 September 2007) described Russia’s 
position in the following way: “Moscow will have to be able to make a Potemkin-style 
division of Gazprom to get around any future EU restrictions”. As a result, Gazprom’s 
representatives voiced, on various occasions, their disagreement over the eventual 
introduction of ownership unbundling.49 For Gazprom, it was not reasonable for the 
Commission to advocate in favour of the “Gazprom clause”, as this would reduce 
investments in the EU energy market (Miller, 2008b; 2008c). Gazprom’s point of view 
was that extremely costly investments in infrastructural projects can be undertaken 
only by vertically integrated companies, not by ‘unbundled’ companies. While 
emphasising that “Gazprom will remain the guarantor of energy security for the 
European consumers”, the company’s Chairman of Management Committee, Alexey 
Miller, also warned that Gazprom is developing its relations with “new markets such 
                                                          
49 See for example a speech of Stanislav Tsygankov, Head of Gazprom’s International Business 
Department (Tsygankov, 2008), or a speech of Alexey Miller, Chairman of Gazprom Management 
Committee (Miller, 2008b). 
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as North America and China” and that “attempts to limit Gazprom’s activity in 
European market (…) will make no good results” (in BBC, 20 April 2006). 
 
Table 5. Participation of third countries’ investors in EU gas infrastructure in 2006. 
Gazprom 
Eesti Gas (Estonia)  37.2% 
Europolgaz (Poland)  48% 
Gasum (Finland)  25% 
Interconnector (UK-BE)  10% 
Latvijas Gaze (Latvia) 34% 
Lietuvos Dujos (Lithuania) 37.1% 
Wingas (Germany) 49.99% 
VNG (Germany) 5.26% 
Equinor 
Swedegas (Sweden) 30% 
Netra gas pipeline (Germany) 23.1% 
Etzel gas storage facility (Germany) 20.1% 
Exxon 
BEB Erdgas und Erdoel (Germany) 50% 
Source: European Commission (2007e, p. 106); Equinor (2007); Lewiner (2008). 
 
The largest Norwegian energy company, Equinor50, also aimed to expand the 
company’s presence in the downstream sector and to increase gas deliveries to Europe 
(Equinor, 2007, p. 12). Unlike Gazprom, Equinor did not strongly oppose ownership 
unbundling (Interview 5), since the company did not have as many assets as Gazprom 
in the EU (see table 5). Secondly, the process of gas market liberalisation, including 
discussions on unbundling, had influenced the company’s strategic thinking about how 
the gas industry could look and what role Equinor could play (Interview 5). Equinor 
saw the future liberalisation of the EU gas market as an opportunity for the company 
to shift its business strategy and adapt to further changes. In that sense, Equinor started 
to move towards a position in which ownership over infrastructure meant less. Still, 
                                                          
50 For more see the Equinor’s website: https://www.equinor.com/en/about-us.html. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019].      
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instead of ownership unbundling, Equinor proposed an independent system operator 
(ISO), citing the example of the Norwegian company GASSCO as a role model 
(Equinor, 2006). The Independent system operator (ISO) model involves situations 
where a company which produces or supplies energy may formally own network 
assets, but the full control over the transmission network must rest with an independent 
company (European Commission, 2007c, p. 6). Asked to comment on unbundling 
models, an Equinor representative replied that “an ISO-type system already exists in 
Norway” and “is working well” (in EUobserver, 10 January 2007). He explained that 
the company preferred an ISO over ownership unbundling because it needed “to keep 
pipeline assets on its books in order to secure good credit ratings and raise cheap capital 
on the international money markets for investments in new gas and oil fields” (in 
EUobserver, 10 January 2007; Interview 5). For vertically integrated companies, it was 
important to maintain ownership of infrastructure not only because they wanted to 
advance their presence at the EU market, but also because they could get bank credit 
which could be used for investments in energy production if they kept ownership of 
pipeline assets. This was the main reason why Equinor took a position that an ISO 
model might be the preferred option over ownership unbundling, though the company 
was not strictly against ownership unbundling, either.  
Thus, unlike Gazprom, who opposed ownership unbundling without reflecting on 
the Commission’s preferences towards further market liberalisation, Equinor decided 
to adjust its business strategy to the forthcoming changes in the EU gas market. Also, 
unlike its Russian counterpart, the Norwegian company backed the Commission’s 
determination to expand EU competition rules into non-EU producing countries by 
referring to “legislative and regulatory constraints in energy-producing countries” 
(Equinor, 2006, p. 8). Equinor regarded the Energy Charter Treaty as a significant 
instrument in this respect.  
At the beginning of negotiations on the third energy package, ExxonMobil, the US 
energy company51, opposed a further unbundling regulation. In response to the earlier 
mentioned ERGEG public consultations, Exxon expressed doubts about future 
measures on unbundling, arguing instead in favour of full enforcement of the Second 
                                                          
51 For more see the Exxon’s website: https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Company/Who-we-are/Our-
history. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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Gas Directive (Exxon, 2006b). However, during consultations on the Commission’s 
green paper, Exxon did not express any particular preferences concerning ownership 
unbundling. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham EU) – where Exxon was 
a board member -  did not refer specifically to unbundling in its position paper, either. 
However, it took the view that the existing legislation (the Second Package and legal 
unbundling) “should be given the time necessary to achieve its intended results” 
(AmCham, 2006, p. 2). This could be explained by Exxon’s intention to change its 
business strategy, as had Equinor. In 2007, when Exxon completely withdrew from the 
transmission business in the EU and sold its assets in the German market (BEB Erdgas 
und Erdoel)52, the company’s position slightly evolved in a more liberal direction. 
Commenting on the UK energy market, Exxon stated that ownership unbundling in the 
UK had provided for good market conditions (Exxon, 2008a).  
As for reciprocity in energy relations with foreign producing countries, Exxon 
backed the Commission’s efforts to promote “regulatory reforms and positive 
alternatives to command-and-control practices” (ExxonMobil, 2006c, p. 9). The 
position was supported by AmCham who took the view that the EU partnerships with 
producing states should be based on “reciprocal access to each other’s markets and 
infrastructure” (AmCham, 2006, p. 9).  
 
3.5. Non-EU interest groups’ lobbying activities 
At the time when the Commission launched the initiative for energy market reforms 
in 2006, the relations between Russia and the EU were, to an extent, strained. 
Following the criteria differentiating between insiders and outsiders, it would be hard 
to grant Gazprom either status at that point. The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 
January 2006, caused concerns in Brussels, leading to some decision-makers within 
the Commission to doubt Gazprom’s reputation as a reliable energy partner. After a 
dispute over the price Ukraine was supposed to pay to Gazprom for the gas deliveries, 
Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006. This dispute raised the alarm 
                                                          
52 The Shell’s official website: http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2007/11/23/statement-by-royal-dutch-
shell-plc-shell-and-exxonmobil-divest-from-german-gas-pipeline-assets/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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in the EU, since, at that time, around 80% of Russian gas to the EU has been 
transported through the Ukrainian territory (Parfitt, 02 January 2006). While “some 
believed that Gazprom is a reliable supplier, others did not” (Interview 3). On the other 
hand, Gazprom was the largest energy supplier to Europe, covering approximately 
20% of the EU gas needs. For that reason, it was important for the Commission to 
engage in conversation with Gazprom (Interview 3).   
“I understood, at least at that time, that Russians are important and that they are 
always suspicious. Whatever you do, they always feel that you are doing 
something against them. So you try really hard to be transparent and to engage 
with them. With their ministers, it has been usually easier, but with the company, 
it was more difficult. But the strategy was always to engage as much as possible, 
because that meant less problem for us, for them, for everybody” (Interview 3).  
With approximately 20% of the market share, Gazprom had secured a seat at the 
table discussing the future of the EU gas market. Nevertheless, after the first Russian-
Ukrainian gas dispute in 2006, some decision-makers within the Commission started 
to doubt its reputation of being a reliable energy supplier. At the same time, Gazprom 
started to question the Commission’s intentions towards the company.  
In addition to maintaining communication with the Commission, Gazprom turned 
to its partners in the member states. In the period between January 2006 and April 
2009, the company held more than 50 meetings with member states’ ministers and 
heads of states.53 Representatives of Gazprom held consultations with the President of 
France, Nicolas Sarkozy, the Slovenian President, Danilo Turk, the Prince of 
Luxembourg, the Chancellor of Austria, and other high-ranking officials from member 
states. Most meetings were held with public officials from Bulgaria and Austria, and 
somewhat fewer with officials from Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Slovenia and 
Hungary. Over the same period, Gazprom held about 50 meetings with representatives 
of EU energy companies. The most frequent were meetings with Italian companies 
(ENI and Enel), German energy businesses (VNG Gas AG, E.ON and Wintershall 
Holding), BP (the UK), Gaz de France (France), OMV (Austria), and MOL (Hungary). 
Communication was the most intensive before the Commission tabled its proposal in 
                                                          
53 Data obtained from the Gazprom’s official website.  
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September 2007, as well as prior to the adoption of the Council’s common position on 
the Commission’s proposal, in June 2008.  
Over the same period, Gazprom updated its bilateral agreements for natural gas 
supplies with some of the main EU companies such as E.ON Ruhrgas (until the end of 
2035) and Italian ENI (until the end of 2035), as well as some member states such as 
Austria (until the end of 2027) (Gazprom, 2006, p. 51). In addition, in 2007, the 
company hired GPlus consultancy to represent its interests in the EU. According to the 
Corporate Europe Observatory, GPlus worked to bring together Gazprom, on the one 
hand, and EU officials and media, on the other (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014, 
p. 13).  
The lobbying strategies of Equinor and Exxon differed from those employed by 
Gazprom. Firstly, whereas the two companies used public consultations hosted by the 
Commission to express their position, Gazprom did not. Secondly, when compared to 
Gazprom, the Norwegian and the US companies communicated more frequently with 
the Commission through EU business associations. As the table below shows, Exxon 
and, especially, Equinor were better integrated and connected with the most influential 
associations in the EU than Gazprom.  
 
Table 6. Interest groups’ membership in EU associations in 2006.    
Association  Membership Board 
Eurogas 
Represents European gas 
sellers and distributers.  




Association of Oil 
and Gas Producers 
(IOGP) 
Represents energy producers 







of Energy Traders 
(EFET) 
Represents energy traders. Equinor  
Gas Infrastructure 
Europe (GIE) 
Represents the gas 
infrastructure industry.  
Exxon   





Source: Websites of the respective associations. 
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During 2006 the Commission consulted five forums of stakeholders (advisory and 
expert groups) on a regular basis (European Commission, 2006c, p. 11). Three of them 
were of particular importance for the gas-related legislation: (1) the High Level Group 
on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment (HLGCEE) – which members 
included members of the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission, 
industry representatives, and consumer groups54; (2) the European Forum of Energy 
and Transport (EFET) – which members included a number of stakeholders55; and (3) 
the Gas Regulatory Forum (Madrid Forum) – which included member states, national 
regulators, industry representatives, and consumers56.  
The Gas Regulatory Forum (Madrid Forum) was the most important for discussions 
about the EU gas market. At these meetings, the energy industry was mostly 
represented by associations such as Eurogas, the International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers (IOGP), the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), Gas 
Infrastructure Europe (GIE), and EASEE-gas. Membership in these associations had 
provided an opportunity for Equinor and Exxon to have their voices heard during 
meetings in Madrid. It should be noted that Gazprom took part in meetings in Madrid 
twice, in 2005 and 2007, Exxon on three occasions, whereas Equinor was represented 
via the Norwegian government, who participated in these meetings on a regular basis. 
On the other hand, none of the companies under consideration took part in meetings 
organised by the other two groups: the HLGCEE and EFET. Yet, a representative of 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) was among the members of EFET and, at that time, 
only Exxon was a member of GIE (see table 6). 
In addition, Equinor and Exxon regularly commented on reports, 
recommendations, and other documents issued by: (1) the European Regulators Group 
for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) – a Commission’s advisory group that consisted of 
national regulators; and (2) the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) - 
established for the cooperation of the energy regulators57.   
                                                          
54 See the European Commission (2005h).  
55 See the European Commission (2004).  
56 See the European Gas Regulatory Forum: https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/32nd-madrid-forum-
2019-jun-05_en. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].    
57 See the CEER’s website: https://www.ceer.eu/eer_about. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].  
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In addition to this, in the period between 2006 and September 2007 (when the 
Commission adopted the final proposal for the third energy package), Equinor’s 
representatives met high-ranking Commission representatives on five occasions.58 The 
company also had contacts with other Commission staff in Brussels on a regular basis. 
The difference in lobbying styles could be partly explained by lobbying experience 
in Brussels. In contrast to Gazprom, who only opened its representative’s office in 
Brussels in 2013, Equinor opened its EU Affairs Office as early as 2002 (Equinor, 
2005, p. 60). Similarly, Exxon had its own EU Affairs team representing the company 
in the EU59 since the beginning of the 2000s. In addition, Exxon has been a board 
member of AmCham EU, who was among the first established lobby organisations in 
Brussels.  
Secondly, unlike Gazprom, Equinor liked to be listened to, but it did not try to make 
a political debate (Interview 3). 
“Equinor is a very politically correct company. They tried to be friendly, 
engaging, knowledgeable (…) but there is a huge difference in style between 
Gazprom and Equinor (…) Unlike Equinor, Russians were always suspicious” 
(Interview 3). 
Thirdly, the public image of the companies under consideration differed 
substantially. In media reports60 Gazprom has often been mentioned in a negative 
context. Titles containing words such as “threat”, “warning”, “dispute”, and “risk” 
reveal, to a certain extent, the public reputation enjoyed by the company in Brussels. 
Gazprom’s representatives themselves shared this impression. Alexey Miller, 
Gazprom’s Chairman of the Management Committee, once said: “One gets the 
impression that certain European officials are still unable to decide what it is they fear 
more – a real energy shortage, or the fictitious ‘Russian threat’” (Miller, 2008a). Even 
Gplus (a public affairs and communications consultancy hired by Gazprom) has had a 
bad reputation, just because it represents Gazprom (Interview 5). What is more, 
                                                          
58 Data obtained from the Equinor’s website.  
59 See the Exxon’s webiste: https://www.exxonmobil.eu/en-eu/company/about-us/european-union-
affairs/european-union-affairs. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
60 Sources: EurActiv and EuroNews between 2006 and September 2007 (when the Commission’s 
proposal was adopted). 
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Gazprom attracted, and still attracts, far more media attention in the EU than most of 
its counterparts. Between 2006 and September 2007, EurActiv realised four news 
stories on Equinor, five on Exxon, and approximately 30 on Gazprom. 
“Once when Miller [Alexey Miller, Gazprom’s Chairman of Management 
Committee] came (…) it was like a king is coming. I have never seen any 
company, even 2% of such public attention (…) The building was occupied by 
media” (Interview 3).    
Overall, it could be said that Equinor and Exxon shared more characteristics of a 
lobbying insider than Gazprom. They already had established offices in Brussels. They 
were better integrated into the network of EU associations. They showed more 
willingness to adjust their businesses to the future market liberalisation favoured by 
the Commission. Finally, the two companies had a foreign origin that matched the 
Commission’s vision of the EU external energy policy.  
 
3.6. The Commission’s proposal  
At the end of 2006, it became clear that Andris Piebalgs was convinced that ownership 
unbundling was a necessary step forward. Still, as mentioned earlier, at that time, 
ownership unbundling was an extremely unpopular policy option (Interview 3). The 
vast majority of energy producers and member states (including France and Germany) 
opposed ownership unbundling.  
However, despite the strong opposition, in September 2007, the Commission 
adopted the proposal for a new gas directive, putting forward the possibility for 
member states to opt for one of the following forms of unbundling: (1) ownership 
unbundling; or (2) an independent system operator (ISO) (European Commission, 
2007c). The Independent system operator (ISO) model involves situations where a 
company which produces or supplies energy may formally own network assets, but the 
full control over the transmission network must rest with an independent company 
(European Commission, 2007c, p. 6). While the Commission preferred ownership 
unbundling, the ISO model was introduced as a “bargaining chip” if ownership 
unbundling did not receive sufficient support (Interview 3; Eikeland, 2011a, p. 252). 
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By proposing the ISO model, in addition to ownership unbundling, a compromise 
was made. The opinion of the Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, did not 
evolve from her previously expressed support in favour of ownership unbundling. 
Even though she took the view that the creation of a rather complicated ISO model 
“will deliver effective separation of the network”, she expressed hope that “many 
companies will see that it is in their interest to move from the ISO model to full 
ownership unbundling” (Kroes, 2007). Energy Commissioner, on the other side, 
decided to make a compromise for two reasons. Firstly, because the camp opposing 
ownership unbundling led by France and Germany was particularly strong; therefore, 
it would be highly unlikely for the proposal to pass through the Council without the 
second option. Secondly, the argument employed by the energy industry – the 
expropriation of companies’ property – was seen by the Energy Commissioner as a 
relevant argument that should be taken into account (Interview 3).  
The compromise with the external dimension of the proposal, nevertheless, was not 
made. The Commission took the position non-EU companies have to obey the same 
unbundling rules as their EU counterparts (European Commission, 2007c, p. 7). The 
Commission imposed one additional requirement with regard to third-country 
companies, suggesting that a non-EU actor cannot take control over a transmission 
system (or operator) in the EU “unless this is permitted by an agreement between the 
EU and the third country” (European Commission, 2007c, p. 7). This requirement 
became known under the name of its “supposed target”: the ‘Gazprom clause’61 
(Youngs, 2009, p. 38; Van Vooren and Wessel, 2014, p. 450). Thus, non-EU 
companies were to be treated in the EU market in the same manner as EU companies 
were treated in third countries’ markets (i.e. reciprocity). The Gazprom clause was 
introduced for two reasons: (1) as a carrot to force external energy suppliers to open 
up their domestic markets for EU companies (Youngs, 2009, p. 39); and (2) as a carrot 
to weaken the resistance of eastern member states that afraid that, in the absence of 
such provisions, Gazprom could take the opportunity to buy more assets in the EU 
(Eikeland, 2011a, p. 254).  
                                                          
61 Gazprom’s representatives called it the ‘anti-Gazprom clause’ (Miller, 2008c). 
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But still, even though a compromise was made (through the introduction of a second 
‘lighter’ option), what seemed puzzling was the Commission’s determination to 
propose ownership unbundling, despite the huge opposition of member states 
(Eikeland, 2011a, p. 244). After the Council’s meeting in Jun 2007, Andris Piebalgs 
said: “The majority is not with me” (EUobserver, 07 June 2007). So why did the 
Commission decide to make a decision despite such strong opposition? 
Firstly, the UK support was considered an important factor behind the 
Commission’s decisions (Interview 3). The UK was regarded as the prime advocate of 
ownership unbundling. The country’s position towards further market liberalisation in 
general terms, and ownership unbundling specifically, supported by Denmark and the 
Netherlands, prevented the creation of a united opposition among member states. This 
was important for the Commission since it would be highly unlikely to propose a 
measure opposed by almost all member states. 
Secondly, while energy producers were united in opposing ownership unbundling, 
another camp of stakeholders was created to advocate in favour of the proposed 
measure – energy-intensive industries and consumer groups. In the period between 
2003 and 2007, the influence of the energy supplier and energy-intensive industry 
shifted towards the latter (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 257). By defending the rights of and 
connecting more strongly with industrial energy consumers, DG COMP played a 
significant role in this process (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 258). 
Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, the sector inquiry, infringement procedures against 
member states, and antitrust investigations against certain vertically integrated 
companies were also important in this respect. Following antitrust proceeding against 
E.ON, the company agreed to unbundle its assets in return for the Commission 
dropping the investigations against it (The Guardian, 29 February 2008). It seems that 
the Commission believed that this would reduce the companies’ incentives to lobby 
their governments against the proposed ownership unbundling (Eikeland, 2011a, p. 
253). The statement given by Germany’s Deputy Energy Minister, Peter Hintze, 
confirms this intention: “It’s very astounding. The timing coincidence of these events... 




3.7. Lobbying success of non-EU interest groups 
Gazprom was among the strongest opponents of both ownership unbundling and the 
Gazprom clause. Equinor took a position that the ISO model should be the preferred 
option over ownership unbundling, though the company was not strictly against 
ownership unbundling either. Concerning the Gazprom clause, during public 
consultations, Equinor expressed the opinion that relations with producing countries 
needed to be based on reciprocity, which was the exact intention behind the Gazprom 
clause. Similarly, Exxon, in the beginning, argued against ownership unbundling; 
however, after selling some of its assets in Germany, it seems that the company made 
a shift from its previously expressed position. As for relations with producing 
countries, Exxon’s position was similar to Equinor’s. AmCham followed the same line 
of thought.    
Hence, the actor whose preferences were the most embedded in the Commission’s 
final position was Equinor, followed by Exxon. The proposal was the least favourable 
for Gazprom (see table 7). 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the estimated degree of success of the analysed non-EU groups. 
The Commission’s 
proposal (2007) 
Equinor Exxon Gazprom 
Ownership Unbundling ✓x ✓x x 
ISO ✓ N/A x 
The Gazprom clause ✓ ✓ x 
            ✓ - support; x – oppose; ✓x– partly support; N/A- no position. 
 
3.7.1. Commission preferences on the discussed issues 
At the beginning, DG TREN favoured full implementation of the Second Directive 
over the new legislation on unbundling. Still, after the preliminary results of the inquiry 
arrived, a shift in position was made – DG TREN started to question the adequacy of 
the Second Gas Directive in dealing with malfunctions in the gas market. Neelie Kroes, 
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on the other hand, was convinced from the beginning that ownership unbundling was 
the best solution. The Commission’s determination to secure fair treatment of the EU 
companies in Russia, based on reciprocity, was clearly expressed, even before public 
consultations on the green paper were organised. How did the Commissioners’ 
preferences on the discussed issues affect the companies’ prospects of lobbying 
successfully? 
Firstly, the Commission had used the competition law to advance the development 
of the gas market. As early as her hearing before the European Parliament, Neelie 
Kroes announced that the Commission would use all the tools at its disposal to push 
for a more proactive application of the competition policy. Sectoral screenings, 
unannounced inspections of gas companies, and antitrust investigations were important 
in this respect. The fact that the Commission had strong cases against some of the most 
high-profile energy companies in Europe seems to have helped the Commission prove 
its point, that ownership unbundling is needed, and to make a consensus more likely 
(Interview 3; Eikeland, 2011a). Finally, DG COMP’s networking with energy-
consuming industries created a strong block backing the Commission’s intention to 
introduce ownership unbundling.  
Secondly, it appears that DG TREN wanted to defend its preferences before interest 
groups, instead of the other way around.  
“We tried to speak with everyone, to really understand their position and 
arguments. Then you try to explain your [the Commission’s] argument, knowing 
that perhaps you will not convince them, but at least they have been listened to, 
and arguments were exchanged.” (Interview 3).  
Andris Piebalgs was reluctant to propose ownership unbundling, not because full 
ownership was seen as a preferable option, but because the opposing camp, led by 
Germany and France, was so strong that it was hard for the proposal to get through the 
Council. Hence, role-play by interest groups was seen as significant in this respect.  
“Interest groups are, at least for very challenging proposals, crucial. You cannot 
afford for anybody to be extremely hostile. Information is significant. It 
[information provided by interest groups] gave the direction of political 
compromise. Perhaps you do not get too much new information, but you become 
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aware of where the political compromise could be found (…) We have been very 
open to listening. And also it was a precondition to get it [the proposal] through 
the Council.” (Interview 3).   
Therefore, rather than receiving expertise or technical knowledge, it was important 
to get information about how political compromise could be made. Additionally, by 
sharing its views and by discussing its position with interest groups, the Commission 
also wanted to avoid, or at least to relax, the resistance of member states.   
Interest groups, thus, managed to escape the worst-case scenario – ownership 
unbundling was not the only option; instead, an alternative (ISO) was proposed in 
addition, leaving the possibility for member states to opt between the two options. This, 
however, did not mean that member states and energy companies, including Gazprom, 
were pleased with the final outcome. On the contrary, following the release of the 
Commission’s proposal, a bloc of member states led by Germany and France sent a 
letter to the Commission and the European Parliament, arguing that the Commission’s 
proposal was “not compatible with national law and the free movement of capital” 
(EurActiv, 01 February 2008; EWEA, 17 March 2008). In addition, the member states 
took the view that ownership unbundling would not increase investments and 
competition in the energy domain. Instead, a third option – the independent 
transmission operator (ITO) model - was proposed, alongside ownership unbundling 
and the ISO model.  
 
3.7.2. Commission’s position on the interest groups 
Gazprom was clearly an important company because of its size and market share in the 
EU, which is one of the criteria for a company to be seen as an insider. Nevertheless, 
according to all the other characteristics of the company, it was closer to being an 
outsider. Gazprom did not have an established presence in Brussels, it was not a 
member of most of the EU associations, and it did not have a broad portfolio of 
engagement. The company was focused on pursuing its own interests (against further 
liberalisation of the European gas market) without considering sufficiently the 
Commission’s preferences.  
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“Gazprom tried to fight the Third Package as much as it could, but it failed (…) 
They [Gazprom] asked: ‘Guys what do you want?’ We have gas, we have 
networks, we have skills. So the cheapest way actually is that we are integrated. 
And what do you ask from us – that we sell gas at the border to somebody who 
will then resell this gas. You will pay more.’ (…) That was logical for them 
[Gazprom]. Because if you do not believe in competitive forces, then vertical 
integration sounds like a logical idea. But that was not the way the European 
market worked” (Interview 3). 
While getting directly engaged with the Commission, Gazprom also issued several 
statements with a threatening tone. Alexey Miller, Gazprom’s CEO, for instance, stated 
that Gazprom could develop its relations with new markets (e.g. China), away from 
the EU, and that any restriction of Gazprom’s activities in the EU “will make no good 
results” (in BBC, 20 April 2006). This confrontational style of communication has 
been seen as uncharacteristic to insiders (Grant, 2001, p. 343).  
Equinor and Exxon shared more characteristics of a lobbying insider than Gazprom. 
Similar to Gazprom these companies were seen as important because of their size and 
market share – 13% (Equinor) and 7% (Exxon) of overall EU gas consumption in 2005. 
However, unlike Gazprom, they already had established offices in Brussels. They were 
better integrated into the network of EU associations. They were more open towards 
changing their business strategies. The whole process of gas market liberalisation, 
including discussions on unbundling, influenced Equinor’s strategic thinking about 
how the gas industry could look and what role Equinor could play in that regard 
(Interview 5). The company did not see the situation as black or white; instead, it was 
important to create a system that could work. For that reason, Equinor did not take as 
strong a position on unbundling as its Russian counterpart.  
“It might not be helpful [for a lobbyist] if you did not prove to be helpful 
[solution-oriented] before or you have very, very narrow agenda and you do not 
see all interests of the EU, but only your own interests” (Interview 5).  
Besides, the green paper, adopted by the Commission in 2006, had emphasised the 
importance of both energy suppliers:  Russia and Norway. Nevertheless, while stating 
that Norway is one of the EU most important energy partners and that the EU should 
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facilitate Norway’s efforts to develop resources in Europe (European Commission 
2006b, p. 16), partnership with Russia was portrayed in a different way:  
“The EU, as Russia’s largest energy buyer, is an essential and equal partner in 
this relationship. (…) A true partnership would (...). mean fair and reciprocal 
access to markets and infrastructure including, in particular, third-party access to 
pipelines. Work should start on an energy initiative based on these principles” 
(European Commission, 2006b, p. 15).  
The problems associated with its country of origin that were recognised by decision-
makers in Brussels did not prove to be helpful for Gazprom’s lobbying efforts. The 
Commission’s determination to secure reciprocity between the EU and Russia one way 
or another (through the Energy Charter Treaty or the Gazprom clause), have not left 
much room for Gazprom to fight against these provisions.  
The company did not make a secret of its intention to alter the Commission’s 
proposal. Commenting on the Commission’s proposal, Alexey Miller stated that a lot 
of Gazprom’s European partners supported Gazprom’s views and that the company 
would coordinate its efforts with them “in order to persuade European officials that 
one should not saw off the bough on which he is sitting” (Miller, 2008c).  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
The case study indicates that the Commission’s initial preferences affect interest 
groups’ lobbying success. In particular, the analysed case suggests that the 
Commission might have strong early preferences not only over outcomes (the gas 
market liberalisation) but also over policies aiming to achieve the desired outcomes 
(Gazprom clause). Besides, the case indicates that Commissioners in charge of a 
proposal also might have initial preferences based on their previous knowledge, 
beliefs, personal or their countries’ experience. Thus Neelie Kroes, Commissioner for 
Competition had the strong preferences for ownership unbundling due to her country’s 
positive experience with ownership unbundling.  
The empirical findings provide support for the assumption that the Commission 
might use competition law to advance its preferences. DG COMP’s launch of the 
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sectoral screening, inspections of gas companies, and opening of antitrust 
investigations against E.ON and Gaz de France is a case in point. It seems that the fact 
that the Commission had strong cases against these and other large companies helped 
the Commission to demonstrate that ownership unbundling is a necessary step forward 
and to make a consensus with stakeholders opposing ownership unbundling more 
likely. The case also finds support for the assumption that the Commission may 
organise a network of allies to shift a debate into a direction preferred by the 
Commission. DG COMP has established regular contacts with energy-consuming 
industries, thus creating a strong block backing the Commission’s intention to 
introduce ownership unbundling.  
On the other side, the case indicates that the absence of the Commission’s strong 
early preferences increases the likelihood of groups’ lobbying success. The gas 
industry managed to escape the worst-case scenario, since ownership unbundling was 
not the only option; instead, an alternative – ISO - was added, leaving the possibility 
for member states to choose between the two options. The argument put forward by 
the energy industry – supposed expropriation of companies’ property – was seen by 
the Energy Commissioner as a relevant argument that should be taken into account. 
At the same time, however, the ISO model was seen as a “bargaining chip” aimed at 
appeasing the opposing member states. In this way, the Commission has defended its 
basic interest – to get approval by the Council.    
The case, however, does not find support for the assumption that insiders (Equinor, 
Exxon) have better access to the Commission than outsiders (Gazprom) when it comes 
to bilateral meetings with Commission officials, and interest groups’ access to 
Commission’s advisory groups (e.g. Madrid Forum). One of the reason for that is 
Gazprom’s economic power. As one of the biggest energy supplier to Europe, 
Gazprom was able to secure a seat at the table discussing the future development of 
the EU gas market. However, the case confirms that access does not necessarily 
“translate into influence” (Dür, 2008a, p. 1221). While acquiring access to the 
Commission, the company did not manage to successfully defend its “ideal position”. 
The case also provides support for the assumption that interest groups coming from 
countries that are strategically important for the EU (Norway and the US) are more 
likely to lobby successfully.  
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 Chapter 4: Third-Party Access to Natural Gas Transmission Networks 
 
This chapter examines the level of lobbying success of non-EU interest groups during 
the preparation of the Commission’s proposal on third-party access (TPA) regimes to 
gas networks (pipelines and storages). The proposal was tabled in 2007 and eventually 
adopted in 2009 as part of the Third Energy Package. The chapter also analyses the 
Commission’s proposed amendments to the Third Energy Package, adopted in 2017. 
The aim of the amendments was to extend the Third Energy Package to offshore 
import pipelines, namely those that bring gas from third (non-EU) countries to the EU.   
The provisions on TPA proposed in 2007 have not been part of the Commission’s 
priorities defined at the beginning of its mandate. However, DG Competition had early 
preferences on certain measures such as the establishment of a single European grid, 
harmonisation of powers and independence of national regulators, and cooperation 
among them. On the other hand, measures such as long-term contracts, exemptions 
from TPA to new infrastructure, access to storage, and price formation, have not been 
identified as part of the Commission’s early preferences. As for the amendments 
proposed in 2017, the Commission has strongly advocated in favour of these changes. 
Although these amendments have not formally been part of the Commission’s policy 
priorities, the rationale behind their adoption was to protect one of its policy priorities 
- the diversification of energy sources. The chapter examines the lobbying success of 
the four companies - Gazprom, Equinor, Exxon, and Naftogaz – which varied among 
themselves as regards their status of insiders/outsiders. 
 
4.1. Background 
Similarly to other network industries, the gas industry also depends on a network – the 
pipelines, storage and other facilities within a given market. Since, in most cases, it 
does not make economic sense to duplicate a network, gas transportation and supply 
in a given market will depend on this single network (Talus, 2016, p. 20; European 
Commission, 2006d, p. 17). As a consequence, the owners of the gas infrastructure are 
“considered to be in control of a natural monopoly” (European Commission, 2006d, 
p. 17). The European Union is no exception in this respect, as the majority of gas 
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which is consumed in the EU is transported from distant non-EU countries (e.g. Russia 
and Algeria). 
Historically, the main partners of gas producers outside the EU were national 
champions (monopolies) which were importing gas to the EU (European Commission, 
2006d, p. 18). Relations between the producers and importers were based on long-
term contracts which aimed to ensure that a buyer could not easily replace the energy 
provider (security of demand for producers) and that the provider could not easily 
switch to other buyers (security of supply for buyers) (Vavilov and Trofimov, 2015, 
p. 139; Talus, 2011b). The underlying objective of these long-term contracts was to 
guarantee investments in the development of gas infrastructure, while, at the same 
time, allowing customers to benefit from reliable energy supplies (European 
Commission, 2007a, p. 85).   
Because of the market concentration (the domination of vertically integrated 
companies), long-term relations between producers and importers, and dependence on 
a single gas network, access by third parties to the gas infrastructure was seen as an 
essential tool allowing for market competition to develop (Talus, 2016, p. 20). Third-
party access (TPA) provisions were introduced in 1996. The idea was to prescribe 
conditions under which an owner of gas infrastructure (e.g. pipelines and storage) had 
to provide to third parties (anyone apart from the network owners) access to this 
infrastructure on a non-discriminatory basis, sometimes even against her own will 
(Talus, 2013, p. 71). 
The First Energy Package (Directive 98/30/EC62) prescribed an obligation for 
member states to offer TPA to gas infrastructure in the form of either the negotiated 
or regulated access regime. Under the negotiated access regime, gas companies 
negotiated, under the previously published commercial conditions, access to the gas 
network (Article 15 of the Directive 98/30/EC). Under the regulated assess regime, 
member states (not companies) were setting rules - tariffs and other terms - under 
which third parties could obtain access (Article 16 of the Directive 98/30/EC). The 
Directive, however, provided several possibilities for derogation from the TPA rules. 
According to Article 17, gas companies were allowed to refuse access to infrastructure 
either “on the basis of a lack of capacity” or pre-existing contractual obligations or 
                                                          
62 European Parliament and the Council (1998). 
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“where the access to the system would prevent them from carrying out the public-
service obligations”.  
Since these provisions did not provide a sufficient level of market opening, the 
Second Energy Package (adopted in 2003) eliminated the possibility of negotiated 
access and limited its application only to particular parts of the gas infrastructure, i.e. 
storage (Talus, 2013, p. 74). Owners of pipelines were obliged to provide regulated 
TPA, grounded in the previously published tariffs and methodologies used for their 
calculation, set by member states and approved by national regulatory authorities 
(NRA) (Article 3 of the Regulation 1775/200563). Besides, technical rules regarding 
TPA such as the “capacity allocation” management64, “congestion” management65, 
and transparency requirements were introduced as well. Finally, the Directive 
2003/55/EC66 prescribed the possibility for new infrastructure to be the exempted from 
TPA provisions (Article 22), with an aim to create incentives for investments in new 
pipelines, storage and other costly gas facilities that were needed to satisfy the 
increasing gas demand. Still, the Directive attached conditions under which an 
exemption could be granted in order to protect competition in the European gas market 
(Article 22). 
While the Second Energy Package set an obligation for member states to provide 
regulated TPA to pipelines, it did not prescribe the same obligation for gas storage. 
Instead, the choice of a third-party access regime (negotiated or regulated) was left to 
member states. Also, storage operators were obliged to offer TPA only when the 
access to storage was “technically and/or economically necessary for providing 
efficient access to the system for the supply of customers” (Article 19 of the Directive 
2003/55/EC). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Directive left the possibility for new 
infrastructure, including storage facilities, to be exempted from the TPA provisions. 
To compensate for the lack of EU regulation on access regimes to storage facilities, 
the Commission and national energy regulators adopted a non-binding guideline on 
access to storage, the Guidelines for Good TPA Practices for Storage System 
                                                          
63 European Parliament and the Council (2005). 
64 Capacity represents the maximum flow which a network user can use according to a transportation 
contract (Article 2 of the Regulation 1775/2005). 
65 Congestion management represents the management of a pipeline capacity with the aim of achieving 
optimal use of the capacity (Article 2 of the Regulation 1775/2005).   
66 European Parliament and the Council (2003). 
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Operators (GGPSSO) (ERGEG, 2005b). Storage operators then committed 
themselves to respect these guidelines voluntarily. 
However, despite prescribing a number of rules related to TPA, the Second Energy 
Package did not provide a sufficient level of market opening for new entrants 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 4). Therefore, the debate about the European gas 
market was opened in 2005. One important part of the discussion was the question of 
ownership unbundling, discussed in the first case study. Another concerned provisions 
on third party access and related policy measures. This chapter firstly analyses policy 
measures on TPA proposed by the Commission in 2007 and adopted by the Council 
and the European Parliament in 2009 as part of the Third Energy Package. Thereafter 
the chapter turns to the Commission’s amendments to the Third Package (the Third 
Gas Directive and related regulation) that were tabled in 2017.  
 
4.2. The Third Energy Package (2007) 
This section analyses the participation of non-EU lobby groups in the preparation of 
the Commission’s proposal on third-party access (TPA) regimes to gas networks 
(pipelines and storage) adopted in 2007. The leading Commissioner on the issue of 
third-party access was the Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs. Another important 
person involved in the preparation of the Commission’s proposal was the 
Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes. 
 
4.2.1.  Early positions  
4.2.1.1. The Commission’s early position 
4.2.1.1.1. Hearings before the European Parliament 
As already mentioned in the first case study (ownership unbundling), in 2004 the new 
Commission under the Presidency of José Manuel Barroso was appointed. In the 
newly formed Commission, the position of Energy Commissioner was given to the 
Latvian nominee - Andris Piebalgs. Similar to the previous case study, during the 
hearing before the European Parliament in 2004, Andris Piebalgs did not mention any 
specific regulatory measures regarding TPA regimes (Piebalgs, 2004). Instead, the 
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priority was given to the full implementation of the previous legislation. Furthermore, 
the Regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks (which has 
been part of the Second Energy Package together with the Second Gas Directive) was 
still under negotiation between the Council and the European Parliament when Andris 
Piebalgs was appointed. Though the previous Commission, under Romano Prodi, had 
made a proposal on the Regulation in 2003, the final agreement between the Council 
and the Parliament was not reached until July 2005. Therefore, before taking the 
position of Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs did not express strong initial 
preferences for TPA to gas networks because when he was nominated, the Second 
Regulation was still under negotiations.   
As explained in the previous chapter, the Commissioner for Competition, Neelie 
Kroes, initiated “sector-wide investigations” with the aim of revealing barriers to 
competition in certain policy domains (Kroes, 2004). The initiative was approved by 
the Commission and presented to the Council in February 2005 (European 
Commission, 2005b). 
 
4.2.1.1.2.  Preliminary reports on the sector inquiry 
In November 2005, DG Competition (DG COMP) published the initial findings of the 
energy sector inquiry. The results confirmed many of the concerns related to TPA, 
underpinning the decision to open the sectoral investigations: (1) “market 
concentration” – the dominance of gas companies that controlled gas imports to the 
EU through long-term contracts with non-EU gas producers; (2) “vertical foreclosure” 
– limited access to gas infrastructure for new entrants and limited liquidity of gas 
markets ; (3) lack of integration between national markets – restricted cross-border gas 
trade and fragmentation of the EU gas market along member states’ borders; (4) lack 
of transparency – lack of information necessary to provide for non-discriminatory 
access to gas infrastructure; and (5) a gas price issue – wide-spread use of oil price 
indexes in gas import contracts (European Commission, 2005c, p. 2-3).  
These initial findings were presented to the Council by Neelie Kroes in December 
2005 (Kroes, 2005). Speaking about further steps that should be taken regarding TPA, 
Commissioner Kroes  stressed that it would be important to tackle two things:  (1) how 
to limit the adverse effects of exemptions from TPA; and (2) how to establish a 
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common European grid, as suggested by the Council Presidency67(Kroes, 2005).  At 
that time, as shown by the inquiry, the EU gas market was nationally divided, with 
limited cross-border gas trade. Part of the reason behind the lack of integration was 
the lack of a gas infrastructure that would connect member states. Another sound 
reason was the lack of common rules that would regulate gas transportation between 
the member states. A third important reason was that many pipelines connecting 
member states (so-called transit pipelines) were exempted from TPA provisions under 
the Second Gas Directive (European Commission, 2005c, p. 2). Hence, as will be 
explained below, Neelie Kroes saw the establishment of the European grid (a gas 
network) as one of the priorities of the future EU energy policy.  
In February 2006, the “Preliminary Report on Energy Sector Inquiry” was adopted. 
The report confirmed the major concerns raised by the initial findings: the market 
opening for newcomers had not been achieved (European Commission, 2006d, p. 37). 
Inadequate unbundling of the vertically integrated companies (discussed in the first 
case study) was seen as one of the major obstacles. Other problems related to third-
party access (TPA) were also identified.  
Firstly, the report concluded that long term supply contracts between a few 
dominant producers and importers had aggravated access to gas in both upstream and 
downstream markets (European Commission, 2006d, p. 4). Given the long duration 
and exclusivity of these contracts, new entrants were usually precluded from an 
opportunity to obtain gas directly from producers. Since national gas markets were not 
liquid enough to provide available gas in the short term, entrants were not in a position 
to buy gas on hub markets either (European Commission, 2006d, p. 38). Secondly, as 
already mentioned, the Second Gas Directive had prescribed the possibility for new 
gas infrastructure to be exempt from TPA rules (Article 22). The results of the inquiry, 
however, indicated that new infrastructure usually ended up in the hands of already 
dominant market players, thus creating further barriers to market entry for smaller 
companies (European Commission, 2006d, p. 73-74).  
The third problem to be identified by the inquiry concerned access to gas storage. 
The investigation had revealed that negotiated TPA represents a preferred form of 
access to storage in many member states (European Commission, 2006d, p. 51). 
                                                          
67 See the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2006).  
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However, numerous concerns over negotiated access regimes were raised by new 
entrants: the lack of transparency, insufficient use of storage, and high access prices 
(European Commission, 2006d, p. 51). Furthermore, many storage facilities were 
actually excluded from TPA provisions due to exemption possibilities provided by the 
Second Package (European Commission, 2006d, p. 52). The inquiry also revealed that 
the available storage capacity (capacity that was not booked or derogated from TPA) 
was very scarce, partly due to long-term reservations made by the dominant market 
players (European Commission 2006d, p. 52). Finally, it was concluded that 
compliance with the voluntary Guidelines for Good TPA Practices for Storage System 
Operators (GGPSSO) was unsatisfying (European Commission, 2006d, p. 51).   
Fourthly, the inquiry demonstrated that companies rarely engaged in the gas trade 
between member states (European Commission, 2006d, p. 55). Access for new 
entrants to pipelines connecting member states’ markets (the so-called “transit 
pipelines”) was limited due to the predominance of long-term contracts (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 4). The analysis also revealed a lack of transparency with 
regard to the information on the conditions under which TPA was provided (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 85). Finally, the report pointed to concerns related to the gas 
price formation. The problem was seen in linking the gas price to the oil price in most 
of the import contracts, thus failing to establish a “market-based pricing mechanism” 
that would follow changes in gas supply and demand (gas to gas competition), instead 
of other fossil fuel prices (European Commission 2006d, p. 5). 
Even though the report concluded that it was “too early to draw conclusions” on 
remedies to the market malfunctions, certain preliminary conclusions were drawn 
(European Commission, 2006i, p. 189). First, it was stressed that the inquiry findings 
would be beneficial for the Commission’s antitrust investigations (European 
Commission, 2006i, p. 189). In 2006 the Commission carried out inspections of gas 
companies in a few member states (European Commission, 2006e), as explained in 
the first case study.  Second, the report highlighted that the transparency obligations 
from the Second Package should be strengthened, as well as the powers of the national 
regulators (NRAs) and cooperation between them, and the rules on interconnectors 
between member states’ infrastructure (European Commission, 2006i, p. 190).  
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Overall, the preliminary report on the energy inquiry identified many malfunctions 
related to TPA. Albeit at that stage, DG COMP was still unsure which measures would 
be the most appropriate to deal with these issues, it was emphasised that that the 
transparency obligations, the powers of NRAs, and rules governing interconnectors 
between states should be further strengthened. All other regulatory issues were still 
open for discussion with stakeholders. Hence, another round of public consultations, 
asking interest groups to provide their views on the preliminary report, was organised 
in 2006. Commenting on the major findings of the report, Andris Piebalgs promised 
to share his conclusions about whether further Commission action was needed by the 
end of 2006 (Piebalgs, 2006).  
 
4.1.1.2. Interest groups’ early positions 
In September 2005 the tenth meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum (the 
Madrid Forum), an advisory group to the Commission, was held with the aim of 
discussing the challenges and future developments of the gas market. The most 
significant business associations that took part at the tenth meeting in 2005 were: the 
European Federation of Local Energy Companies (CEDEC), the European 
Association for the Streamlining of Energy Exchange (EASEE-Gas), the European 
Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), the Union of the Electricity Industry 
(Eurelectric), Eurogas, Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), and the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP)68. In addition, industrial energy 
consumers, such as UNICE (since 2007, known as BusinessEurope), representing 
national business federations, and the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), 
and IFIEC Europe, representing the interests of industrial energy users, were also 
present. When it came to foreign stakeholders, the Norwegian government was invited 
to take part, as well as a representative from Gazprom. Exxon’s representative took 
part as a member of the EASEE-Gas delegation.  
All stakeholders agreed that effective competition in the European gas market still 
was not achieved. However, different views were expressed regarding whether the full 
                                                          
68 The European Gas Regulatory Forum: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/markets-and-
consumers/wholesale-energy-market/gas-network-codes/madrid-forums_en#madrid-forum-meetings-
2005-2017. [Accessed on 07/07/2019] 
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implementation of the existing legislation would be sufficient (the Regulation on TPA 
had just been adopted), or whether further regulatory measures should be introduced. 
As the meeting’s conclusions show, GIE and Eurogas, took the position that the 
Second Energy Package contained all the needed measures aiming at delivering 
market competition (European Gas Regulatory Forum, 2005). Similarly, the IOGP 
emphasised the significance of regulatory stability for future investments in the gas 
sector. On the other hand, the EFET, representing energy traders, as well as 
associations that represented the large industrial energy consumers (e.g. CEFIC and 
IFIEC) pointed out a need for the improvement of certain aspects of the market 
legislation (e.g. transparency) (European Gas Regulatory Forum, 2005). The 
Commission, however, still did not take a clear position on further steps related to 
TPA; while remaining open to future legislation, the Commission gave priority to the 
full implementation of the Second Package (European Gas Regulatory Forum, 2005).  
In addition to the Madrid Forum, the European Regulators Group for Electricity 
and Gas (ERGEG) represented another significant forum for discussions on energy 
market-related issues, as explained in the previous chapter. In 2005, the ERGEG 
presented “A roadmap towards a single European Gas Market”, explaining the 
European regulators’ preferences in regards to the future development of the EU gas 
markets (ERGEG, 2005a). Issues identified as those seeking further improvements 
were: cooperation among national regulators, transparency, effective access to gas 
networks, and availability of sufficient amounts of gas (ERGEG, 2006a, p. 3). The 
stakeholders were asked to comment on the paper in November 2005. Overall, 26 
responses were received, including comments made by Exxon. Positions taken by 
stakeholders were similar to those expressed during the Madrid Forum meeting. 
Exxon’s position will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.  
During the same year, DG TREN published a report on the gas market. 
Stakeholders were also asked to provide their positions on issues considered within 
the report. Approximately 50 responses arrived, including those made by Equinor 
(European Commission, 2005f, p. 180). While the positions of stakeholders will be 
discussed in subsequent sections, it is important to note here that the DG TREN still 
had not expressed any clear preferences over further policy measures. Instead, it was 
emphasised that the immediate core action should be the implementation of the Second 
Package (European Commission, 2005e, p. 2).  
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Thus, at the beginning of the Commission’s mandate, DG TREN did not take any 
position on provisions concerning third-party access regimes. This was because, when 
the new Commission under the Presidency of José Manuel Barroso was appointed, the 
Second Energy Regulation, proposed by the previous Commission under Romano 
Prodi, was still under negotiation between the Council and the European Parliament. 
DG COM, on the other hand, took the position that that transparency obligations under 
the Second Package – related to TPA to gas infrastructure - should be strengthened, as 
well as the powers of the national regulators and cooperation between them. National 
regulators backed this position throughout ERGEG. In addition, Neelie Kroes 
suggested the establishment of a common European grid. Interest groups were divided 
on the issue: while gas industrial associations, such as GIE, Eurogas, and IOGP, took 
the position that the Second Energy Package contained all the measures necessary to 
deliver competition, representatives of energy consumers and traders (e.g. the EFET, 
CEFIC and IFIEC), as well as new entrants, pointed out the need for improvement of 
internal gas market legislation. 
 
4.2.2. The Commission’s preliminary position paper 
In March 2006, DG TREN published a green paper: “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”. It was decided that, by the end of 2006, 
after the full implementation of the Second Energy Package and completion of the 
inquiry, the final decision would be “made on any additional legislative measures 
needed” to ensure non-discriminatory TPA (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6). 
However, it was added that certain areas “need particular attention” (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 6).  
Firstly, it was suggested that a single European grid (network) that could be created 
through the establishment of a European grid code, i.e. common rules to regulate 
cross-border gas trade, is needed (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6). The reason 
underpinning this proposal was the creation of a single European energy market that 
would succeed in the fragmented national market with little cross-border trade. With 
the aim of assisting work on developing network codes, the Commission considered 
the creation the European Centre for Energy Networks, bringing together the network 
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operators69 (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6). It was also stressed that the 
harmonisation of powers and the level of independence of national regulators, as well 
as cooperation between them, should be properly addressed (European Commission, 
2006b, p. 6). As for the cooperation, a question put forward was whether the existing 
cooperation was sufficient (i.e. the cooperation between national regulators through 
the ERGEG) or whether increased cooperation was needed through the creation of a 
European energy regulator (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6).  
It was concluded that these measures should be “addressed as a priority”, whereas 
the final decisions on any other measures would be made by the end of 2006 (European 
Commission, 2006b, p. 18). Thus, for the first time, DG TREN put forward clearly 
defined options that had to be considered by the stakeholders. Measures related to 
other TPA issues that had been defined as problematic by the DG COMP’s sectoral 
inquiry – long-term contracts, exemptions from TPA to new infrastructure, access to 
storage and oil price indexation – were not explicitly mentioned in this document, 
whatsoever.   
To sum up, during 2006, both DG COMP and DG TREN expressed more clearly 
defined preferences towards increasing the national regulators’ powers and 
cooperation between them. Additionally, Neelie Kroes and Andris Piebalgs had 
argued in favour of the creation of a single European grid that would succeed 
nationally divided gas markets. Nevertheless, complaints related to the long-term 
contracts, the gas price formation mechanism, new infrastructure exemptions from 
TPA provisions, and provisions concerning negotiated access to storage were not 
addressed in the form of clearly defined proposals. Even though energy consumers 
and new entrants these raised these issues, the decision-makers still did not make a 
final pronouncement on necessary remedies.  
 
                                                          
69 Network operators are operators of distribution systems, transmission systems, and storage facilities 
(Article 2 of the Directive 2009/73/EC). 
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4.2.3. Interest groups’ positions 
The green paper was discussed during the eleventh Madrid Forum meeting in May 
2006 and in subsequent public consultations. The stakeholders’ views are presented in 
the following paragraphs.   
A European grid code. While some stakeholders supported the establishment of a 
European grid code, most of them opposed the idea either entirely or by emphasising 
that the proposal “requires more clarification on its content and added value” 
(European Commission, 2006c, p. 22). Member states were divided on the issue. Some 
states (e.g. France and Slovenia) agreed on the need for common rules. Others, such 
as Estonia and the UK, did not find the proposal appealing. The gas companies were 
mostly against grid codes, whereas the industrial energy consumers favoured the 
establishment of common rules (see appendix IV).  As for foreign companies, Equinor 
was one of the rare gas companies that fully endorsed the development of the European 
grid (Equinor, 2006). Similarly, Exxon agreed that the development of a European gas 
market should be supported by “a single European gas grid within a framework of 
harmonised regulatory regimes” (ExxonMobil, 2006c, p. 4). Norway and Ukraine also 
backed the proposal. Although Gazprom did not take part in the public consultations, 
it seems from statements made by its representatives on other occasions, that the 
creation of network codes was not well received by the company70. The aim of these 
codes was the harmonisation of the gas trade between member states through the 
introduction of a number of technical rules concerning capacity allocation, congestion 
management, third-party access, tariffs, and so on. The rules required the 
reorganisation of pipeline capacity usage, including the long-term booked capacities, 
an issue that was seen as challenging by Gazprom (Yafimava, 2013, p. 29-52).  
The European Centre for Energy Network. To assist the work on the development 
of network codes, the Commission proposed the creation of the European Centre for 
Energy Networks, bringing together gas network operators (European Commission, 
2006b, p. 6). The proposal, however, did not receive considerable support among the 
domestic interest groups and member states (European Commission, 2006c, p. 27). 
Exxon did not back the idea either. The company argued that many forums (for 
instance the Madrid Forum) for energy cooperation already existed and that the 
                                                          
70 See Konoplyanik (2011) and Komlev (2011).  
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improvement of these existing forums’ effectiveness would be more beneficial than 
the creation of new bodies (ExxonMobil, 2006c, p. 5). While underlining that “closer 
cooperation between transmission system operators” should be supported, Equinor 
also emphasised that if the European Centre for Energy Networks was established, it 
needed “to be complementary to the transmission system operators and not interfere 
with market dynamics” (Equinor, 2006). Other foreign actors taking part in 
consultations did not express a position on this issue.  
The energy regulators. Most of the stakeholders (member states, network operators, 
and energy consumers) opposed the establishment of a European regulator (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 23). Instead, the stakeholders agreed that the Commission 
should increase the powers and the independence of national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) (European Commission, 2006c, p. 23; appendix IV). Industry representatives, 
including Equinor, took a similar position. Equinor preferred the development of 
strong national, rather than European, regulators because, arguably, most regulatory 
challenges were related to national energy markets (Equinor, 2006). Exxon and the 
American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) took the position that a two-step 
approach should be applied: Commission should advance the powers and 
independence of NRA at first and, thereafter, it should reconsider cooperation among 
regulators (ExxonMobil, 2006c, p. 2; AmCham, 2006, p. 2). Exxon warned that an 
“excessive bureaucratic regime” might discourage investments which were needed for 
a future development of the gas infrastructure (ExxonMobil, 2006c). Gazprom did not 
express a view on this issue.   
Whereas some policy measures did not find a place in the green paper, some of the 
issues discussed by the sectoral inquiry were addressed by stakeholders on various 
occasions. Their positions were as follows.  
Long-term contracts. The significance of long-term contracts for securing 
investments in gas infrastructure and providing energy security was acknowledged by 
both, large industrial consumers and the energy producers (European Commission, 
2006c, p. 26). While many member states shared this view, the UK referred to long-
term contracts and the oil price indexation as the main obstacle to the market 
competition (European Commission, 2006c, p. 26). Exxon, AmCham, Equinor, and 
Gazprom shared the view of their European counterpart. They favoured long-term 
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contracts as instruments necessary to bring infrastructure investments in Europe, thus 
opposing any regulatory changes in this respect.  
TPA to pipelines. As for exemptions from TPA to new infrastructure, most of the 
gas companies expressed an opinion that these exemptions should be maintained 
(European Commission, 2007b, p. 216; ERGEG, 2008). They argued that the 
exemptions protected the investors against regulatory risks “after the investment in 
infrastructure has become a ‘sunk cost’” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 216). 
Regulators, consumers, and new entrants, on the other hand, took the position that 
exemptions should be granted only in a limited number of cases (European 
Commission, 2007b, p. 216). The foreign companies, Equinor (Equinor, 2006), Exxon 
(ExxonMobil, 2008b), and Gazprom (Komlev, 2011) backed the position of their EU 
counterparts; exemptions should be maintained in a form prescribed by the Gas 
Directive, without further limitations.  
TPA to storage. While vertically integrated companies provided support for 
negotiated rather than regulated TPA to storages, gas consumers and new entrants, 
complained that the negotiated TPA regime has been preventing access to the gas 
infrastructure (European Commission, 2007b, p. 213). Equinor recommended “a 
liberal regime” regarding TPA exemptions to storages, which would attract the 
necessary investments for the development of new storage capacities (Equinor, 2006). 
The company also supported negotiated TPA to storages (Equinor, 2010), as did its 
American colleague Exxon (ExxonMobil, 2004). Even though Gazprom did not take 
part in the public consultations, WINGAS, then a joint venture of the German BASF 
and Gazprom (currently a subsidiary of Gazprom), also favoured the Second Gas 
Directive leaving storage operators with the opportunity to choose between negotiated 
and regulated TPA to storage (WINGAS, 2004). As for GGPSSO, given that the 
implementation of the voluntary GGPSSO was unsatisfying, ERGEG recommended 
to the Commission the introduction of binding legislation for TPA to gas storage 
(ERGEG, 2006b, p. 8). Both Gazprom’s subsidiary WINGAS and Exxon took the 
position that guidelines should remain voluntary. Equinor did not comment on this 
issue.   
Gas price. Concerning the gas-oil price link, vertically integrated companies and 
gas producers argued in favour of the oil price indexation, whereas national regulators, 
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newcomers, and traders considered the oil price indexation either as an indicator of 
the market malfunctioning or as a practice that should be removed from import 
contracts (European Commission 2007b, p. 219-220). Exxon (ExxonMobil, 2006c) 
AmCham (AmCham, 2006), and Gazprom (Kupriyanov, 2012) backed the position of 
the former. The rationale was that any interventions in this respect would distort 
market-based signals which create the gas prices (ExxonMobil, 2006c, p. 2). Equinor 
did not comment on this issue. 
 
4.2.4. Non-EU interest groups’ lobbying activities 
As mentioned earlier, at the time when the proposal on TPA was drafted, Russia was 
one of the most significant energy suppliers to Europe. Hence, “within the context of 
the consumer-producer dialogue”, it was important for the Commission to exchange 
its views with Gazprom (European Gas Regulatory Forum, 2005). Exxon was also a 
“longstanding participant” at the EU energy market, involved in energy production, 
processing, and storage (ExxonMobil, 2010b, p. 1). Similarly, Norway had been 
among the top gas suppliers to Europe (second only to Russia), which is why, most of 
the time, EU officials were interested in hearing what Equinor had to say about 
developments in the European gas market (Interview 5).  
The three companies had access to some of the most important forums for 
discussion about energy market developments, even though to different extents, as 
explained in the previous chapter. Gazprom, Equinor, and Exxon had their 
representatives at the Madrid Forum meetings. However, unlike Gazprom, Equinor 
and Exxon were more active during the public consultations organised by the 
Commission and ERGEG, thus using additional lobbying channels. For example, 
Exxon took part in all the public consultations on gas-related issues organised by 
ERGEG in 2004 and 200571. In addition, Equinor and Exxon were better integrated 
with the most influential industry associations than Gazprom (see table 8). 
Membership in these associations had provided the two companies with an 
opportunity to have additional channels within the Commission’s advisory and expert 
groups. Besides this, they had their representatives in IOGP’s Board and, 
                                                          
71 Available at the CEER’s website: 
https://www.ceer.eu/eer_consult/closed_public_consultations/gas.  [Accessed on 07/07/2019]      
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consequently, had more influence over the association’s positions. The IOGP was 
among the most active business groups in debates on the internal gas market. 
 
Table 8. Interest groups’ membership in EU associations in 2006.  
Association Description Membership Board 
Eurogas Represents European gas 
sellers and distributers.  




Association of Oil 
and Gas Producers 
(IOGP) 








of Energy Traders 
(EFET) 
Represents energy traders. Equinor  
Gas Infrastructure 
Europe (GIE) 
Represents the gas 
infrastructure industry.  
Exxon   




* If left empty, none of the companies under consideration was a member of a respective 
association/Board.  
Source: Associations’ official websites.  
 
Following January 2006, Gazprom’s reputation among the Europeans started to 
change. The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in January 2006, triggered a 
reconsideration of the energy partnership with Russia. On the one hand, some EU 
officials started to question Gazprom’s reputation of being a reliable supplier. On the 
other, Gazprom itself had become suspicious of the EU’s intentions towards Russia 
(Interview 3). In his speech in February 2006, Andris Piebalgs said:  
“(…) It is clear that recent events in the European energy markets, and the 
experience of rather cold conditions this winter, have raised somewhat deeper 
questions about how the European Union should plan for its future energy needs. 
Many are beginning to question the current approach under which energy 
networks are planned, operated and regulated at a national level, and it is only 
after the event that we make some effort to achieve an integrated market” 
(Piebalgs, 2006).  
This position was also reflected in the green paper, where it was stated that the EU 
needed “a new energy partnership with Russia” that would be based on “fair and 
reciprocal access to markets” (European Commission, 2006b, p. 15). At the same 
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time, it was stressed that cooperation with Norway and other global partners that face 
similar energy challenges, such as the US, should be facilitated (European 
Commission, 2006b, 14-16). Thus, from that point onward, Gazprom’s reputation of 
being a reliable gas supplier started to vanish, while energy cooperation with Norway 
and the US began to attract more attention among decision-makers.  
 
4.2.5. The Commission’s proposal  
In January 2007, DG COMP published the final report on sector enquiry. The report 
was adopted, together with the DG TREN’s energy strategy (European Commission, 
2007f) and a report on the future development of the internal energy market (European 
Commission, 2007g). This time, all three documents confirmed that a new regulation 
would be introduced. The measures proposed by these documents were almost 
identical to those adopted as a part of the final Commission’s proposal. 
Firstly, the powers and independence of NRAs were about to be harmonised and 
increased (European Commission, 2007f, p. 7). The Commission took the view that 
NRAs needed ex-ante powers over many areas of the gas market, including all aspects 
of TPA to gas infrastructure (European Commission, 2007g, p. 13). Secondly, 
enhanced cooperation between transmission system operators (TSOs) was also seen 
as a necessary step forward. Thirdly, the creation of either a European energy regulator 
or formalisation of the role of the ERGEG, with the aim of improving regulatory 
cooperation at the EU level, was proposed (European Commission, 2007g, p. 14). As 
for access to gas storage, the Commission took the position that the voluntary 
Guidelines for Good TPA Practices for Storage System Operators (the GGPSSO) 
adopted in 2005, should become legally binding (European Commission, 2007g, p. 
16). However, when it came to long-term contracts and exemptions from TPA 
regimes, no further legally binding measures were proposed. Instead, the guidelines 
were seen as an appropriate mechanism to deal with problems associated with this 
issue (European Commission, 2007g, p. 16). Documents did not provide any proposals 
related to either negotiated access to storage or the price formation mechanism, i.e. the 
linkage between oil and gas prices.  
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Still, even after the adoption of these documents in early 2007, the Commission 
organised the targeted consultations72 (European Commission, 2007e, p. 11). In 
addition, ERGEG was consulted about the upcoming legislative measures (European 
Commission, 2007e, p. 11). Equinor took part in the consultations organised by the 
ERGEG. The industrial associations taking part in the targeted consultations were, 
among others, GIE and Eurogas. During that time, Exxon was a member of GIE, while 
the Russian Gas Society was an associated member of Eurogas. Besides this, during 
2007, before the Commission adopted the final proposal, Equinor’s representatives 
met EU Commission officials on two occasions.73  
After numerous debates, consultations, and meetings, the final proposals were 
tabled in September 2007. Discussed policy measures were covered by two proposals 
adopted simultaneously: the proposal on rules concerning internal gas market 
(European Commission, 2007c) and the proposal on the conditions for TPA to gas 
networks (European Commission, 2007h). The proposals contained the following 
elements: (1) the strengthening of the NARs’ market powers and independence; (2) 
the creation of a European regulator – the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators; (3) the establishment of the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Gas (ENTSO); (4) the development of the European grid codes (a set of 
rules regulating cross-border trade) (European Commission 2007c; European 
Commission, 2007h). When it came to TPA to storage, the Commission proposed 
making the principles in the GGPSSO guidelines legally binding in addition to 
improvement of regulatory oversight by NARs (European Commission, 2007h, p. 17). 
Negotiated access related to gas storage did not find a place in the Commission’s 
proposal. As for the exemption rules, the Commission did not propose changes in this 
respect, apart from providing the European Agency with the “decision power on 
exemption requests” for cross-border gas infrastructure and making a guideline to 
assist NRAs (European Commission, 2007h, p. 12). As for long-term contracts, the 
Commission did not suggest any legally binding provisions. Instead, it decided to 
                                                          
72 Participants: (1) Regulators - ERGEG; (2) Gas industry – ETSO, GTE, Eurelectric, Eurogas, GEODE, 
and GIE; (3) Renewable energy associations - EWEA and EREC; (4) Energy-intensive consumers – 
IFIEC, EuroMetaux, EFMA, Cefic, Cimeurope, VEMW, VIK, MEUC Limited, and UEAPME; (5) 
Traders and new entrants – EPSU and EMCEF; (6) Consumers and NGOs – BEUC, World Wildlife 
Fund (European Commission, 2007e, p. 11-12). 
73 Data obtained from the Equinor’s website: (1) in June 2007 when the Energy Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs, visited Norway; and (2) in May 2007 during the 14th European Gas Conference in Oslo. 
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provide guidance on compliance of long-term contracts with the EU competition rules 
(European Commission, 2007h, 18). The price formation mechanism was not changed, 
either.  
 
4.2.6. Lobbying success of non-EU interest groups 
As the table below shows, the companies’ preferences did not differ from the 
Commission’s final position on most of the discussed issues. While Gazprom did not 
express a position on the regulators’ powers, cooperation between them and network 
operators, Equinor and Exxon supported an increase of powers and the independence 
of national regulators. Conversely, they were not enthusiastic about the creation of the 
new bodies – a European Regulator and European Network of Transmission System 
Operators. As for the introduction of grid codes, unlike Equinor and Exxon, Gazprom 
did not support the proposal.  
         
   Table 9. Comparison of the estimated degree of success of the analysed non-EU groups. 
The Commission’s proposal 
(2007) 
Equinor Exxon AmCham Gazprom 
Strengthening of national 
regulators’ powers and 
independence. 
✓ ✓ ✓ N/A 
European regulator. x ✓x ✓x N/A 
European Network of 
Transmission System 
Operators. 
✓x x N/A N/A 
European grid codes. ✓ ✓ N/A x 
No changes to long-term 
supply contracts. 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
No changes to the negotiated 
TPA to storage. 
✓ ✓ N/A ✓ 
No substantial changes to 
rules on the exemption from 
TPA for new infrastructure. 
✓ ✓ N/A ✓ 
No changes to the price 
formation mechanism. 
N/A ✓ ✓ ✓ 






3.7.1. Commission’s preferences on the discussed issues 
It seems that the proposal on the provisions related to third-party access (TPA) was 
more in line with the energy companies’ preferences than the proposal on unbundling, 
discussed in the previous chapter. The same College of Commissioners made both 
proposals; nevertheless, unlike the previous one, this proposal was more favourable 
for the gas industry.  
But, before turning to the question of why the Commission’s proposal did not 
address some issues, the Commission still did propose some relevant changes, such as 
the creation of new institutions – the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO) – as 
well as the improvement of regulators’ powers and independence. Secondly, the 
proposal suggested the establishment of European grid codes; these codes would have 
a considerable influence on the EU gas market in the coming years (see Yafimava, 
2013). As for storages, the Commission proposed making the principles contained in 
the GGPSSO guidelines legally binding. 
Although from the beginning the Commission argued that third-party access (TPA) 
should be provided to everyone in a non-discriminatory manner, DG TREN was not 
certain which, if any, further measures should be introduced for that objective to be 
realised. This was because when the new Commission under the Presidency of José 
Manuel Barroso was appointed, the Second Energy Regulation, proposed by the 
previous Commission under Romano Prodi, was still under negotiations between the 
Council and the European Parliament. DG COM, on the other hand, took the position 
that the powers of the national regulators and cooperation between them should be 
strengthened, already in 2005. National regulators backed this position through the 
ERGEG. In addition, Neelie Kroes suggested the establishment of a common 
European grid following the UK Presidency’s conclusions in 2005.  
Most of stakeholders supported an increase in the power of the national regulators. 
However, an overwhelming majority opposed the creation of the European energy 
regulator. Similarly, the majority of stakeholders was not enthusiastic about the 
establishment of the European grid code. Still, the Commission did not alter its 
preferences in this respect. This confirms that when the Commission has strong initial 
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views on policies under consideration, attempts by opposing interest groups to change 
its positions would be less likely.  
Equinor and Exxon provided support for the creation of the European energy code. 
Similarly, the companies supported the increase of powers and independence of the 
national regulators. On the other hand, Equinor and Exxon did not support the creation 
of the new bodies – a European Regulator and European Network of Transmission 
System Operators. Nevertheless, they did not lobby strenuously against these 
proposals.  
Some problems identified by the sector inquiry, however, were not addressed by 
the Commission’s proposal. The gas industry did manage to keep some issues out of 
the green paper and the final proposal – long-term contracts, price formation (the gas-
oil price linkage), criteria for exemption from TPA, and negotiated access to storage. 
Still, the lobbying success of the interest groups should not be overstated. Another 
important reason behind this Commission’s decision was the lack of member states’ 
support for the introduction of changes in this respect (Interview 3). 
“At that time (…) long-term contracts were still preferred by everybody, by 
Russians, but also European companies, as well as formulae based on oil 
indexation. This has changed the latter, with more diversification of supply and 
changes in the demand pattern. But at that time, it was seen as normal, so we 
could not do anything” (Interview 3).   
Additionally, access to gas storage was seen as a sensitive issue by member states 
(Interview 3). Storage plays a specific role in the gas sector since, in addition to the 
commercial utility, it is also used as a tool for maintaining the security of supply.  
Finally, it should be taken into consideration that the debate on TPA provisions took 
place at the same time as the preparation of the proposal on ownership unbundling 
since both proposals constituted a part of the same legislative package - the Third 
Energy Package. Still, ownership unbundling was “a star” of the negotiations over the 
Third Package, attracting most of the decision-makers’, the interest groups’, and even 
the researchers’ attention. It might also be that the Commission did not want to 
introduce too many changes at the same time because it would have had to fight several 
battles at the same time.  
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“My experience with the Commission is that they choose their battles carefully. 
The reactions they got to the sector inquiry arguably told them that there were 
sensitivities there. If you propose a monster package of changes, it might be too 
much. It is possibly better to put this into a package that is a smaller bite” 
(Interview 5).  
 
3.7.2. Commission’s position on the interest groups 
As explained in the first case study (chapter 3), at the time when the proposal was 
discussed, Gazprom was a Brussels’ outsider more than an insider. Equinor, Exxon, 
and AmCham had already established themselves as insiders.  
Still, all the examined foreign actors were pleased with the fact that the Commission 
did not introduce measures related to long-term contracts, oil price indexation, and 
negotiated access to storage. While it would be wrong to attribute the intended policy 
outcome only to their lobbying efforts, as explained above, these companies certainly 
played a role in influencing the Commission’s (lack of) position on these issues. Long-
term supply contracts regulate the relationships between EU energy importers and non-
EU energy producers. Precisely their longevity provides incentives for producers to 
make costly investments in infrastructure which brings gas to the EU. Hence, foreign 
companies’ opinion mattered in this respect. This confirms that when the Commission 
does not have strong preferences over specific policy measures, both insiders and 
outsiders tend to be more successful.  
 
4.3. Amendments to the third energy package (2017) 
In November 2017 the Commission proposed amendments to the Third Energy 
Package (2009) to extend the application of the Third Package to pipelines connecting 
member states with non-EU countries (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). Before 
2017, the Third Energy Package and its major provisions (e.g. ownership unbundling, 
TPA rules, etc.) did not explicitly apply to the offshore parts of import pipelines 
(Talus, 2019, p. 2). By introducing amendments, the Commission sought to clarify 
that the EU energy legislation will apply to all pipelines up to EU borders (European 
Commission, 2017a, p. 2).  
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4.3.1. Early positions  
4.3.1.1. The Commission’s early position 
Many experts believed that the proposed amendments targeted the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline project (see Yafimava, 2017; Talus, 2019). Nord Stream 2 is a pipeline 
bringing gas from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream AG, 2018a). 
The project was named Nord Stream 2 (NS2) to be distinguished from the Nord Stream 
pipeline which also brings Russian gas to Germany. Gazprom is the owner of the 
company Nord Stream 2 AG (NSAG).74  
Since the agreement to build the pipeline NS2 was made in 2011, the project started 
facing criticism in the EU. Donald Tusk, European Council President, was of the view 
that NS2 as a project does not contribute to the diversification of EU energy sources 
(EUobserver, 18 December 2015). Central and Eastern European countries worried 
that the Nord Stream 2 would put at risk the security of supply in these countries 
(EUobserver, 17 March 2016). In response to these concerns, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the European Commission, made the statement that NS2 would not be 
built “in a legal void, or only according to Russian law” (in Reuters, 16 June 2016). 
He added that the impact of NS2 “goes beyond the legal discussions” since “if built, 
Nord Stream 2 could alter the landscape of the EU’s gas market” (in Reuters, 16 June 
2016).  
The main legal issue was the question of whether the Third Energy Package applies 
to sub-sea (offshore) parts of the NS2 pipeline (Hancher and Marhold, 2019, p. 289). 
Whereas NSAG argued that the Third Package does not apply to sections of the 
pipeline going through Baltic Sea (offshore), the Commission took the opposite 
position. The main political issue was the question of whether NS2 will jeopardise one 
of the Commission’s policy priorities - to diversify EU’s energy supplies and routes 
(Šefčovič, 2016). EU have already been heavily dependent on Russian gas. Hence, 
one of the Commission’s objectives has been to diversify gas supplies away from 
Russia, the objective that supposedly ran counter to what was intended by NS2. 
Another concern was that the Ukrainian status of the main transit country for Russian 
                                                          
74 See the website of the Nord Stream 2: https://www.nord-stream2.com/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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gas could be challenged. In 2016 Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the Commission, 
stated: 
“Despite economic and political challenges, Ukraine continues to be a reliable 
gas partner and transit country. It is in the interest of all parties that Ukraine 
remains a significant gas transit corridor” (Šefčovič, 2016).  
In 2016 the Commission asked its legal service to provide an opinion on the issue. 
The response of the Commission’s legal service was negative – the Third Energy 
Package does not apply to offshore parts of NS2 (Talus, 2019, p. 2; Yafimava, 2017, 
p. 2). After receiving this response, the Commission turned to the Council by asking 
for a mandate to negotiate an agreement on the NS2 pipeline (European Commission, 
2017b). On that occasion Maroš Šefčovič said:   
“As we have stated already several times, Nord Stream 2 does not contribute to 
the Energy Union’s objectives. If the pipeline is nevertheless built, the least we 
have to do is to make sure that it will be operated in a transparent manner and in 
line with the main EU energy market rules” (in European Commission, 2017b). 
To underpin its request, the Commission emphasised the potential conflict between 
the Russian and the EU law due to the legal uncertainty related to offshore parts of 
NS2 (Yafimava, 2017, p. 1; Talus, 2019, p. 2). After analysing the Commission’s 
request, the legal service of the Council rejected the potential conflict of laws because 
the Third Package did not apply to the offshore parts of the pipeline - a condition that 
was seen as necessary for the conflict of laws to take place (Yafimava 2017, p. 2-3). 
Since there was no conflict of laws, it was concluded that there was no ground for the 
Commission to take over negotiations on NS2.  
In September 2017, in President Juncker’s letter of intent to the European 
Parliament and the Council (European Commission, 2017c), the Commission 
mentioned for the first time that it would propose amendments to the Third Energy 
Package (Wilson, 2019, p. 5; European Parliament, 2019, p. 5). As soon as November 




4.2.1.2. Early positioning of interest groups 
Following the launch of NS2 project in 2015, the CEO of the Ukrainian company 
Naftogaz, Andriy Kobolev, stated: “If Nord Stream-2 operates, Ukraine will be dead 
as a transit land for Russian gas” (Reuters, 06 November 2015). Just a few months 
later, the company filed the complaint against NS2 to the Commission because of its 
supposed incompatibility with the Energy Community75 regulations (Naftogaz, 2016). 
Naftogaz shared its concerns with high-ranking Commission officials on several 
occasions between June 2015 and June 201776.   
Representatives of NS2 also held meetings with Energy Commissioner, Miguel 
Arias Cañete, Maroš Šefčovič, and members of their cabinets on several occasions 
between June 2015 and June 201777. According to the minutes of the meetings78, the 
Commission kept the company informed about its worries regarding NS2 and the 
measures being taken by the Commission to investigate legal aspects related to the 
pipeline79. The company’s representatives, on their side, tried to reassure the 
Commission by emphasising that NS2 aims to enhance, not reduce, the security of 
supply in Europe and to complement, not substitute, the existing import routes through 
Ukraine (Nord Stream, 2018a, p. 10).  
 
4.3.2. The Commission’s proposal 
Only two months after announcing that it will propose amendments to the Third Energy 
Package legislation, the Commission tabled the proposal. What was particularly 
unusual was that the Commission neither provided an impact assessment of the 
proposed changes nor organised ex-ante public consultations on the proposal. Instead, 
                                                          
75 Energy Community is an international organisation established with an aim to create a “pan-European 
energy market” between EU member states and their neighbouring countries. See: https://www.energy-
community.org/aboutus/whoweare.html. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
76 List of meetings is available at the Transparency Register. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=769349815543-90. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].       
77 List of meetings is available at the Transparency Register. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=662856722412-20. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
78 Minutes of meetings available at the AskTheEu.org: 
https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/access_to_documents_related_to_m. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
79 Ibid.  
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stakeholders were asked to express their opinion only after the proposal was made (ex-
post). This was one of the reasons why the proposed changes have been opposed by 
many stakeholders80. 
Under the proposed amendments, the Third Energy Package became applicable to 
“pipelines to and from third countries, including existing and future pipelines, up to 
the border of EU jurisdiction” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). Since the 
amendments would create “legally complex stations” - different regulatory regimes for 
the two ends of the same pipeline (one in the EU and another in a third country) – the 
Commission proposed an international agreement for ensuring “a coherent regulatory 
framework for the entire pipeline” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). If such an 
agreement could not be reached, the pipeline would operate in line with EU legislation 
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). 
 
4.3.3. Interest Groups’ positions 
While stakeholders coming from Poland and Central and Eastern European countries 
backed the proposed amendments, other companies raised concerns over the drafted 
changes.  
In contrast to the Commission’s view that the proposed amendments clarify EU gas 
legislation, NS2 took the position that it actually creates legal uncertainty due to the 
potential conflict of Russian and EU law (Nord Stream AG, 2018b, p. 1). NS2 also 
raised the voice against retroactive application of the proposed amendments, which, 
according to the company, should be avoided. Finally, NS2 complained that the Nord 
Stream pipelines would be disadvantaged in comparison to pipelines from Norway, 
which had received “more favourable treatment as ‘upstream gas pipelines’” (Nord 
Stream AG, 2018b, p. 2).   
Upstream pipelines are pipelines that are either part of an energy production project 
or used to transport gas from the place of extraction to the place of processing or 
loading (Article 2 of the Directive 2009/73/EC). They are actually part of a gas 
production field. Under the Third Energy Package upstream pipelines were exempted 
                                                          
80 For stakeholders’ feedback see European Commission (2017d).  
158 
 
from TPA and other related provisions, unlike transmission pipelines – those 
transporting gas between member states. Since pipelines bringing gas from Norway to 
the EU are treated as upstream pipelines, they have been exempted from many TPA 
provisions. Nord Stream pipeline, on the other hand, was to be treated as a 
transmission pipeline under the proposed amendments; hence, all rules applying to 
transmission pipeline (e.g. TPA access to infrastructure) would be applicable to NS2. 
This was the reason behind the NS2 complaints related to its supposed unfavourable 
position under the proposed amendments in comparison to the Norwegian pipelines. 
For the same reason, Equinor advised the Commission to differentiate upstream 
from transmission pipelines consistently (Interview 5). By definition found in Article 
2 of the Directive 2009/73/EC, the Norwegian pipelines were treated as upstream 
pipelines. Maintaining the difference between the two types of pipelines (upstream 
and transmission pipelines) was important because the proposed amendments were 
supposed to be applicable to transmission pipelines only, not upstream infrastructure. 
Equinor, therefore, supported the proposal under the condition that it preserves the 
difference between upstream and transmission pipelines (Interview 5). The confusion 
over the difference between the two types of pipelines was caused by the 
Commission’s statement that pipelines that could be affected by the amendments were 
those transporting gas from Russia, Algeria, Norway, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya 
(European Commission, 2017e; IOGP, 2018, p. 1). However, Equinor received the 
assurances that the Commission’s intention was not to introduce any changes related 
to the definitions of different sorts of pipelines; hence pipelines from Norway would 
not be affected by the proposed amendments (Interview 5). Equinor’s position was 
fully backed by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP, 2018). 
IOGP’s Committee responsible for EU energy regulation (EU Committee) was chaired 
by an Equinor representative81. The Vice-Chair of the same Committee was the Vice 
President of EU Affairs at ExxonMobil. IOGP’s representatives met the 
Commission’s officials on several occasion to discuss this issue (IOGP, 2018). 
 
                                                          
81 See the IOGP’s website: https://www.iogp.org/our-committees/eu/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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4.3.4. Lobbying success of non-EU interest groups 
Equinor and Naftogaz’s preferences were embedded in the Commission’s final 
position. The proposal was the least favourable for Gazprom. 
The Commission’s position was clear from the beginning: Third Energy Package 
applies to offshore parts of Nord Stream 2. After receiving the responses from both 
the Commission’s and the Council’s legal service stating that the Third Package 
actually was not applicable to offshore sections of pipelines coming from third 
countries, the Commission asked for a mandate to negotiate an agreement on NS2 on 
the behalf of the EU. After another negative response, the Commission announced that 
it would propose amendments to the Third Gas Directive. Only two months later, the 
proposal was tabled. 
The Commission did not organise public consultations ex-ante, a practice rarely 
seen in Brussels. An impact assessment was not carried out either. The Commission 
explained that the content of the proposed amendments “is limited to providing 
clarification in an area where applicable EU law (or the lack thereof) and applied 
practice diverge” (European Commission, 2017a, p. 4). Hence, the need for an ex-ante 
assessment was not seen as necessary. Companies, nevertheless, disagreed. 
The empirical analysis indicates that strong prior positions on issues under 
consideration make it harder for lobbyists to alter officials’ preferences during 
preparations of legislative proposals. Interest groups opposing the proposed changes 
were left without the opportunity to issue position papers on the amendments. Also, 
they did not have a sufficient time to lobby given that the proposal was made only two 
months after the Commission announced its intention to propose amendments.  
During the debate on the amendments, Gazprom was facing antitrust investigation 
for alleged abuse of the dominant position in Central and Eastern Europe (European 
Commission, 2015f). Besides, its reputation was undermined due to the Russian-
Ukrainian crisis stared in 2014. As a result, many EU officials, including some 
Commission’s officials, were asking for the reduction of Russian gas supplies to 
Europe. Nord Stream 2 was seen as the project which threatens the EU energy 
objectives:  the security of supply, competitiveness, and diversification of energy 
supplies (European Commission, 2017b). Hence, the chances of Gazprom’s lobbying 
success were not promising. 
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Naftogaz’s position was completely different. Unlike Russia, Ukraine was seen as 
“a reliable gas partner” to the EU (Šefčovič, 2016). Naftogaz’s position on NS2 was 
strongly supported by the Commission. Even more, the objective to maintain transit 
routes for Russian gas via Ukraine was one of the reasons underpinning the 
Commission’s proposal.   
In its explanation the Commission stated that the proposed amendments would 
affect not only the pipelines from Russia but also those coming from other third 
countries such as Norway (European Commission, 2017e). This caused Equinor’s 
concern. Nevertheless, soon after that the Commission reassured Equinor that the 
Norwegian pipelines will be affected by the amendments since those would not change 
the definition of upstream pipelines. The Commission did not alter its initial 
preferences because of the Equinor’s lobbying engagement. However, it probably felt 




Two Commission’s proposals analysed as part of this case study suggest that 
Commission’s initial positions on policy issues affect groups’ prospects of lobbying 
successfully. Specifically, when the Commission has early preferences for certain 
legislative measures, interest groups’ attempts to alter its positions is less likely (the 
amendments to the Third Energy Package). Conversely, when the Commission does 
not have strong initial preferences over discussed measures, interest groups have better 
prospect to lobby successfully (measures aimed at providing non-discriminatory TPA 
to gas infrastructure). 
The first part of the case study (the provisions on TPA) provides support for the 
assumption that the absence of Commission’s initial views (on price formation, long-
term contracts, access to storage) eases lobbyists’ job. It also demonstrated the 
plausibility of the theoretical assumption that the Commission pursues its basic 
interests (Klüver, 2013b, p. 32), as well as the long-standing policy objectives vis-à-
vis other actors (Pollack, 2003, p. 322). By refraining from proposing changes related 
to gas price formation, long-term contracts, and access to storage, the Commission 
sought to escape the anticipated discontent of member states. On the other hand, by 
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establishing a single European grid and the European Agency for Energy Cooperation, 
the Commission was acting as a competence-maximiser seeking “more Europe” 
(Pollack, 2003, p. 322, 39).  
The second part of the case study - the amendments to the Third Energy Package -  
provides empirical evidence on how Commission’s strong initial views reduce the 
likelihood of lobbying success. The amendments have been tabled at short notice, 
without prior public consultations and an impact assessment. Interest groups opposing 
the proposed changes were thus left without the opportunity to lobby and to issue 
position papers ex-ante.  
Empirical findings also suggest that the insiders, Equinor and Naftogaz, have been 
in a better position to make an impact than the outsiders (Gazprom). The case study 
also indicates that those non-EU interest groups whose countries of origin are 
strategically important for the achievement of the EU objectives (Ukraine and 
Norway) are more likely to be granted with the status of an insider – and consequently 
- to lobby successfully. The case, however, does not find support for the assumption 
that insiders (Equinor, Exxon, Nagtogaz) have better access to the Commission than 
outsiders (Gazprom) when it comes to bilateral meetings with the Commission. On 
the other side, Exxon and, especially, Equinor were better integrated and connected 
with the most influential associations in the EU than Gazprom. Membership in these 
associations (e.g. IOGP) had provided two companies with an opportunity to have 











Chapter 5: Indirect Land-Use Change Related to Biofuels Production 
 
This chapter examines non-EU interest groups’ (lack of) lobbying success during the 
preparation of the Commission’s proposal on indirect land-use change (ILUC) related 
to biofuels production. The proposal on ILUC was adopted in 2012, with the aim to 
initiate the transition from less sustainable biofuels to biofuels that can achieve 
considerable GHG savings, when the ILUC effect is taken into account (European 
Commission, 2012c, p. 2). 
The proposal on ILUC is a case in which the Commission faced a new and a highly 
technical issue, without previous knowledge or expertise on the issue under 
consideration. The policy measures that were adopted had not been part of the 
Commission’s policy priorities. Also, the Commission did not have strong early 
preferences related to ILUC. But the Commissioner for Climate Action at that time, 
Connie Hedegaard, had been “very cautious on biofuels” (in EurActiv, 02 February 
2012) even before taking office. The case examines to what extent three foreign groups 
- Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), Exxon, and Brazilian Sugarcane Industry 
Association (UNICA) – were successful in their lobbying efforts. Those three interest 
groups are suitable for analysis because of their mutual variations when it comes to 
the status of insiders/outsiders. 
 
5.1. Background 
Biofuels are fuels made from biomass: biodegradable parts of agricultural products 
and residues (e.g. vegetal and animal substances), forestry, and industrial waste 
(Article 2 of the Renewable Energy Directive 2018/200182). The most common types 
are bioethanol, produced from biomass such as wheat and sugarcane, and biodiesel, 
produced from vegetable oils (e.g. palm oil or soybean) (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 2). 
Although they have been in use since the late nineteenth century, biofuel production 
increased significantly during the second half of the twentieth century, first in Brazil 
and, thereafter, in the US (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 2).  
                                                          
82 European Parliament and the Council (2018).  
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These conventional (“the first generation”) biofuels produced on a commercial 
basis are derived from crops which can be also used as food (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 
1). Advanced biofuels - “the second and third generation” biofuels - are derived from 
materials that cannot be used as food: waste or crops grown specifically for biofuels 
production (e.g. algae) (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 1). In comparison to their predecessors 
(conventional biofuels), advanced biofuels still have not been developed on a 
sufficiently large scale for commercial purposes.   
For a long period of time, conventional biofuels were seen as an important energy 
source contributing to the EU energy mix. As early as 1997, the EU set a non-binding 
target of a 12% share of renewable energy (biofuels included) in overall energy 
consumption by 2010 (European Commission, 2006f, p. 4). In addition, in 2003, the 
EU passed a directive setting a target of a 5.75% share of biofuels in petrol and diesel 
consumption by the end of 2010 (European Commission, 2008a, p. 3).  
When the first José Manuel Barroso Commission83 took a position in 2004, one of 
the Commission’s priorities in the energy domain was a further promotion of 
renewables (biofuels included) across Europe (European Commission, 2005g). As a 
result, the Commission drafted a Renewable Energy Road Map, suggesting the 
establishment of legally binding targets for the renewables (European Commission, 
2006f, p. 3). Following the European Council’s acceptance, the Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED)84 was adopted in 2009. The directive set two targets to be met by 
2020: (1) a 20% share of energy to come from renewables85, in the overall EU energy 
mix; and (2) in the transport sector, a 10% share of the energy spent to come from 
renewables (Article 3). In addition, the Fuels Quality Directive (Directive 
2009/30/EC86), adopted in 2009, set a 6% target reduction in GHG emission of 
transport fuels to be reached by 2020 (Article 7a of the Directive 2009/30/EC). 
The promotion of biofuels and other renewables was seen as a significant 
contribution to climate change mitigation through the reduction of CO2 emissions and 
                                                          
83 José Manuel Barroso was the president of the European Commission in the two mandates: the first 
from 2004 to 2009, and the second from 2010 to 2014.  
84 Directive 2009/28/EC (European Parliament and the Council, 2009b). 
85 Renewable energy means “renewable non-fossil energy sources: wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, 
hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases” (European Commission, 
2008a, p. 21). 
86 European Parliament and the Council (2009c).  
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the decarbonisation of transport sector (European Commission, 2006g, p. 3). Equally 
important, an increased use of renewables was expected to reduce the dependence on 
conventional energy (e.g. oil and gas), making the EU less vulnerable to external 
producers of fossil fuels (European Commission, 2006g, p. 3). Finally, it was argued 
that the development of biofuel production would create additional jobs in rural areas 
in both developed and developing countries (European Commission, 2006g, p. 3-4). 
Overall, from the late 1990s to 2010, biofuels production was encouraged through 
different measures: targets for the share of renewables in the EU energy mix, subsidies, 
and duty exemptions87. These measures were supposed to incentivise industrial actors 
to make investments in renewable energy sources (European Commission, 2008a, p. 
3).  
 
5.1. Indirect land use change (ILUC) 
While it may represent a better solution for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
when compared to conventional fuels (e.g. oil and gas), biofuels production may have 
negative environmental effects as well. If for example, a forest is converted to cultivate 
materials for biofuels production, the stored carbon will be released (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 17). Thus, the resulting negative GHG impact can 
counterweight the positive GHG impact of biofuels (European Commission, 2008a, p. 
17). This is so-called direct land use (DLU) effect. For that reason, the Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED) imposed sustainability criteria for biofuels production 
(Article 17 of the Directive 2009/28/EC88). To be considered sustainable, the biofuels 
needed to reach at least 35% of GHG savings when compared with fossil fuels (Article 
17). The required target for savings was supposed to increase to 50% in 2017 and to 
60% in 2018 (Article 17). Additionally, RED banned biofuels cultivation in specific 
“no-go” areas, such as wetlands or forests (European Commission, 2010b, p. 3). 
In spite of the above sustainability requirements for biofuels production, the EU 
support policy for biofuels faced extensive criticism (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 3). The 
                                                          
87 Some studies estimated that EU biofuel subsidies amounted to between 5.5 and 8.4 billion euros per 
year (in Bourguignon, 2015, p. 3).  
88 European Parliament and the Council (2009b). 
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main objection, raised primarily by NGOs, was that neither RED nor FQD took into 
account the so-called indirect land-use change (ILUC) effect (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 
3; Interview 7). 
ILUC occurs when land “that would have otherwise been used for food production” 
gets used for the production of biofuels, and the existing food production 
“geographically moves” to new cropland which has been converted from grasslands 
or forests (Croezen et al., 2010, p. 11). Thus, the additional biofuel demand leads 
indirectly to change of a land use - the conversion of grasslands and forests into 
cropland, not for biofuel production but for food production that has been displaced 
as a result of increasing biofuel production (European Commission, 2010b, p. 3).  
Already in 2008, environmental NGOs started arguing that the EU biofuels policy 
- the RED-set targets and subsidies – were resulting in  worldwide deforestation, which 
significantly increased CO2 emissions (Bourguignon, 2015, p. 3).
89 Besides having a 
negative effect on the greenhouse gas savings, it was argued that the biofuel 
production negatively affected food prices. In a 2014 report, the UN special 
rapporteur, Olivier De Schutter, warned that the growing demand for biofuels resulted 
in “higher food prices” and encouraged “land grabs on a large scale” (De Schutter, 
2014, p. 10), which has opened the so-called “food vs fuels” debate (Bourguignon, 
2015, p. 4). Put simply, the argument was that raising the demand for biofuels brings 
about both environmental and social changes: deforestation, land grabs, and increases 
in food prices.  
Neither the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) nor the 2009 Fuel Quality 
Directive (FQD) contained any obligation for biofuels producers regarding ILUC. 
However, RED included an obligation for the Commission to review ILUC, to deliver 
a report on ILUC by the end of 2010 and, if appropriate, to propose further actions in 
this respect (European Commission, 2010b, p. 3). The issue generated intense debate 
and long negotiations which lasted more than six years – from the end of 2009 to the 
end of 2015.  
                                                          
89 See, for example, NGOs letter to the Council presidency in 2013 (Transport and Environment, 2013).  
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5.2. Early positions 
The debate on ILUC was initiated in Europe in 2009 during the mandate of the first 
Barroso Commission. In 2010, the second Barroso Commission was appointed. The 
following section briefly presents the early positions of the first Barroso Commission. 
Thereafter, the chapter turns to the second Barroso Commission, who eventually 
drafted a proposal on ILUC.  
 
5.1. Early positions (the first Barroso Commission) 
As mentioned earlier, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) adopted in 2009 did not 
contain any obligation for biofuels producers concerning ILUC. However, RED 
included an obligation for the Commission to deliver a report on ILUC by the end of 
2010 and, if appropriate, to propose further actions (European Commission, 2010b, p. 
3).  
To prepare the report that was supposed to be submitted to the European Parliament 
and Council by the end of 2010, the DG Environment held public consultations on 
ILUC. The Commission proposed several ILUC-related options to be considered by 
interested stakeholders. They ranged from “do nothing” to imposing “additional 
sustainability requirements” for biofuels from crops (the first generation biofuels) or 
to include ILUC-related emission in GHG calculations for biofuels (European 
Commission, 2009a, p. 1-2). An “international agreement on protecting carbon-rich 
habitats” was also considered as a potential solution (European Commission, 2009a, 
p. 1). The paper, however, emphasized that is made “without prejudice to the 
Commission’s final position” (European Commission, 2009a, p. 1). This was a clear 
indication that the Commissioner for Environment in the first Barroso Commission 
did not take any strong view on ILUC in 2009.  
The biofuel industry and farmers taking part in the consultations supported either 
“no action” or dealing with ILUC through an international agreement (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 13). In contrast, NGOs favoured the inclusion of ILUC related 
emissions within the existing GHG emission calculation for biofuels (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 13). Member states have been divided (European Commission, 
2010b, p. 13). 
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Public and private representatives from foreign countries also engaged in the 
consultations. Norway (Royal Ministry of the Environment, 2009) and Exxon 
(ExxonMobil, 2009) argued in favour of regulation on ILUC. Brazil (Brazil, 2009a), 
Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA, 2009), Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
(2009), Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (2009), and Argentina (Argentina, 2009), 
conversely, questioned the scientific knowledge about ILUC, arguing that further 
legislation would be premature. The latter four countries have been well-known 
biofuels producers – Brazil’s bioethanol has been mostly produced from sugarcane, 
Argentina’s biodiesel is soybean-based, and Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s palm 
biodiesel - oil-based.   
To provide more science-based analysis on ILUC, the Commission commissioned 
several in-house studies: (1) two studies which were carried out by the Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC); and (2) an in-house literature review on ILUC which 
was conducted by DG Energy (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). The Commission 
also drew from a study conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), as well as from analytical work of leading international experts (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 6). Thus, though consulting interest groups, the Commission 
was also using in-house and international expert knowledge.  
The problem with the analytical work on ILUC, however, was that there was no 
straightforward way of measuring it (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). If, for 
example, a biofuel producer buys land previously used for food production, the food 
production might be geographically relocated anywhere in the world, a phenomenon 
that is not possible to observe directly (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). 
Therefore, the only way to estimate the amount of the ILUC caused by the growing 
biofuels production was by modelling (European Commission, 2010b, p. 6). However, 
the problem was that the results varied considerably across different models used to 
estimate ILUC related to biofuels (European Commission, 2010b, p. 9).  
Still, a common conclusion among these studies, acknowledged by the 
Commission, was that ILUC reduces GHG emission savings from biofuels (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 14). When ILUC is taken into account certain biofuels may 
contribute as much to the GHG emissions as fossil fuels, which should be replaced by 
their supposed better alternatives – biofuels (ICEDD et al., 2013, p. 12). The research 
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on ILUC shown differences in GHG emissions among different types of biofuels. 
Some biofuels (e.g.  palm oil or soy bean biodiesel) have higher estimated GHG 
emissions related to ILUC than other biofuels (e.g. bioethanol from sugar cane) 
(European Commission, 2012a, p. 41-42). Yet, while it was clear that some biofuels 
are more sustainable than others, “there was a high degree of uncertainty” regarding 
the magnitude of ILUC related emission for each type of biofuels (ICEDD, 2013, p. 
13). In other words, for the same crop, the different models produced differing values 
of the GHG emissions caused by ILUC, stemming from the different assumptions used 
in the models (European Commission, 2010b, p. 9). These variations across models 
related to the amount of estimated GHG illustrated how challenging and provisional a 
modelling of ILUC might be (European Commission, 2010b, p. 9). At the same time, 
these differences across models, would be used as the key arguments by the biofuel 
industry when advocating against legislation on ILUC.  
 
5.2. Early positions (the second Barroso Commission) 
In 2010, the second Barroso Commission was appointed90. Günther Oettinger, a 
former Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg in Germany, became the new 
Energy Commissioner. The Commission also created a new post - climate action, 
which previously had been a part of the environment portfolio. Connie Hedegaard, a 
former Danish Minister for the Environment, was appointed as the first Climate 
Commissioner. The Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, was charged with 
ILUC-related matters, whereas Connie Hedegaard was designated to be the joint 
leading person on the issue.   
Neither Günther Oettinger (Oettinger, 2009) nor Connie Hedegaard (Hedegaard, 
2010) mentioned biofuels or ILUC during the hearings before the European 
Parliament. Nevertheless, Günther Oettinger promised to deliver a report on biofuels 
and land-use change, given that the report was required by the RED (Oettinger, 2009).  
Five months after taking office, in response to rising NGOs’ criticism related to the 
environmental and social consequences of biofuel production, the newly elected 
                                                          
90 The second Barroso Commission (2010-2014). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/members/index_en.htm.  [Accessed on 
07/07/2019]      
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Commission set up a voluntary certification scheme (European Commission, 2010d). 
The certification scheme was established to verify the compliance of biofuel 
production with the EU’s sustainability standards by independent auditors (European 
Commission, 2010d). While recognising the EU need to ensure that biofuels are 
produced in a sustainable manner, Günther Oettinger, added that “in the years to come, 
biofuels” will be “the main alternative to petrol and diesel used in transport” (in 
European Commission, 2010e).  
Environmentalists, however, were not pleased since the proposed certification 
scheme did not take into account ILUC (Rankin, 2010). While acknowledging that 
ILUC “needs to be analysed carefully”, Günther Oettinger insisted that biofuel offered 
“a bigger opportunity than dangers” (in Rankin, 2010). These statements give the 
impression that the Commissioner for Energy wanted to find a right balance between 
two objectives of the EU energy policy: security of supply (diversification of energy 
sources away from fossil fuels usually produced in outside the EU) and sustainability.   
Connie Hedegaard, the Climate Commissioner, had gained more experience in the 
fields of environment and energy policy than her colleague from the Energy 
Department. Before coming to the Commission, she had served in Denmark as 
Minister for Environment (2004-2007), and thereafter as Minister for Climate and 
Energy (2007-2009). She had been engaged in  the debate on biofuels in Denmark 
even before she was appointed Climate Commissioner.91 Commissioner Hedegaard 
was more cautious about biofuels than Günther Oettinger. In one interview, she stated: 
“Personally, I’ve always been very cautious on biofuels (…) It’s great to see the 
potential in new technologies, but we should take very much care in Europe that 
we are now not establishing a new big industry that we then – after some time – 
say, wow, that was not so good” (in EurActiv, 02 February 2012). 
Even though Günther Oettinger promised to deliver the report on ILUC by the end 
of 2010 since this was the Commission’s legal obligation under the RED, it seems that 
he was resolute in continuing to provide support for biofuels as an alternative to fossil 
fuels. Connie Hedegaard, however, was more cautious.   
                                                          
91 See for instance, BioPress (2007).  
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5.3. Interest groups’ positions 
In July 2010, another round of public consultations on ILUC was organised. 
Stakeholders were again asked to consider several possible policy options: (1) taking 
no action; (2) encouraging the consumption of some types of biofuel; (3) discouraging 
the consumption of some types of biofuel; or (4) taking other action not mentioned 
under 1-3 (European Commission, 2010c, p. 3).  
The Commission was not explicit about which type of biofuels should be 
encouraged or discouraged but, instead, asked for the stakeholders’ opinions. 
Nonetheless, it was generally considered that ILUC was a pressing concern for the 
conventional first-generation or crop-based biofuels - bioethanol and biodiesel - rather 
than for the advanced second-generation biofuels. As mentioned earlier, conventional 
biofuels are produced on agricultural land from materials that could be used as food as 
well. According to the analysis conducted by the Commission, some of these biofuels, 
such as biodiesel produced from vegetable oils (e.g. palm oil), were seen as more 
harmful for the environment than others, such as bioethanol. On the other hand, the 
advanced second-generation biofuels, produced from materials that cannot be used as 
food (e.g. waste), featured as a more sustainable alternative to the conventional 
biofuels (biodiesel and bioethanol) as their production did not lead towards the 
conversion of forests and grassland into agricultural land.      
This time, the number of stakeholders’ responses was twice as high (145 responses) 
in comparison to the consultations held in 2009 (71 response) (European Commission, 
2010b, p. 13). Nevertheless, the responses did not substantially differ. The biofuels 
producers and the farmers’ associations claimed that the studies conducted by the 
Commission were not adequate for determining the ILUC effect (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 13). The argument was that the ambiguities regarding the 
measurement of ILUC led to the differing results and, consequently, the conclusion 
was that no further action was necessary until more reliable data on ILUC could be 
obtained. By contrast, most NGOs and a few non-biofuel industry’s representatives 
argued in favour of the inclusion of ILUC emissions within the existing GHG emission 
calculation (European Commission, 2010b, p. 13). They held that the studies had 
proven that ILUC had a significant effect on GHG emissions and, hence, further action 
by the Commission was needed. The member states were divided: whereas Denmark 
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and the UK preferred the EU legislation on ILUC, Spain and Austria opposed further 
legislation (see appendix V).  
The biggest EU industry associations of biofuels producers took the untied position 
that legislation on ILUC is not needed. Besides, the association representing ethanol 
industry, ePURE, complained that biofuel industry has been “demonised” by some 
media and stakeholders (ePURE, 2010, p. 5). European Biodiesel Board (EBB), 
representing the major biodiesel producers, warned that given the uncertainty related 
to estimation of ILUC, “any distinction of biofuels ILUC on the basis of feedstock 
and/or geographical origin” would “raise issues of legal certainty and WTO 
compatibility” (European Biodiesel Board, 2010, p. 4). Copa-Cogeca, an association 
that have been representing EU farmers, expressed the view that most of the problems 
related to ILUC have been originating from non-EU countries, such as Brazil and 
Southeast Asia, and added that “European farmers cannot be made liable for 
production methods in other countries which damage the environment” (Copa-Cogeca, 
2010, p. 1).  
Many foreign companies took part in the public consultations as well. Most of them, 
apart from ExxonMobil, argued against legislation on ILUC.  
The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA), an association that 
represents the Brazilian bioethanol industry92, argued that ILUC was not related 
exclusively to biofuels, but to agricultural production in general, as well as other 
deforestation drivers such as illegal logging and the like (UNICA, 2010a, p. 2). After 
discussing the scientific studies on ILUC, UNICA suggested that it was still premature 
to evaluate the degree of ILUC regardless of the scientific studies on ILUC whose 
relevance it acknowledge. Furthermore, like some of its counterparts, UNICA warned 
that any policy based on “highly debatable” scientific conclusions could be challenged 
at the WTO (UNICA, 2010a, p. 11). It also warned that any measures that would 
discriminate based on the biofuels type, or geographical origin, would probably be in 
violation of the international trade rules (UNICA, 2010a, p. 14). UNICA also pointed 
to the measures taken in Brazil to tackle environmental concerns related to land usage. 
Another important point was that the potential EU legislation on ILUC could have 
negative effects on the economies of biofuel producing countries. It was therefore 
                                                          
92 See the UNICA’s website: http://english.unica.com.br/unica/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].       
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suggested that an international agreement would be the best way to deal with the 
question of biofuel sustainability (UNICA, 2010a, p. 16). 
The same arguments were employed by the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), 
an organisation that brings together the palm oil industry of Malaysia93. MPOC argued 
that the EU studies did not constitute a reliable basis for further legislation on ILUC 
since the different models analysed by the Commission had arrived at differing 
estimates of its magnitude (MPOC, 2010, p. 5). In a similar manner to UNICA, MPOC 
argued that palm oil production creates jobs and boosts the rural economy in Malaysia 
(MPOB, 2009, p. 5). It was also added that the developing countries have had their 
‘fair share’ in deforestation long time ago, and that, accordingly, the same should not 
be denied to the developing countries whose rural economies depend on agricultural 
production (including palm oil) (MPOB, 2009, p. 5). EU therefore should monitor the 
ILUC, whilst at the same time strive to ensure that there was “no discrimination on any 
biofuel source and all of them must be given equal access into EU market” (MPOC, 
2010, p. 6). 
Other foreign stakeholders, mostly from Argentina - RENOVA (Argentina), the 
Argentine Biofuels Chamber (CARBIO), PBE (Argentina), the Argentinean Soybean 
Chain Association, Vicentin (Argentina), as well as the Brazilian Association of 
Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE) - also took the same position:  there was no need 
for any further action at the EU level. 
In contrast to the biofuel producers coming from Malaysia, Brazil, and Argentina, 
ExxonMobil was among the rare non-biofuels companies that engaged in this debate. 
Its Dutch and UK counterparts, Shell and BP, also took part in the discussions. But, 
unlike Shell and BP, who basically supported the biofuels producers’ view that the EU 
should not put forward legislation on ILUC, Exxon argued that the EU studies did 
prove a significant ILUC effect and, hence, ILUC should be included in the 
calculations of biofuel greenhouse gas emissions (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 1). Exxon also 
proposed that the EU reconsiders the targets set by RED and to introduce ILUC factors 
for different types of biofuels, following the example of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency and the California Air Resources Board (ExxonMobil, 2010, p. 4). 
                                                          
93 See the MPOC’s website: http://www.mpoc.eu/2011/11/corporate-profile/. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019]      
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Finally, the company advocated further EU regulation to provide support for the 
development of advanced biofuels.   
UNICA, MPOC, and the stakeholders from Argentina are associations representing 
the biofuel industry. Their key goal was to prevent legislation that would impose 
additional sustainability criteria on biofuels aimed at discouraging the use of certain 
categories of biofuels (e.g. biodiesel). Exxon’s interest, conversely, was to spur debate 
as it intended to make investments in advanced biofuels. In 2009, the company teamed 
up with Synthetic Genomics, a biotech company, to jointly research and develop 
advanced biofuels made from algae (Synthetic Genomics, 2017). The company 
believed that its work with algae “offers some of the greatest promise for next-
generation biofuels, which is why Exxon has committed hundreds of millions of dollars 
to algae research” (ExxonMobil, 2018). In addition to this, Exxon had been funding 
research programs on other advanced biofuels such as cellulosic biomass, for example. 
Advanced biofuels, as mentioned earlier, are more sustainable than conventional 
biofuels since they do not need agricultural land to be produced. However, the problem 
with the advanced biofuels is that large-scale production has not been sufficiently 
developed due to high production costs (when compared to conventional biofuels), as 
mentioned earlier. Hence, some companies, including Exxon, lobbied in favour of 
legislation that would provide better support for the research and development of these 
types of biofuels. 
At the same time, Shell and BP argued against further legislation on ILUC since the 
two companies had made huge investments in the Brazilian market for ethanol. British 
Petroleum (BP) was among the first fossil fuel companies to make investments in 
bioethanol, in 2008 (UNICA, 2009b). The move was welcomed by UNICA. Following 
this, Shell created, in 2010, a $12 billion joint venture with the Brazilian Cosan 
company to produce ethanol (UNICA, 2010b). 
 
5.4. The Commission’s preliminary position paper 
In 2010, the Commission published the report analysing ILUC related to biofuel 
production. The first conclusion in the report was that “renewable energy, including 
biofuels, is an essential element of the EU’s energy and climate strategy”, suggesting 
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that the stable investment climate for biofuels producers created by RED should be 
preserved (European Commission, 2010b, p. 14). This conclusion was in line with the 
position of the domestic and foreign biofuel industries94.  Secondly, the Commission 
acknowledged the numerous uncertainties related to estimating ILUC, adding that 
further work should be conducted to address these deficiencies (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 14). This was also in line with the biofuels producers’ positions 
expressed during the consultations. However, the Commission also stressed that the 
studies had shown that ILUC has an impact on GHG emissions of biofuels and, if any 
regulation in this regard was required, it “should be addressed under a precautionary 
approach” (European Commission, 2010b, p. 14).  
For further steps, the Commission promised to carry out an impact assessment that 
would assess the following options: (1) no action; (2) increase the minimum GHG 
savings threshold for biofuels; (3) impose additional sustainability standards for 
biofuels; and (4) a quantification of ILUC-related GHG emissions of each type of 
biofuel (European Commission, 2010b, p. 14). The forth option was favoured by 
Exxon.  
Clearly, at this point, the Commission was still not certain whether a legislative 
proposal on ILUC would be drafted or not. All the options, from “take no action” to 
the introduction of stringent measures that would limit use of certain types of biofuels, 
were still on the table. The second Barroso Commission had inherited the discussion 
on ILUC from the previous College of Commissioners. Under pressure from the 
NGOs, an obligation for the Commission to issue a report on ILUC by the end of 2010 
was inserted into RED. Hence, the report delivered in 2010 was not a product of the 
Commission’s clear vision on how to deal with ILUC related to biofuel production, but 
rather it was its obligation under RED. In addition to this, the issue was highly complex 
given the difficulties related to estimating the effects of ILUC. Finally, as will be seen 
later, it seems that the positions of the two Commissioners – for Energy and 
Environment – diverged on how to tackle the issue. These were the main reasons why 
the Commission did not have a strong early position on ILUC. The lack of the 
                                                          
94 For example, commenting on the report UNICA expressed satisfaction with the fact that the 
Commission has decided to take “a cautious approach” to ILUC and that it is acknowledged that 
biofuels have an important role in EU energy policy (in EurActiv, 12 January 2011).  
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Commission’s initial position would open a window of opportunity for stakeholders to 
try to shape the debate in accordance with their interests.  
 
5.5. Non-EU interest groups’ lobbying activities  
Non-EU biofuel industry representatives tried to shape the debate on ILUC from 2009. 
Their efforts were directed at being engaged in the consultations organised by the 
Commission in 2009 and 2010, as already mentioned. Both MPOC and UNICA were 
invited by the Commission to take part in discussion on ILUC (Interview, 7), but they 
used other lobbying strategies as well.  
Since 2009, the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC) has claimed that the palm oil 
industry from Malaysia has been under continuous attack from some European NGOs, 
such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (MPOC, 2009a). MPOC has argued that 
these NGOs are trying to persuade the EU decision-makers to limit the import of palm 
oil on the grounds that its production damages the environment (MPOC, 2009b). It 
also felt disadvantaged in comparison to NGOs advocating against palm oil-based 
biofuels, since many of them were funded by the Commission (EurActiv, 28 April 
2010). To counter this view, the chairman of MPOC and IOI Corp95, Datuk Lee Yeow 
Chor announced in 2009 that they will increase their efforts to brand Malaysian palm 
oil through increased investments into research on palm oil, as well as through greater 
engagement with stakeholders, primarily NGOs and the media (MPOC, 2009c). 
As a result, MPOC launched two advertisements in the UK with the aim of 
promoting palm oil as a sustainable energy source. The commercials were, however, 
banned by the UK Advertising Standards Authority due to the provision of misleading 
information (The Guardian, 09 September 2009). MPOC also hired Fleishman-
Hillard, Brussels-based PR company, who advised the association to find a “narrative 
to tell how palm oil sustainability processes have improved” given that palm oil “has 
only a few friends in the EU” (Fleishman-Hillard, 2012). In addition, MOPC was 
advised to pursue lobbying across all levels – from national to the EU level 
(Fleishman-Hillard, 2012). MPOC’s PR campaign, was not well received by European 
                                                          
95 IOI Corp is one of the leading global palm oil companies from Malaysia. See the IOI’s website: 
www.ioigroup.com. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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NGOs. As a representative of Friends of the Earth said: “No amount of PR will alter 
the facts about palm oil” (The Guardian, 20 May 2011). 
According to the MPOC website, the Malaysian palm industry held meetings with 
EU officials, offering explanations surrounding the palm oil production (MPOC, 
2009d). However, it seems that the organisation’s arguments were not well received 
in Brussels.  
“They [EU] are going into ILUC without proper studies (…) We provide our data 
but they don’t. My researchers have gone to Brussels but they [the EU] never 
disclose their data. They have the final say”, said Mohd Basri, CEO of Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board (MPOC, 2009d). 
MPOC also engaged in communication with stakeholders from Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium (MPOC, 2009e).  
According to data obtained from the EU Transparency Register, biofuel legislation 
was among the issues monitored by Exxon during the negotiation on ILUC. Besides 
taking part in public consultations, the company also engaged in debate on ILUC via 
the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), the Commission’s “science 
and knowledge service”96. Namely, Exxon was among the members of Concawe, an 
association created by oil companies to conduct research on ecological issues that 
might be important for the oil industrial sector97. In 2000, Concawe, together with the 
European Council for Automotive R&D (EUCAR) and the Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), created the ‘JEC Consortium’ to carry out scientific studies 
about road transport, fuel consumption, and other areas including biofuels (Concawe, 
2014, p. 8). Reports delivered by JEC Consortium (e.g. Lonza, et al., 2011) were cited, 
together with other studies, in the Commission’s impact assessment on ILUC 
(European Commission, 2012a, p. 21- 22). 
As part of its advocacy efforts, Exxon used the services of PR firms such as 
Fleishman-Hillard and Burson-Marsteller. Exxon also launched TV advertisements 
featuring statements on algae as a sustainable source of biofuel. The advert was, 
however, banned by the UK Advertising Standards Authority, due to alleged 
                                                          
96 See the JRC’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-centre_en. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019].   
97 See the Concawe’s website: https://www.concawe.eu/about-us/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
177 
 
misleading information (EurActiv, 24 March 2011). Exxon complained by citing the 
Joint Research Centre’ studies to prove its point.  
The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) used the services of the 
two PR firms as well: Digonnet&Kutas Consulting and Fleishman-Hillard98.  In 
addition, Apex-Brasil, the Brazilian Trade Promotion and Investment Agency99, 
helped UNICA on various occasions to promote their interests in Europe. Besides the 
services of consultancy firms, between 2009 and 2010, UNICA took part in many 
European conferences attended by EU officials as well100. UNICA was also among the 
sponsors of Green Week 2010, the conference on the EU environment policy, 
organised by the DG Environment.101 At these events, UNICA representatives made 
the case that Brazilian sugarcane ethanol contributed to the sustainability of the EU 
transport sector, and to overall EU energy security. The UNICA PR campaign in 
Europe also included the publication of an English version of “Noticia UNICA”, an 
electronic newsletter about Brazilian sugarcane, which they started to disseminate 
across Europe and elsewhere with the aim of promoting the industry abroad.102 
The major purpose of all these campaigns was to portray the biofuel industry as a 
sustainable alternative to fossil fuels and as an energy source that contributed to the 
security of supply in the EU. Foreign industry representatives tended to present biofuel 
production as a “success story” that could be replicated in the EU, as well as across 
other parts of the world. UNICA thus argued that bioethanol production helped Brazil 
                                                          
98 Data obtained from the Transparency Register.  
99 The Transparency Register. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=91665214476-01.  
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
100 For example, the Fuels of the Future conference (Berlin 2009), Biofuels Conference (Budapest 
2009), Green Week organised by DG Environment (Brussels 2009), European Fuels Conference (Paris 
2010), Second European Bioethanol Fuel Conference (Brussels 2010). The data obtained from the 
UNICA website: http://english.unica.com.br/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
101 European Parliament. See: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-
4321&format=XML&language=EN. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
102 UNICA. See: http://english.unica.com.br/media-center/10386912920310621254/unica-to-launch-
english-newsletter-on-11-february/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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to deal with the problem of energy dependency on fossil fuels, a practice that, 
according to UNICA, should be followed by the EU as well103.  
Non-EU countries were also invited to take part in the stakeholder meeting on ILUC 
organised by the Commission in September 2010.104 UNICA representatives also met 
with public officials from many member states, among them the Danish Minister for 
the Environment (in 2009), the Dutch Minister for Foreign Relations (2010), a State 
Secretary at the German Ministry of Transport (2010), Prince Philippe of Belgium 
(2010), the Swedish Ambassador in Brussels (2012), and several others.105  
UNICA, MPOC, as well as Exxon, also used the European Parliament as a lobbying 
channel. For example, in April 2010, the Senior Vice President of ExxonMobil 
requested a meeting with the European Parliament President, Jerzy Karol Buzek, to 
discuss the future of the company’s research into algae biofuels and related 
developments.106 In January 2011, Conservative MEP Roger Helmer paid a visit to 
Malaysia, as a guest of MPOC. He wrote on his blog, following his return: 
“The MPOC is very concerned about the EU’s environmental score-card for bio-
fuels, which purports to measure both the emissions savings, and the impact of 
changes in land use associated with each biofuel. The MPOC clearly feels that the 
criteria applied, while theoretically objective, in fact reflect prejudices based on 
the propaganda of green NGOs (which, as we recall, are mostly funded by the EU 
itself — which means funded by you, the tax-payer). The NGOs constantly say 
that use of palm oil for bio-fuels forces up food prices, that palm oil development 
drives deforestation and contributes to CO2 emissions, and that palm oil 
cultivation threatens endangered habitats and in particular the orang-utan.  These 
points, it seems, are greatly overstated or just plain wrong (…). But the symbiotic 
relationship between green NGOs and the European Commission means that the 
NGOs carry greater weight than diplomatic or commercial interests — and more 
weight than a fair, unbiased analysis would justify. As a result, palm oil bio-fuel 
                                                          
103 See a website established by UNICA, Sugarcane.org: https://sugarcane.org/energy-diversity/. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
104 Available at: https://www.clientearth.org/reports/ce-v-ec-reply-annexes-2-march-2011.pdf. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
105 Data obtained from the UNICA’s website: http://www.unica.com.br. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
106 European Parliament. See: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/courrier_officiel/arrivee/2010/EP-
PE_LTA(2010)004432_EN.pdf. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
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suffers severe discrimination in the EU as against other food crop bio-fuels” 
(Helmer, 2011). 
While Roger Helmer and a few other MEPs who paid visit to Malaysia on later 
dates107 showed sympathy for MPOC’s position, they faced criticism at home for 
paying the visits. For instance, in reaction to Roger Helmer’s visit to Malaysia, 
Greenpeace’s campaigner Sarah Shoraka said:  
“No doubt the voters of East Midlands will wonder why their MEP Roger 
Helmer felt it was in their interests to accept an invitation to fly out to Malaysia 
to advise the palm oil industry on how to lobby Europe for lower environmental 
standards” (in the Guardian, 02 February 2011). 
Thus even when MPOC managed to find some friends in the EU, these would face 
criticism in Brussels108.  
UNICA also met MEPs on various occasions: (1) in October 2009, during the 
debate on the future of biofuels in the European Parliament, sponsored by Shell;109 (2) 
in July 2010, during the debate on ILUC in the European Parliament;110 and (3) in 
October 2011, during the reception at the European Parliament organised by UNICA 
and Apex-Brasil (the event was supported by BP, Novozymes, Scania, and Shell, and 
hosted by MEP Britta Thomsen, a member of the Social Democrats). Some MEPs, 
such as Britta Thomsen, provided support for the Brazilian sugarcane industry111. In 
addition, the Brazilian “success story” in dealing with the problem of energy 
dependency on fossil fuels was seen by some decision-makers as the story that should 
be replicated in the EU. Overall, it seems that MPOC’s and UNICA’s lobbying efforts 
were more effective when it comes to some MEPs, than the Commission.  
 
                                                          
107 The mission to Singapore and Malaysia organised for the MEPs by the European Energy Forum in 
May 2013 (European Energy Forum, 2013).  
108 For more see the Corporate Europe Observatory (2013) and The Guardian (02 February 2011). 
109 UNICA. See: http://english.unica.com.br/news/7064751920331155362/unica-por-cento3A-
adoption-of-clean-alternative-fuels-in-europe-can-no-longer-be-delayed/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
110 UNICA. See: http://english.unica.com.br/news/4112404592034872045/global-perspective-on-iluc-
only-way-to-ensure-effective-eu-policy/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019].      
111 UNICA. See: http://english.unica.com.br/news/4112404592035297016/european-parliamentarian-
plans-campaign-in-support-of-brazilian-ethanol-in-europe/. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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5.6. Impact assessment and interest groups’ reactions 
In 2012, the Commission published the impact assessment of previously discussed 
policy options, as well as a fifth option that was not mentioned explicitly during the 
consultations, but which received the support of NGOs and a few industrial 
stakeholders (one of them being Exxon) (European Commission, 2012a, p. 36).  
The first option (“take no action”) was favoured by the biofuel industry, including 
UNICA and the Malaysian Palm Oil Council and farmers. The second option implied 
raising the minimum GHG savings threshold set for biofuels by RED (according to 
Article 17 of RED, biofuels need to achieve GHG savings of at least 35% when 
compared with fossil fuels). This option was neither supported by the industry nor by 
the NGOs engaged in the consultations (European Commission, 2012a, p. 32-33). The 
third option consisted of introducing additional sustainability standards for some types 
of biofuels (European Commission, 2012a, p. 33-34). This option was supported by 
many NGOs. The fourth option implied the incorporation of crop-specific GHG 
emissions (European Commission, 2012a, p. 34). This option was similar to the second 
option apart from one important difference. The second option implied raising the 
minimum GHG savings for biofuels in general, without taking into account the 
differences among the biofuels. The fourth option suggested that the GHG saving 
threshold should be raised relative to the estimated ILUC emission for each type of 
biofuel; the so called crop-specific ILUC factor (European Commission, 2012a, p. 35). 
For example, if a GHG emission that stemmed from ILUC was higher for palm oil than 
for sugarcane, the palm oil-based biofuels would be required to yield higher GHG 
savings than the sugarcane-based biofuels. Most NGOs and most academics and 
scientists backed this option during the consultations (European Commission, 2012a, 
p. 36). This option was also favoured by Exxon. 
This fifth option suggested imposing a limit on the amount of conventional biofuel 
being produced, which would be counted towards the target set by RED (10% in the 
transport sector) (European Commission, 2012a, p. 36). Since ILUC related mostly to 
conventional biofuels, it was proposed that, in order to limit their production, their 
maximum contribution towards the 10% target should be set at 5% (European 
Commission, 2012a, p. 61).  
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The general conclusion of the impact assessment was that the best solution for 
dealing with ILUC was to combine the fifth option with the second: (a) to set a 5% cap 
for the contribution of conventional biofuels towards the 10% target and to raise the 
minimum GHG savings threshold set by RED, plus (b) to incorporate the ILUC-caused 
GHG emissions into the existing GHG emission methodology for biofuels (European 
Commission, 2012a, p. 69). Additionally, it was proposed that the EU should provide 
support for advanced biofuels.  
Thus the impact assessment conclusion mostly reflected the NGOs’ preferences 
whilst, at the same time, acknowledging many negative effects of the proposed options 
highlighted by the biofuel industry. The impact assessment also recognised the 
potential problem of the compatibility between the fourth option and those WTO rules 
“related to its reliance on modelling for the determination” of ILUC-related GHG 
emissions (European Commission, 2012a, p. 56). As already mentioned, the alleged 
incompatibility of the regulation on ILUC with WTO rules was raised as an issue on 
several occasions by non-EU business representatives, such as MPOC and UNICA. 
Yet, it seemed that the impact assessment report did not perceive this as a “credible 
threat”, arguing that the US applied similar regulations which had not been challenged 
up to that point by the WTO (European Commission, 2012a, p. 56). The report also 
highlighted that the forth option would considerably limit imports of biodiesel into the 
EU, however, it was added, that this could be compensated by trade in advance biofuels 
and bioethanol (European Commission, 2012a, p. 56). This reflected Exxon’s position 
on the issue. 
In May 2012, the Commission had a meeting to discuss proposals on ILUC based 
on the above impact assessment report (European Commission, 2012b). The minutes 
of the meeting indicate that the Commission was not united on what measures should 
be taken. The Commission’s president, Jose Manuel Barroso, stressed that ILUC was 
“a technically highly complex and politically highly sensitive issue” which should be 
addressed with caution (European Commission, 2012b, p. 11). Hence, he called for a 
balanced approach on the issue given the consequences of a future proposal on the EU 
industry, agricultural production, and trade between the EU and non-EU countries 
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 11).  
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Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, pointed out the need to stimulate the 
development of advanced biofuels and to reduce negative consequences of ILUC 
related to conventional biofuel production (European Commission, 2012b, p. 12). 
However, the Commissioner emphasised that it was important to take into account both 
“the economic and environmental consequences” of a future proposal, the needs of 
biofuel producers and farmers, the global energy market, and the fact that it was 
impossible to exclude biofuel imports from third countries (European Commission, 
2012b, p. 12). Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action, 
pointed out that certain biofuels “were better than others” concerning ILUC, and that 
the EU should support investments in advanced biofuels (European Commission, 
2012b, p. 13). President Barroso concluded that, given the different opinions expressed 
during the discussion, the final decision should be postponed (European Commission, 
2012b, p. 14). 
According to the minutes of the Commission meeting, media reports (EurActiv, 03 
May 2012), and analyses of the negotiations on ILUC (Lydgate, 2013; Poláková et al., 
2012), the energy and climate directorate were divided over which options should be 
introduced by the forthcoming regulations. The key dispute was over whether the crop-
specific ILUC factor (an increase of the GHG savings threshold relative to the 
estimated ILUC emissions for each type of biofuel) would be included in the future 
proposal or not. DG Climate wanted to have the GHG saving threshold raised relative 
to the estimated ILUC emission for each type of biofuel, whereas the energy directorate 
did not want to include this option in the forthcoming proposal.  
The issue with the crop-specific ILUC factor was that it would affect mostly EU 
biodiesel producers. The EU had been consuming more biodiesel than bioethanol – 
approximately 75% of biodiesel and around 21% of bioethanol (Ecofys, 2012, p. iii). 
More than 80% of biofuels consumed in the EU had been domestically produced, 
mostly from soybean and rapeseed (Ecofys, 2014, vi). Since biodiesel production 
yields higher GHG emissions related to ILUC than bioethanol does, the EU biodiesel 
industry would be negatively affected if the crop-specific ILUC factor was to be 
included.  
In September 2012, a leaked draft proposal revealed a compromise solution: crop-
specific ILUC emissions were to be included in the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), but 
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not in the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) (EurActiv, 17 September 2012; 
Dunmore, 2012). The leaked draft also proposed quadruple-counting for advanced 
biofuels (Dunmore, 2012). The industry branded the draft proposal as “ill-
conceived”112 and “shocking”113. After the draft was leaked (mid-September 2012), 
members of the Commission were “receiving three mails by the hour on this subject” 
(EurActiv, 07 May 2013). Documents obtained by AskTheEU.org confirmed that after 
the draft was leaked, the industry launched intensive lobbying in an attempt to water 
down the forthcoming proposal.114 
In a joint letter aimed to address the leaked draft, EU associations of biofuels 
producers and farmers (e.g. ePURE, European Biodiesel Board, Copa-Cogeca, 
Coceral) called the leaked draft “a masterpiece of irresponsible policy making” 
(Coceral, 2012). They complained that crop-specific ILUC factor would cause “the 
immediate death” of European biodiesel industry (Coceral, 2012). They also added that 
the leaked proposal did not address the real problem which is management of land use 
in non-EU countries. Hence, EU biodiesel producers believed that the Commission 
should not deal with ILUC related to biofuels in Europe, but instead in countries 
outside the EU. Similarly, it was argued that ILUC did not concern biofuels production 
as such, but instead inappropriate management of land use in non-EU countries.  
 
5.7. The Commission’s proposal 
In October 2012, after an intense debate within and outside the Commission, a 
proposal concerning ILUC was finally published (European Commission, 2012c). The 
proposal contained all the measures contained in the leaked draft except for one – the 
inclusion of crop-specific ILUC emissions in the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD). 
Instead, the Commission proposed only reporting duties related to ILUC, namely that 
biofuel producers and member states should report ILUC-related GHG emissions 
                                                          
112 See for example, reaction of the UK biofuel producers. Available at: 
http://www.scopa.org.uk/resources/documents/ILUC-UK-Industry-response.pdf. [Accessed on 
07/07/2019].      
113 See for instance, reaction of the most powerful business associations of biofuels producers and 
farmers, European Biodiesel Board, ePure, Copa-Cogeca, Fediol, and Coceral (Coceral, 2012).  
114 AskTheEU.org. Available at: 
https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/exchanges_between_geoghegan_quin#incoming-8592.  
[Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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(European Commission, 2012c, p. 2), which differed from the initial idea of mandatory 
accounting for crop-specific GHG emissions, which was left out of the proposal.  The 
proposal also contained the following elements: (1) the introduction of a 5% limit on 
the amount of biofuels which could be counted towards the target set by RED for 
energy used in transport; (2) an increase in the minimum GHG savings threshold for 
biofuels from 35% to 60% (compared to fossil fuels); (3) the promotion of advanced 
biofuels (made from wastes and algae) by way of multiplying their contribution 
towards the 10% target (European Commission, 2012c, p. 3). 
Even though the binding ILUC factor was not included in the final proposal, the 
proposal was seen by the industry representatives as a “U-turn” in the EU biofuel 
policy (Coceral, 2012). This was especially so since, in addition to what was proposed, 
the Commission suggested that biofuels that did not lead to considerable GHG savings 
(when emissions from ILUC were included) and those that were produced from food-
based crops should not continue to receive subsidies after 2020 (European 
Commission, 2012c, p. 3). Energy Commissioner Connie Hedegaard stressed that the 
Commission “had a clear preference” for the advanced biofuels, and the key message 
from the proposal needed to be that advanced biofuels should be the only type of 
biofuels to receive support after 2020 (in ICEDD et al., 2013, p. 16). 
Concerning non-EU producers, after the Commission published the proposal, 
UNICA stated that the 5% cap on conventional biofuels ignored the differences 
between ILUC emissions caused by different crop-based biofuels (UNICA, 2013, p. 
1). The proposal, according to UNICA, did not acknowledge the sustainability of 
certain types of biofuels, such as sugarcane ethanol produced in Brazil. UNICA also 
pointed out that the 5% cap has been “potentially trade-restrictive to non-EU produced 
biofuels” and hence “vulnerable to breaching WTO rules” (UNICA, 2013, p. 1-2). 
While supporting the Commission’s intention to encourage the development of 
advanced biofuels, UNICA suggested a 2% target for advanced biofuels by 2020 
(UNICA, 2013, p. 2).  
MPOC was not satisfied with the proposal either. Even though the proposal did not 
include crop-specific ILUC emissions, through national reporting, MPOC claimed that 
the proposal encourages consumers to use biofuels with supposedly smaller ILUC 
emissions (MPOC, 2013). Similarly, to UNICA, MPOC stated that the Commission’s 
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proposal has not been compatible with the WTO rules (MPOC, 2013). Exxon, did not 
comment the proposal publicly.  
 
5.8. Lobbying success of non-EU interest groups 
The table below shows, the Commission’s proposal was more in line with the Exxon’s 
position than the one lobbing for by UNICA and MPOC. As explained, the message 
behind the Commission’s proposal was that advanced biofuels should be the only type 
of biofuels that will be receiving public support after 2020 (ICEDD, 2013, p. 16). This 
position matched the Exxon’s preferences. While at the beginning of the debate on 
ILUC, in 2009, UNICA argued against discrimination among biofuels, it was not 
satisfied eventually with the 5% cap on conventional biofuels, because this cap 
overlooked the differences between ILUC emissions caused by different types of 
biofuels (UNICA, 2012, p. 1). Bioethanol made of sugarcane is among the biofuels 
that achieve the highest GHG savings, when compared to fossil fuels. Hence, a cap that 
limits consumption of all biofuels, instead of only those that are mostly harmful, was 
not well received by UNICA. In the end, by imposing reporting duties related to ILUC, 
and by increasing from 35% to 60% the overall GHG savings for biofuels, the proposal 
- as seen by MPOC - aimed to discourage the consumption of palm oil-based biofuels. 
Hence, it was not welcomed by MPOC either. 
 





MPOC UNICA Exxon 
The 5% cap for 
crop-based biofuels 
The 5% cap for 
crop-based 
biofuels 
x x ✓ 
Increase in overall 
GHG savings from 
35% to 60% 
Increase in overall 
GHG savings from 
35% to 60% 

















Compromise: Member states to report 
ILUC emissions 
x N/A N/A 
X – oppose; ✓ - support; N/A – no position.  
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5.8.1. Commission’s preferences on the discussed issues 
The debate about ILUC in the EU was sparked mostly by NGOs. To tackle the NGOs’ 
criticism, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) prescribed the obligation for the 
Commission to review ILUC and to produce by the end of 2010 a report on this issue. 
Hence, the proposal was not a result of the Commission’s preferences; instead it was 
a result of its obligation under RED.  
The negotiations on ILUC regulation were a highly complex process. Many 
proposals on how to deal with indirect land-use change related to biofuels production 
were raised both inside and outside of the EU institutions. In general, the positions of 
the different actors could be divided into two groups: (1) those aiming to impose strict 
regulations on biofuel production related to ILUC, and make a turn in EU biofuels 
policy from conventional to advanced and more sustainable biofuels; and (2) those 
aiming to protect the conventional biofuels industry and preserve the EU policy of 
support for these biofuels (e.g. subsidies). Climate Commissioner, Liberal MEPs and 
Greens, some member states (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK), the 
involved NGOs, and those who had invested in advanced biofuels (including Exxon) 
fell into the first group. The opposing block comprised of the biofuels producers and 
several member states (e.g. France, Spain, Poland). The proposal that was adopted 
could be described as both a half empty and a half full glass.  
The Commission struggled to reach an early common position due to two reasons: 
firstly, because it was hard to measure the magnitude of ILUC related to biofuel 
production (issue complexity); secondly, because the two Commissioners had 
different perspectives on how to deal with this issue.  
The differences between the two Commissioners could be partly explained by their 
portfolios. Commenting on regulations concerning ILUC, one Commission official 
stated: 
“Biofuels policy was based on climate, on energy security and on rural 
development – three legs. And the thing was that whenever you – this is going 
back a long time now – but whenever you said “oh, but this biofuel doesn’t do x”, 
[people could] say “oh, but it does y and z” (in Palmer, 2014, p. 343). 
Unlike the Energy Commissioner, whose job was to take into account not only the 
environmental aspects of legislation, but other important issues too (e.g. energy 
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security), for Connie Hedegaard, the major task was to deliver the legislation that 
would reduce CO2 emissions. While, for Connie Hedegaard, the question of ILUC 
boiled down to the question of GHG emissions and related food price increases, the 
Energy Commissioner argued that the EU policy towards biofuels should take into 
account not only their sustainability but also other important aspects: the economic 
consequences, trade with non-EU countries, and the security of supply. 
Besides this, as already mentioned, before coming to the Commission, Connie 
Hedegaard served in Denmark as Minister for the Environment and Minister for 
Climate and Energy. She had been engaged in a debate on biofuels in Denmark even 
before she was appointed as the Climate Commissioner. In one interview, she stated: 
“Personally, I’ve always been very cautious on biofuels” (in EurActiv, 02 February 
2012). Therefore, it was a reasonable assumption that her personal experience in the 
fields of environment and energy policy made it harder for lobbyists to alter her 
preferences. It must also be remembered that she was the first Climate Commissioner 
as, before her appointment, climate action had been a part of the environment portfolio. 
This also may be one of the reasons why Connie Hedegaard preferred more stringent 
regulation on ILUC.   
The absence of Commission’s early position on ILUC, uncertainties related to 
measurement of ILUC, together with different positions within the Commission, 
created an opportunity for the biofuel industry to water down the initial leaked proposal 
(to exclude crop-specific ILUC factor).  
However, in the end, the proposal was not changed because the stakeholders 
provided new information or important scientific data about ILUC. As seen earlier, the 
Commission was using its own in-house expertise, as well as information provided by 
international experts, which came in parallel to the interest groups’ expertise 
(Interview 1). The proposal actually represented a compromise between the 
sustainability objectives and the economic interest of biofuel producers. This 
conclusion could be confirmed by the statement made by Connie Hedegaard that the 
final proposal “is not perfect” and that it represents only “a first step” in dealing with 





5.8.2. Commission’s position on the interest groups 
Both UNICA and MPOC were important actors in the debate on ILUC because of two 
reasons. Firstly, because the EU rules on ILUC affect not only producers in the EU, 
but also those in non-EU countries. Secondly, the question of EU trade with external 
countries and possible violation of WTO rules was a significant part of the debate. 
Hence, since the beginning, the Commission invited MPOC and UNICA to take part 
in the discussion on ILUC related to biofuels (Interview 7). Nevertheless, according 
to all other characteristics, the two foreign actors were closer to the groups of 
outsiders. Firstly, unlike Exxon, UNICA and MPOC did open offices in Brussels in 
2008, the time when the debate on conventional biofuels’ sustainability started in the 
EU. Secondly, during the preparation of the proposal on ILUC, UNICA’s and MPOC’ 
relations with the Commission were strained - they were threatening that the 
Commission’s proposal on ILUC could be challenged at the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Thirdly, their market shares in the EU were not crucial for the overall EU 
energy mix (around 2% of biodiesel consumption and 2.8% of bioethanol 
consumption). Fourthly, MPOC struggled to recover its poor reputation in the EU. The 
palm oil industry from Malaysia was criticised by some European NGOs, and 
MPOC’s impression was that the case made by the Malaysian palm oil producers was 
not well received in the EU. Even when, on several occasions MPOC has managed to 
win ‘friends’ in Brussels, such for instance MEP Roger Helmer, those friends would 
suffer criticism.   
On the other side, Exxon was a well-established actor in Brussel, better connected 
and integrated with the most influential industry associations in the EU better than 
UNICA and MPOC. Exxon has been a member of Concawe/FuelsEurope, IOGP, 
CEFIC, AmCham EU, BusinessEurope and other influential associations. Through 
Concawe, the company was in a position to influence the research on ILUC produced 
by the Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). As mentioned, Concawe issued, 
together with the JRC, a study on ILUC and biofuels, which was used by the 
Commission in its impact assessment report. Exxon was among rare companies that 
was advocating for advanced biofuels. Its lobbying success provides support to the idea 
that those interest groups that do account for the preferences of the Commission (in 
this case, the need to increase the sustainability of biofuels), tend to be more successful. 
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Last, but not least, the Commission’s decision not to include crop-specific ILUC 
emissions demonstrates why having a foreign origin might sometimes be a drawback 
for lobbying in the EU. Although UNICA’s and MPOC’s respective market shares in 
the overall bioethanol and biodiesel consumption in the EU were not large, projections 
emerged that both - biodiesel and bioethanol imports - from Malaysia and Brazil will 
increase until 2020 (European Commission, 2012a, p. 20-21). Additionally, it was 
estimated that the EU ethanol will lose it competiveness vis-à-vis the Brazilian ethanol 
(Al-Riffai, Dimaranan, and Laborde, 2010, p. 44). As mentioned, the EU was 
consuming more biodiesel than bioethanol – approximately 75% of biodiesel and 
around 21% of bioethanol (Ecofys, 2012, p. iii). More than 80% of the biodiesel 
consumed in the EU was domestically produced (Ecofys, 2014). As a result, albeit it 
was confirmed that production of biodiesel causes more GHG emissions than 
bioethanol production, and albeit Brazil had the potential to increase bioethanol 
imports to the EU, the Commission eventually made the proposal which allowed EU 
biodiesel producers and farmers to escape the worst case scenario, at the expense of 
bioethanol producers, UNICA included. While all the studies had confirmed the 
superiority of bioethanol over biodiesel, crop-specific GHG emissions were eventually 
left out of the proposal. It seems that this was mainly owing to the extensive lobbying 
of EU biodiesel producers and farmers. Thus, even though UNICA’s position was in 
line with the scientific findings, the Commission eventually made a compromising 
solution between the sustainability objectives (based on scientific knowledge) and the 
interest of domestic biodiesel producers and farmers. It would be highly unlikely for 




In the case study analysed in this chapter, the Commission’s initial positions on policy 
issues affected the lobbying success of the involved interest groups. It has been shown 
that, specifically, when the Commission does not have strong initial preferences over 
the discussed measures, interest groups will be enjoying better prospects to shift the 
debate into a preferred direction. Biodiesel industry and farmers have managed to 
prevent “the worst case scenario”, that is the provision on crop-specific ILUC factor. 
Yet, the case also indicates that when a Commissioner in charge of a legislative 
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proposal (Connie Hedegaard) has strong early preferences, due to her/his previous 
experience or the nature of the portfolio which she covers, interest groups tend to be 
less successful in lobbying to impact the Commissioner’s initial preferences. 
The findings obtained in this chapter also suggest that having a foreign origin, when 
lobbying in the EU, could be a drawback. A foreign group may be less successful if its 
interests do not coincide with the interests of domestic (EU) groups, in which case the 
Commission will likely choose to protect the interests of the domestic groups. On a 
final note, the analysed case suggests that those groups that factor in their lobbying 
preferences of the Commission (Exxon), tend to be more successful. The case, 
however, does not find support for the assumption that insiders (Exxon) have better 
access to the Commission than outsiders (MPOC and UNICA) when it comes to 
bilateral meetings with the Commission. On the other hand, unlike MPOC and UNICA, 
Exxon was better integrated and connected with the most influential associations in the 
EU and through them it had access to the Commission’s inner cycle of the policy-
making. A case in point is Exxon’s membership in Concawe, an industry association, 
which, together with the Commission’s Joint Research Centre had produced studies 















Chapter 6: Energy Security Package 
 
This chapter examines to what extent non-EU interest groups managed to achieve their 
lobbying objectives during the preparation of the Commission’s proposal on the 
Energy Security Package. The proposal was adopted in 2017. The Energy Security 
Package introduced a number of policy measures aimed at strengthening EU energy 
security. The most important provisions that have been discussed during the 
preparation of this legislative package were: the improvement of regional cooperation 
among member states, the creation of an obligatory solidarity mechanism, ex-ante 
assessment of intergovernmental agreements’ compatibility with EU law, and the 
diversification of energy supplies (European Commission, 2015a). 
The Energy Security Package has been one of the cornerstones of the so-called 
European Energy Union. As such it has been the top policy priority of the Jean-Claude 
Juncker Commission since the beginning of its mandate.  The Commission had strong 
early preferences on most of the discussed issues even before starting the mandate. 
Four companies - Gazprom, Naftogaz, Equinor, and Exxon -  are examined; those 
companies vary among themselves on the insider/outsider distinction. 
 
6.1. Background 
The issue of energy security had not been seen as a pressing concern during the 1990s, 
but by the middle of the 2000s it returned to the top of the international political agenda 
(Young, 2009, p. 1). The era of cheap and plentiful energy supply, which had lasted 
for almost two decades, ended in 2000 as a result of the sharp fluctuations in energy 
prices, the political instability in the producing countries (e.g. Iraq), climate change, 
and the rising energy demand in Asia (e.g. China) (Dannreuther, 2010, p. 114). As the 
Financial Times observed: “Energy security, a dead issue in the 1990s, has emerged 
as a pressing concern of governments and business” in the 2000s (in Young 2009, p. 
1). Europe was no exception in this regard. The European Union was already among 
the world’s largest energy importers; in 2000 it imported about 50% of its energy 
needs (European Commission, 2000, p. 2). Import dependence continued to grow after 
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the EU enlargement in 2004, when ten new member states were admitted, most of 
them dependent on a single energy supplier (Russia).  
In the old system dominated by national champions, energy security was seen as an 
issue of national security guaranteed by each of the member states (Talus, 2011a, p. 
34-36). Liberalisation and market integration changed this old paradigm by 
recognising that an internal energy market should be followed by a common energy 
security (Talus, 2011a, p. 34-36; European Commission, 2002b, p. 5). As a result, 
together with competitiveness and sustainability, the security of supply became one of 
the three main objectives of the EU energy policy (Talus, 2011a, p. 35).  
The security of supply means that energy is available to all customers at an 
affordable price (European Commission, 2008b, p. 3). However, despite the modest 
definition, energy security is “a multi-dimensional concept” which encompasses “a 
large number of fears” (Talus, 2011a, p. 69). EU law defines energy security as the 
security of energy supply (long-term security) and technical safety (short-term 
security) (Article 2 of the Directive 2009/73/EC115). Long-term security concerns 
investments in energy infrastructure, relations with external producers and suppliers, 
diversification of energy sources, and the management of energy demand (through an 
energy efficiency policy) (European Commission, 2008b, p. 3). Short-term security 
focuses on short-term energy supply disruptions (European Commission, 2008b, p. 3-
4).  
In 2004, the first Directive 2004/67/EC on the security of supply (the SoS 
Directive) was adopted (Council, 2004). The Directive prescribed an obligation for 
member states to specify responsibilities of market players related to the energy 
security and to ensure the protection of household customers in the event of energy 
supply disruptions (Article 3 and Article 4 of the Directive 2004/67/EC). Member 
states were obliged to provide reports concerning the security of supplies (Article 5), 
while the Commission was empowered with monitoring rights concerning the issue 
(Article 6). Finally, a group - the Gas Coordination Group - was established to 
facilitate coordination between member states (Article 7).   
                                                          
115 European Parliament and the Council (2009a). 
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In 2009, the Commission proposed a new regulation to repeal the 2004 Directive 
(Regulation 994/2010116). Unlike the previous, the new legislation was adopted as a 
regulation, with the purpose of shifting more power away from member states to the 
EU (Talus, 2013, p. 103). The responsibility for the security of supply was defined as 
“a shared responsibility” between companies, member states (through their national 
regulators), and the Commission (Article 3 of the Regulation 994/2010). Gas 
companies operating in the EU market were primarily responsible for the security of 
gas supplies (European Commission, 2014b, p. 2). However, in the case of a market 
failure, member states were obliged to implement non-market measures designed to 
deliver gas to protected customers (European Commission, 2014b, p. 2).  
The core elements of the Regulation No 994/2010 were: (1) the supply standard; 
(2) protected customers; (3) infrastructure standards – the N-1 rule and the reverse (bi-
directional) flows at interconnection points; (4) Risk Assessment, a Preventive Action 
Plan and an Emergency Plan; (5) information exchange; and (6) coordination in cases 
of a crisis (European Commission, 2014b, p. 2). These provisions will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section.  
In addition to the SoS Regulation, an information exchange mechanism for 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) was established in 2012 (Decision 
994/2012117). The Decision prescribed an obligation for member states to submit all 
international energy agreements upon their ratification (ex-post) to the Commission 
for the “assessment of their compatibility” with EU law (Article 3).  
 
6.2. Early positions  
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict that escalated in February 2014 had once again 
triggered a debate on EU energy security. On 21 March 2014, the European Council 
addressed the growing tensions between Ukraine and Russia. The Council backed the 
efforts aiming to decrease the EU import dependence, urging the Commission to 
propose an appropriate plan (European Council, 2014, p. 10). It was suggested that the 
European Union should diversify its energy supplies, increase energy efficiency, and 
                                                          
116 European Parliament and the Council (2010).  
117 European Parliament and the Council (2012). 
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develop necessary infrastructure (European Council, 2014, p. 10). Also, it was 
recommended that further actions are necessary to facilitate gas exports from the US 
and to advance the transparency of international energy agreements (IGAs) (European 
Council, 2014, p. 10). Thus in reaction to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 
heads of EU member states urged the Commission to come up with a plan on how to 
diversify the EU energy supplies (away from Russia).  
To prepare a plan, as requested by the Council, the Commission launched a so-
called “stress test exercise” to explore the possible effects of an interruption of energy 
supplies from Russia to the EU countries and members of the Energy Community118 
(European Commission, 2014e, p. 2). The test indicated that the three regions that 
would be most severely affected in the case of an energy crisis are the South East 
region, the Baltic region, and the Energy Community states (European Commission, 
2014e, p. 2). The Commission then promised to continue to work on the development 
of appropriate and effective solutions to the problems identified by the test exercise. 
In parallel, in April 2014, Donald Tusk, Poland’s then-Prime Minister, took one 
step further by calling for the creation of a European Energy Union (Tusk, 2014). In 
reaction to the “excessive dependence on Russian energy”, Donald Tusk proposed the 
establishment of “a single European body” that would buy Russian gas for all 
Europeans (The Financial Times, 21 April 2014; Tusk, 2014). His proposal also 
highlighted the importance of the infrastructure development, solidarity among EU 
states, use of domestically produced energy, and imports of shale gas from the US and 
LNG from Australia as effective measures in dealing with the dependence on Russian 
gas (Tusk, 2014).  
In May 2014, the Commission adopted “European Energy Security Strategy” 
(European Commission, 2014d). The strategy identified areas where further actions 
related to energy security should be taken. Particular attention was paid to the 
solidarity mechanism among the member states, energy efficiency, the common 
external energy policy, the growth of domestic energy production, and the 
diversification of energy supply (European Commission, 2014d, p. 3). Regarding the 
diversification of gas supplies, the Commission emphasised that liquefied natural gas 
                                                          
118 The Energy Community contracting parties are Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania. See: https://www.energy-
community.org/aboutus/whoweare.html. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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(LNG) would represent a major source of diversification in future (European 
Commission, 2014d, p. 15). As for joint purchases of gas, the key element of Tusk’s 
proposal, the Commission took a cautious approach by asserting that it will provide 
an assessment of a “voluntary demand aggregation mechanisms” (European 
Commission, 2014d, p. 19). Based on all these documents - the European Council 
recommendations, the stress test, and the strategy - the Commission formed 
preferences for certain policy measures that were seen as necessary for maintaining 
the EU security of supply. These measures will be further specified and developed by 
the new College of Commissioners that took office at the end of 2014.  
In November 2014, the new Commission, under Jean-Claude Juncker’s presidency, 
was elected. In his opening statement in the European Parliament plenary, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, mentioned, for the first time, that the EU energy policy should be reorganised 
into a new European Energy Union (Juncker, 2014). Even though the term “energy 
union” had been coined by Donald Tusk a few months earlier (Tusk, 2014), Junker’s 
speech in the Parliament made it clear that the creation of an Energy Union would be 
one of the priorities of the newly-appointed Commission. In December 2014, Donald 
Tusk was appointed as the President of the European Council. Thus, the two presidents 
– one of the Commission and another of the European Council – set the creation of an 
Energy Union as one of the priorities of EU policy-making. This intention was 
confirmed by the creation of the portfolio of the Commission’s Vice-President for 
Energy Union in October 2014.   
In his appearance before the European Parliament in October 2014, Maroš 
Šefčovič, Slovak candidate for Vice-President for the Energy Union, asserted that “the 
time for a European Energy Union has clearly come” (Šefčovič, 2014). Energy 
security was of particular importance for Maroš Šefčovič, due to his national 
background – namely, as a Central European country, Slovakia, his home country, 
depended on a single external supplier and was raising concerns over its energy 
security. In his statement in the Parliament, Šefčovič said:  
“I will never forget the winter of 2009, when Slovakia was literally plunged into 
darkness. For over two weeks the economy was at a standstill, factories closed 
and energy was provided only for households and hospitals. You know very well 
that Slovakia was not the only country in such a situation. I am convinced that, 
without European solidarity and almost immediate European assistance, the 
196 
 
consequences would have been horrible. Therefore, it is our solemn duty to make 
sure that our citizens do not face such a situation again” (Šefčovič, 2014). 
The winter of 2009, as Maroš Šefčovič referred to, was the one when the second 
Russian-Ukrainian gas119 dispute took place, leading to interruptions of Russian gas 
supplies to certain EU states. Miguel Arias Cañete, the Spanish nominee for the 
Climate Action and Energy Commissioner, confirmed that energy security must be the 
utmost policy priority (Cañete, 2014). Therefore, all high-ranking EU officials made a 
commitment to creating a European Energy Union, with energy security as one of its 
keystones.   
This commitment was confirmed in the Framework Strategy for the Energy Union 
adopted in February 2015. The strategy considered diversification of energy “sources, 
suppliers and routes” as a crucial tool for improving the security of supply (European 
Commission, 2015a, p. 4). LNG was seen as particularly significant in this respect. It 
was also emphasised that the European Union would further develop its partnerships 
with Norway, the United States, Canada, and Ukraine (European Commission, 2015a, 
p. 7). As for Russia, it was stated that “when the conditions are right, the EU will 
consider reframing the energy relationship with Russia” based on market competition, 
sustainability, and security (European Commission, 2015a, p. 7).  
Furthermore, the Commission stressed the lack of cooperation between member 
states as an urgent issue calling for further actions in this respect. Its vision was to 
intensify the member states’ cooperation especially at the regional level and to create 
an obligatory solidarity mechanism to be enforced during a crisis (European 
Commission, 2015a, p. 10; Interview 6). The strategy also made it clear that an ex-ante 
assessment of international agreements’ compatibility with EU market rules is needed 
(European Commission, 2015a, p. 7). Similarly, ensuring transparency of commercial 
energy contracts was seen as an important step forward (European Commission, 2015a, 
p. 7; Interview 6). At the same time, the Commission was cautious about the Polish 
idea, raised by Donald Tusk, to create a single European body that would buy Russian 
gas (a collective purchasing mechanism). It promised to assess the possibility of 
proposing voluntary, instead of obligatory (proposed by Tusk), mechanisms for 
                                                          
119 The first Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute was the one that happened in January 2006 when Gazprom 
cut off gas deliveries to Ukraine.  
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collective gas purchasing in the case of an energy crisis (European Commission, 
2015a, p. 6).    
In sum, the establishment of a European Energy Union has been among the policy 
priorities of the Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission. The creation of the new portfolio 
of the Commission Vice-President for Energy Union in 2014 provided an additional 
signal that the energy domain would be the top policy priority. Security of energy 
supply was put in the middle of the future Energy Union, often being cited as the main 
rationale for its creation. The most important segments of the early positioning of the 
Commission were: the improvement of regional cooperation, the creation of an 
obligatory solidarity mechanism, ex-ante assessment of compatibility of international 
agreements with EU market rules, and diversification of energy supplies. On the other 
hand, the Commission did not necessarily share Donald Tusk’s vision to establish a 
single European body that would buy Russian gas (a collective purchasing 
mechanism). Instead, it was decided to test this idea by asking stakeholders to provide 
their opinion on the issue (Interview 6).   
 
6.3. Interest groups’ positions 
6.3.1. SoS Regulation 
In April 2015, the Commission organised public consultations aimed at identifying the 
policy areas where the improvements to the SoS Regulation could be made (European 
Commission, 2015c, p. 2). The Commission received around 100 responses. What 
follows are the most important policy measure discussed during the consultations.  
N-1 standard. The N-1 infrastructure standard was set by the Regulation 994/2010 
to ensure that in the event of a disruption of the largest infrastructure (i.e. the largest 
pipeline and/or storage facility), the capacity of the remaining infrastructure (e.g. other 
pipelines) – calculated by the N-1 formula120 – can satisfy gas demand in the 
considered area (Article 6). This rule, basically obliged member states to secure gas 
supply from an alternative infrastructure, if the essential infrastructure fails. Since, 
according to the Commission, the N-1 standard did not produce the intended outcome, 
                                                          
120 As defined in Annex I of the Regulation 994/2010 (European Parliament and the Council, 2010) 
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the Commission asked stakeholders would it be more appropriate to take “a regional 
approach to N-1” (European Commission, 2015c, p. 3). 
While a large group of interest groups pointed that either regional or European 
approach to N-1 standard would be beneficial, many member states and operators of 
transmission systems opposed any binding commitment in this respect, arguing, 
instead, in favour of voluntary regional assessment121 (European Commission, 2015b, 
p. 2; appendix VI). Similarly, it seems that Equinor (Equinor, 2015a) and Exxon 
(ExxonMobil, 2015a) opposed the obligatory regional approach to the N-1 standard, 
since, as noted by the companies, the Regulation 994/2010 already allowed for a 
regional approach to the N-1 rule, where appropriate. Gazprom did not participate in 
public consultations, but WINGAS, a subsidiary of Gazprom, took the same position 
as its Norwegian and American counterparts (WINGAS, 2015).   
Reverse (bi-directional) flows. The SoS Regulation obliged gas companies to 
enable bi-directional (reverse) capacity flows on cross-border interconnections 
(Article 6 of the Regulation 994/2010). The purpose of this instrument was to allow 
for the redirection of energy supplies in the case of a supply disturbance from the 
regular direction (European Commission, 2015c, p. 4). The Regulation 994/2010 
allowed for exemptions from this rule in two cases: in the case reverse capacity would 
not essentially improve the energy security and in the case that the investment costs in 
reverse flows would offset the benefits for energy security (Article 7). Since the 
Commission’s report had confirmed that some major interconnections between 
member states still lack reverse capability (due to exemptions), it asked stakeholders 
whether the rules on exemptions from the bi-directional flows obligation should be 
strengthened (European Commission, 2015c, p. 4). Stakeholders were divided on the 
issue. Some of them took the view that exemption procedure prescribed by the SoS 
Regulation should be maintained (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3). Others argued 
that exemptions should be granted only in a limited number of cases. Central European 
                                                          
121 For instance, the UK government, Spain, and the European Federation of Energy Traders supported 
an additional regional assessment, but only on a voluntary basis or only in specific circumstances. 
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countries122 and Energy Community contracting parties123 were among the strongest 
supporters of a more stringent rule on exemption from the reverse flows obligation. 
Naftogaz, the Ukrainian gas company, also backed this proposal. When the 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis escalated and Naftogaz suspended gas import from Russia, 
the company started buying gas from EU member stated (e.g. Slovakia and Hungary) 
through bi-directional (reverse) flows on cross-border interconnections (Naftogaz, 
2015b). While gas was still flowing from Russia (gas that Gazprom had already sold 
to European companies), by using bi-directional flows, the EU companies were able 
to re-sale that gas to Naftogaz (Buckley, 2018). Hence, Naftogaz saw reverse flows as 
the fastest way to decrease Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas and as a necessary 
step in the process of an integration of the Ukrainian and EU energy markets 
(Naftogaz, 2015a; Naftogaz, 2015b).  
In contrast, Equinor, Exxon, and WINGAS (Gazprom), together with some EU 
industry representatives (e.g. GFD Suez (France) and E. ON (Germany)), argued that 
the exemption procedure prescribed by the SoS Regulation should be maintained. For 
Equinor it was important to prevent the establishment of reverse flows on every point, 
not only because of investment costs but also because that would create a competitive 
disadvantage to gas in comparison to other energy sources (Interview 5). Exxon took 
the view that the existing SoS Regulation does not provide any sort of limitation for 
cost-benefit analysis on case-by-case basis and that, therefore, it should remain 
(ExxonMobil, 2015a).   
The “supply standard” for protected customers. The supply standard was set up to 
ensure uninterrupted gas supplies to protected customers in the case of a crisis (e.g. 
extreme cold) (Article 8 of the Regulation 994/2010). The Regulation, however, did 
not prescribe how the supply standard should be fulfilled; instead, the choice was left 
to member states (European Commission, 2015c, p. 6). Measures to implement the 
standard, thus, varied from “invisible hand” of market (e.g. the UK) to penalties and 
strategic stocks (France) (European Commission, 2015c, p. 7). Since a variety of 
                                                          
122 See for instance, a position paper submitted by the Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP), an 
association representing industrial energy users in Central Europe (CEEP, 2015).  
123 The Energy Community contracting parties are Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, Bosnia and 




different measures has been applied across member states, the Commission asked 
stakeholders whether the supply standard should become “more prescriptive” in terms 
of implementation (European Commission, 2015c, p. 8). The vast majority of 
stakeholders, including Equinor, Exxon, and WINGAS (Gazprom), backed the 
implementation on the supply standard which is “flexible” rather than “prescriptive”, 
thus rejecting “one size fits all” approach (European Commission, 2015b, p. 3).  
In addition, the Commission asked stakeholders to consider several policy 
measures which member states could use to protect customers in case of a crisis, such 
as common (regional or European) energy stocks or the joint purchasing of gas 
(proposed by Donald Tusk) (European Commission, 2015c, p. 12). A majority of 
participants, including Equinor, Exxon, and WINGAS (Gazprom), took the view that 
such measures should be implemented only voluntarily. Energy Community 
Secretariat together with some Central and Eastern countries (e.g. Poland), on the other 
hand, provided support for such measures.  
Preventive, Risk Assessment, and Emergency Plans (plans). Regulation 994/2010 
obliged each member state to prepare three separate documents: Risk assessment, 
Preventive plan (to identify preventive measures), and Emergency plan (to identify 
measures necessary to mitigate the negative impact of an energy crisis) (Articles 4, 5 
and 9). Since the plans provided by member states had been heterogeneous which 
made cooperation between the states difficult, the Commission considered different 
measures in order to harmonise the member states’ plans (European Commission, 
2015c, p. 5). Commission’s view was that joint plans on regional level should be 
strongly encouraged (European Commission, 2014b, p. 13). While the majority of 
stakeholders provided support for future regional cooperation, they were divided over 
the question whether regional plans should be voluntary or mandatory (European 
Commission, 2015b, p. 8). The Western European states opposed the idea of creating 
fixed regions that would cooperate on energy security issues; Eastern European 
countries mostly argued in favour of regional cooperation (Interview 6). Equinor, 
ExxonMobil, and WINGAS (Gazprom) did not back the regional plans, unlike the 
Energy Community Secretariat (Energy Community Secretariat, 2015) and Naftogaz 
(Naftogaz, 2015a).  
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Transparency of commercial agreements. Regulation 994/2010 obliged member 
states and companies to provide to national regulators and the Commission certain 
information about their long-term contracts with external suppliers (in aggregate form) 
(Article 13). During the consultation the Commission proposed an increase in the 
scope of information that shall be provided to the Commission prior to and during an 
emergency situation (European Commission, 2015c, p. 19). The majority of 
stakeholders, including Equinor and Exxon, argued against the proposal. Exxon took 
the view that the transparency obligations which already exist under the SoS 
Regulation should not be changed (ExxonMobil, 2015, p. 15). Equinor’s position was 
fully in line with the Exxon’s. The company warned against excessive reporting duties 
as the existing information requirements were already imposing major administrative 
burden on the gas players (Equinor, 2015a). Still, if an increase in the transparency of 
commercial agreements was inevitable, Equinor suggested that it prefers that 
companies share contractual information with the national regulators rather than with 
the Commission (Interview 5). Naftogaz supported the position that the transparency 
of commercial agreements should be advanced (in Badida, 2015). WINGAS did not 
comment on the issue.  
Protected customers. Regulation 994/2010 obliged companies to ensure 
uninterrupted energy supplies to protected customers during a crisis (Article 8). States 
had discretion to define “protected customers” within their territory, but, as a 
minimum, the Regulation 994/2010 prescribed that all household customers must be 
included (Article 2). In addition, member states could include other consumers such 
as small enterprises (Article 2). Since consumers identified as protected customers 
differed among member states, the Commission asked stakeholders whether a 
harmonized definition of protected costumers across Europe would be more 
appropriate (European Commission, 2015c, p. 15). Majority of stakeholders agreed to 
harmonisation (European Commission, 2015b, p. 7), including WINGAS (Gazprom). 
Equinor, and Exxon, and the Energy Community Secretariat took the position that 
there was no need for harmonization because, it was suggested, the current definition 
provides the sufficient level of protection.  
Solidarity mechanism. During the consultation, the Commission also asked 
stakeholders if they saw merits in introducing the solidarity mechanism ether in the 
form of a multilateral agreement over measures aiming to protect consumers or in the 
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form of “a prohibition for member states to close their borders (…) in case protected 
customers on the other side of the border are still at risk” (European Commission, 
2015c, p. 16). A number of stakeholders, including Exxon and Equinor, opposed 
additional solidarity mechanism, because, as argued by the companies, the SoS 
Regulation already had prohibited restrictions on gas flow within the EU 
(ExxonMobil, 2015a; Equinor, 2015a). Hence, it was believed that further changes 
were not needed. Energy Community, on the other hand, argued in favour of the 
second option. WINGAS took the position that, to deal with a potential regional crisis, 
the member states should have a clear guideline on “how to deal with cross-border 
flows” (WINGAS, 2015).   
Overall, Central and Eastern European member states, together with the Energy 
Community contracting parties, provided the strongest support for the proposed 
measures. As for the foreign companies, Equinor, Exxon, and Gazprom mostly 
opposed the changes put forward by the Commission. In contracts, Naftogaz’s position 
was in line with the Commission’s preferences. This is not surprising since most of 
the provisions that were discussed during public consultations had concerned 
primarily countries that were heavily dependent on Russian gas – the Central and 
Eastern European countries, including Ukraine.  
 
6.3.2. Decision on intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) 
Another important dimension of the debate on the energy security concerned an 
“information exchange mechanism” for intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) laid 
down in 2012 when the Decision 994/2012 was adopted (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2012). The Decision prescribed an obligation for member states to submit all 
existing IGAs upon their ratification (ex-post) to the Commission for the assessment 
of compatibility of these IGAs with EU law (Article 3 of the Decision 994/2012).  
However, following its experience in the implementation of the information 
exchange mechanism, the Commission came up with the conclusion that the value of 
ex-post compatibility verification has been limited (European Commission, 2015e, p. 
1). Amending already finalised IGAs is extremely difficult if not impossible. Hence, 
the Commission initiated a revision process for Decision 994/2012, asking for the right 
to assess IGAs’ compatibility with EU law ex-ante (European Commission, 2015e, p. 
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3). In addition, the Commission asked interest groups to provide opinions about the 
possibility to introduce “mandatory assistance” from the Commission when member 
states negotiate IGAs with third countries (European Commission, 2015e, p. 4).   
The Commission received around 20 responses from stakeholders124. Almost all 
the industry representatives that took part in the consultation, except for PGNiG 
(Polish oil and gas company) and Enagas (Spanish energy company), argued against 
mandatory ex-ante assessments and mandatory assistance from the Commission. 
Lithuania and Poland argued in favour of both mandatory ex-ante assessments and 
mandatory assistance from the Commission. Austria’s National Regulatory Authority 
and Estonia supported mandatory ex-ante assessments but opposed mandatory 
assistance from the Commission. Other states that took part in the consultation - 
France, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus - opposed the two 
proposed measures. Many Gazprom’s representatives believed that the proposed 
provisions were not in line with the company’s interests (Interview 2). Equinor’s 
position was that the Commission already had the opportunity to check IGAs and to 
intervene in cases where IGAs are non-compliant with EU law (Interview 5). 
Therefore, a new law on “information exchange mechanism” was not seen as a 
necessary step forward.  
 
6.3.3 Strategy on LNG and gas storage 
Finally, in July 2015, the Commission held the public consultation on an EU strategy 
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) (European Commission, 2015g). Approximately 150 
responses were received. As already mentioned, the Energy Security Strategy adopted 
in 2014 sought LNG as a main source of diversification in future (European 
Commission, 2014d, p. 15). The strategy emphasised that new LNG supplies from the 
US, Australia, Canada, and Qatar would be promising in that respect (European 
Commission, 2014d, p. 15). However, the problem identified by the Commission was 
that certain regions within the EU have limited access to LNG (e.g.  Central-Eastern 
Europe) (European Commission, 2015g, p. 3). Hence, the Commission asked 
                                                          
124 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/consultation-review-intergovernmental-
agreements-decision_en. [Accessed on 01/07/2019]. 
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stakeholders for their views on challenges and opportunities they saw for LNG in 
Europe as a whole and in different regions in the EU.  
The Commission’s intention to use LNG as a source of diversification was 
welcomed by Equinor, Exxon, and Naftogaz. Equinor agreed with the Commission 
that LNG played a role in the diversification of the energy supply, but also noted that 
LNG was “a means of transportation for natural gas and it is not a separate product in 
itself” (Equinor, 2015b, p. 2). The company opposed any further legislation in regards 
to LNG. Instead, it took the view that since certain parts of Europe (e.g. Central-
Eastern Europe) have limited access to LNG, the Commission should try to solve this 
problem there instead of to impose a “one size fits all” approach (Interview 5). 
ExxonMobil has been involved in LNG industry through the ownership in LNG 
regasification capacity at the South Hook Terminal in the UK and the Adriatic LNG 
Terminal in Italy (ExxonMobil, 2015b, p. 1). The company repeated the position of its 
Norwegian counterpart that LNG is a method of gas transportation, but added that 
“LNG’s logistical flexibility” might contribute the EU security of supplies 
(ExxonMobil, 2015b, p. 3). Arguing that free trade represents the most efficient way 
of ensuring LNG supplies to Europe, Exxon suggested that the EU engages with the 
US to accelerate the export of LNG to Europe (ExxonMobil, 2015b, p. 5). Similar to 
Equinor, Exxon opposed the regional approach to LNG supplies.  
Naftogaz, on the other hand, welcomed the regional markets integration (Naftogaz, 
2015, p. 1). The company saw LNG as a potential solution to Ukrainian dependence 
on Russian gas transported through pipelines. Gazprom, on the other hand, did not see 
a considerable potential of LNG in the years to come (Miller, 2015). Besides, the main 
strategical goal of the considered strategy on LNG was to diversify energy sources 
away from Russian gas. Hence, Gazprom has not been among the supporters of an 
LNG strategy.   
Finally, Trafigura, a trading company registered in Singapore, was very active 
during the preparation of the LNG strategy. The company welcomed the 
Commission’s intention to support LNG imports in vulnerable European regions, 
those heavily dependent on a single supplier (Russia), and suggested the use of 
specialised vessels, Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs), as an 
alternative to the construction of regasification terminals on land (Trafigura, 2015, p. 
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4). South Hook Gas, a LNG import company owned by Qatar Petroleum (67%), Exxon 
(24%), and Total (8%) also backed the Commission’s intention to facilitate LNG 
import to Europe (South Hook Gas, 2015).  
 
6.4. Non-EU interest groups’ lobbing activities 
In addition to the above mentioned public consultations, the Commission repeatedly 
solicited input from stakeholders throughout the multilateral and bilateral meetings. 
To this end, the Commission had eight meetings with the Gas Coordination Group and 
two meetings with the Madrid Forum to discuss energy security. As mentioned earlier, 
the Gas Coordination Group was created in 2004 to advise the Commission and to 
enable the coordination among EU states in the event of a gas supply crisis125. As a 
reminder, the Madrid Forum (Gas Regulatory Forum)  was set up as an advisory forum 
to discuss issues related to the gas market126. The participants of both groups include 
member states’ representatives, the Commission, the gas industry and consumers. The 
industry representatives that took part in the consultations related to the energy 
security within the Gas Coordination Group and Madrid Forum were mostly the 
biggest business associations in the EU energy sector such as: Eurogas, the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP), the European Federation 
of Energy Traders (EFET), Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), and the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). Through 
membership in these associations, foreign companies under consideration gained 
access to the Gas Coordination Group and the Madrid Forum meetings (table 11).  
Unlike Gazprom and Naftogaz, Exxon and Equinor have had representatives on the 
governing boards of some of these associations, which has given them more leverage 
over decisions made by these groups. Thus for example, the IOGP’s position paper on 
the revision of the SoS Regulation was almost identical to Exxon’s position paper. 
Similarly, Equinor did not send a position paper on the Decision on IGAs because the 
company worked with business associations such as Eurogas and IOGP, whose 
                                                          
125 See the Gas Coordination Group: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=1096&
NewSearch=1&NewSearch=1. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
126 See the Madrid Forum: https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/32nd-madrid-forum-2019-jun-05_en. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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position papers reflected Equinor’s preferences (Interview 5). Naftogaz and Ukrainian 
public officials were invited to take part in the meetings organized by the Gas 
Coordination Group127 because of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Energy Community, 
(Ukraine is one of the contracting parties) has been a member of the Gas Coordination 
Group. Naftogaz has been relying on the support of the Energy Community during the 
discussions on EU energy security (Naftogaz, 2015a). Gazprom, on the other hand, 
had tried to get an invitation to the Madrid Forum on several occasions. The company, 
however, had not been successful (Interview 2). In addition, as part of the strategy for 
the European Energy Union, the Commission established an advisory group – Energy 
Infrastructure Forum – for the discussion about EU energy policy.128 Exxon was one 
of the participants. Equinor has been represented through Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy.  
 
Table 11. Interest groups’ membership in EU associations in 2014.   
Association Description Membership Board 








of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP) 







European Energy Forum 
(EEF) 
Association which gathers MEPs 
and industry representatives to 







European Federation of 
Energy Traders (EFET) 















Source: Websites of the associations.  
 
Overall, Equinor was a member of 5, Exxon of 4, and Gazprom and Naftogaz of 3 
associations. Unlike Gazprom and Naftogaz, Exxon and Equinor have had 
                                                          
127 See for instance, Naftogaz (2014). 
128 See the Energy Infrastructure Forum: http://www.energy-infrastructure-forum.com/index.html. 
[Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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representatives on the governing boards in some of these associations. Besides, 
Naftogaz and Ukrainian public officials participated in meetings organised by the Gas 
Coordination groups. Exxon and Equinor had their representatives in the Energy 
Infrastructure Forum. Gazprom, on the other hand, was unsuccessful in getting an 
invitation to the Madrid Forum.  
Besides taking part in expert and advisory groups through membership in the 
industry associations, the foreign companies met the Commission officials on various 
occasions. Table 12 below provides an overview of the foreign companies’ bilateral 
meetings with Miguel Arias Cañete, Maroš Šefčovič, and members of their cabinets 
in the period between December 2014 and February 2016, when the Commission’s 
proposal was adopted. The third column includes only meetings when the Energy 
Union and/or energy security was mentioned as the topic of a meeting; plus, meetings 
when a specific subject of a meeting have not been stated. The forth column includes 
all meetings held during the observed period (December 2014 - February 2016). 
 
Table 12. Non-EU stakeholders’ meetings with Miguel Arias Cañete, Maroš Šefčovič, and 
members of their cabinets (December 2014 - February 2016).  
Company/Association Country Number of meetings 
(Energy Union; 
energy security; no 
subject) 
Overall number of 
meetings 
Equinor Norway 14 25 
Naftogaz Ukraine 5 5 
Trafigura Singapore 4 6 
Exxon The US 4 12 
Gazprom Russia 3 3 
Source: Transparency Register.  
 
The table above clearly indicates that overall Equinor and Exxon had better access 
to the Commission than the other observed companies. As for meetings covering 
energy union and/or security topics, Equinor and Naftogaz had better access than the 
other observed companies (Gazprom, Trafigura, and Exxon).  
Besides having meetings with the Commissioners and the members of their 
cabinets, the companies also had meetings with other Commission’s officials. 
Already, at the beginning of 2015, the EU took the position that “particular attention 
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will be paid to upgrading the Strategic Partnership on energy with Ukraine”, to address 
the significance of Ukraine as a transit country (European Commission, 2015a, p. 7). 
In 2013, around 50% of Russian gas to the EU was passing through Ukrainian territory 
(The Guardian, 07 March 2014). Many of the issues that were discussed during the 
preparation of the legislation on energy security were triggered by the Russian-
Ukrainian conflicts in 2014 and the gas dispute in 2009. Hence, Naftogaz cooperated 
regularly with the Commission (Interview 6). They also cooperated through the 
Energy Community -  Ukraine is one of the contracting parties, together with Moldova, 
Georgia, and the Western Balkans countries.  
Similarly, in 2015, the EU announced that it would deepen its partnership with 
Norway and the United States on energy-related issues (European Commission, 
2015a, p. 7). The US primarily wanted to expend the business for US LNG (Interview 
6). As mentioned, in its position paper, Exxon suggested the EU to take steps to 
accelerate the exporting of US LNG to Europe. Equinor also enjoyed good cooperation 
with the Commission on issues that were seen as the most relevant for the company 
(Interview 5).  
Gazprom’s position was different. Following the start of the Ukrainian crisis, 
Gazprom’s communication with the EU decision-makers was strained, especially 
during 2014 and 2015 (Interview 2). Although the Commission was open to 
everyone’s views on the proposed changes (Interview 6), Gazprom’s poor reputation 
among some officials in Europe hampered its lobbying activities (Interview 2). To add 
to this, in 2015, the Commission sent a “statement of objections” to the company, for 
alleged abuse of the company’s dominant position in Europe (European Commission, 
2015f). In addition, many EU officials saw Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline project 
as a threat to the EU energy security, in sense that the project could jeopardize the EU 
intention to diversify its energy supplies (European Commission, 2017b). Given all 
these events - the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the antitrust investigation, and the Nord 
Stream 2 project - a sense was created that “talking to Russians is dangerous” 
(Interview 2).  
Therefore, although Gazprom did not welcome the Commission’s proposal, it was 
hard for the company to make a good case against it. Instead of lobbying openly 
against the Energy Security Package, the company’s strategy was to persuade 
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decision-makers that Gazprom was a reliable supplier and that there was no need for 
the EU to worry about energy security. 
“(…) Even though Gazprom would prefer not to have it [the Energy Security 
Package], they would not go as far as arguing openly against it because they 
would not have good arguments. They would rather say, ‘we are a very good 
supplier, we are reliable, we have a lot of cheap gas, so buy it from us’” (Interview 
6).   
 
6.5. The Commission’s proposal 
In February 2016, the Commission presented the Energy Security Package containing 
the following proposals: (1) Revision of the SoS Regulation; (2) Revision of the 
Decision on IGAs; and (3) a non-legislative EU strategy for LNG and gas storage 
(European Commission, 2016b).  
 
6.5.1. SoS Regulation 
In February 2016, the Commission adopted the Proposal for the new SoS Regulation 
(European Commission, 2016c). As mentioned, from the beginning, the 
Commission’s vision was to improve the intensity of regional cooperation, to create 
an obligatory solidarity mechanism to be enforced during crisis situations, and to 
introduce additional transparency measures concerning gas supply contracts 
(Interview 6). The proposed changes reflected the Commission’s prior position. 
Firstly, the Commission introduced an obligation for member states to prepare 
regional, instead of national, preventive, emergency, and risk assessment plans 
(European Commission, 2016c, p. 9). The proposal defined several regions within the 
EU that were supposed to prepare the regional plans. Secondly, the Commission 
introduced the obligatory solidarity mechanism: non-protected customers could not 
continue receiving energy supplies in a member state as long as the needs of the 
protected customers for energy supply in a neighbour state have not been satisfied 
(European Commission, 2016c, p. 12). The main idea behind the solidarity mechanism 
was to ensure that protected customers, wherever they were in Europe, were given 
priority during a crisis (Wilson, 2017, p. 3).  
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Thirdly, the proposal contained a “limited increase” in the scope of information to 
be shared with the Commission (European Commission, 2016c, p. 10). In addition, 
national regulators were empowered with the right to ask companies for additional 
contractual information, in the case of a crises (European Commission, 2016c, p. 10). 
The transparency of contracts also included an obligation for companies to notify the 
Commission, and their national authorities, about any long-term supply contracts 
which accounted for more than 40 % of gas consumption in a member state (European 
Commission, 2016c, p. 11).  
In addition, the N-1 standard was modified: N-1 calculation had to be 
complemented with “a national hydraulic calculation and EU-wide simulations” 
(European Commission, 2016c, p. 10). Rules on exemption from the reverse flows 
obligation were strengthened - all decisions on exemptions would have to be jointly 
approved by states at each side of an interconnection point, after consulting other 
eligible states, the Commission, and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (European Commission, 2016c, p. 10). As for the supply standard, no 
change was introduced. Similarly, the definition of protected customers was 
maintained – a harmonised definition at the EU level was not introduced.  
 
6.5.2. Decision on IGAs  
As a part of the Energy Security Package, in February 2016, the Commission also 
proposed a revision of the Decision on IGAs (European Commission, 2016d). The 
proposal introduced a mandatory ex-ante compatibility assessment of IGAs by the 
Commission (European Commission, 2016d, p. 7). Member states, on their part, were 
obliged to inform the Commission of their intentions to enter into negotiations with 
non-EU countries, to share drafts of their IGAs with the Commission and to refrain 
from concluding these IGAs until the Commission provides the assessment of their 
compatibility with EU law (European Commission, 2016d, p. 7-8). The Commission, 






6.5.3. EU strategy for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and gas storage 
The strategy for LNG, was a third document adopted in February 2016 (European 
Commission, 2016e). The main feature of this strategy was to explore how LNG can 
be deployed in order “to make the EU gas system more diverse and flexible” and thus 
improve its security (European Commission, 2016e, p. 2). Hence, it was confirmed 
that LNG might be a significant source of gas diversification in the EU: a position 
preferred by Naftogaz.  
Furthermore, the strategy encouraged regions dependent on gas transported through 
pipelines (e.g. Eastern Europe and the Baltic states) to accelerate the development of 
the needed LNG infrastructure (European Commission, 2016e, p. 2). The 
establishment of floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) was seen as a 
possible solution here (European Commission, 2016e, p. 4), as preferred by Trafigura, 
the trading company from Singapore. 
In addition to having LNG infrastructure, the Commission stressed, liquid gas 
markets were also necessary to attract LNG suppliers from third countries (European 
Commission, 2016e, p. 7). This point was made by many gas companies during the 
public consultations, including Exxon and Equinor. Finally, the strategy emphasised 
cooperation on LNG with third countries, especially Australia, Algeria, the US, and 
Canada (European Commission, 2016e, p. 11). 
 
6.6. Lobbying success of non-EU interest groups 
As the table below shows, almost none of the Gazprom’s or the Exxon’s preferences 
were reflected in the Commission’s proposal. Although opposing most of the proposed 
changes, Equinor was more open to negotiation on certain aspects of the future 
regulations (Interview 5). The company, thus, managed to be a moderating voice on 
reverse flows, the transparency of contractual information, and the supply standard 
(Interview 5). In respect of reverse flows, it was important to escape gold-plating, i.e. 
the introduction of reverse flows on every interconnection point. Furthermore, 
increased transparency was seen as a huge administrative burden on companies; 
however, if contractual information had to be shared, Equinor preferred to share this 
information with a national authority, rather than with the Commission. Finally, in 
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terms of what measures introduced to meet the supply standard should be applied in 
crisis situations (market or non-market), Equinor argued that such measures should be 
market-based for as long as possible, and that the supply standard should not be 
changed. Naftogaz’s preferences were mostly in line with the Commission’s 
proposals.   
 
Table 13. Comparison of estimated degree of success of the analysed non-EU groups. 
The Commission’s proposals Gazprom Equinor Exxon Naftogaz 
Reinforced rules on the N-1 
infrastructure standard. 
x x x N/A 
Reinforced rules on exemption from 
the reverse flows obligation. 
x x x ✓ 
Regional preventive, emergency, and 
risk assessment plans (mandatory). 
x x x ✓ 
Increased transparency of 
commercial contracts with non-EU 
actors. 
N/A x x ✓ 
National authorities empowered with 
the right to ask for additional 
information. 
N/A ✓ x N/A 
Joint purchasing mechanism (on a 
voluntary basis only). 
✓ ✓ ✓ N/A 
No change to the supply standard. ✓ ✓ ✓ N/A 
No change to the definition of 
protected customers. 
x ✓ ✓ N/A 
A new solidarity principle. ✓x ✓x ✓x ✓ 
Ex-ante assessment of IGAs. x x N/A N/A 
LNG Strategy x ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        ✓ - support; x – oppose; ✓x – partly support; N/A – no position.  
 
6.6.1. Commission’s preferences on the discussed issues 
As mentioned earlier, Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk had an idea to create an 
energy union even before they were elected to the position of President of the 
European Commission and the European Council, respectively. This intention was 
confirmed by the creation of the portfolio of the Commission’s Vice-President for 
Energy Union in October 2014. The first pillar of the Energy Union was the security 
of supply (Interview 6).  
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From the outset, the Commission had a strong vision to improve regional 
cooperation within the EU, to create an obligatory solidarity mechanism to, and to 
improve the transparency of both intergovernmental agreements and commercial 
agreements regarding gas supplies (Interview 6). In addition, the Commission saw 
LNG as a major source of gas diversification, a Commission’s policy priority 
(European Commission, 2015a). Theses priorities were defined in the Energy Union 
Strategy that was adopted in February 2015, before the Commission held consultations 
with stakeholders.  
The Commission’s preferences for these provision had been based on the its report 
assessing implementation of the 2010 SoS Regulation in 2014, the stress test 
conducted the same year (European Commission, 2016c, p. 4-5), and the 
Commission’s “significant experience” in the implementation of ex-post compatibility 
assessment of IGAs (European Commission, 2016d, p. 2). Therefore, by monitoring 
the implementation of existing legislation, collecting data through the stress test, and 
by gaining experience with the assessment of IGAs, the Commission has developed a 
kind of “institutional expertise” on energy security which has shaped its preferences, 
regardless of interest groups’ input. During the preparation of the Energy Security 
Package, considerable and important feedback was provided by stakeholders 
(Interview 6). For instance, interest groups suggested some specific provisions to be 
added to the solidarity mechanism, such as a fair and prompt compensation for 
maintaining the energy security (Interview 6). Nevertheless, while managing to alter 
certain details of the proposal, the Commission did not substantially moderate its early 
preferences.  
Even though the majority of stakeholders argued against increased transparency of 
gas contracts, both commercial and intergovernmental, the Commission decided to 
propose measures to improve information sharing on gas agreements. Similarly, while 
many industry and member states representatives opposed the idea of mandatory 
regional cooperation on energy security issues, the Commission introduced an 
obligation for member states to prepare regional, instead of national, preventive, 
emergency, and risk assessment plans (i.e. mandatory regional cooperation).  
In general, the analysis indicates that the strong prior position of the Commission 
on better regional cooperation, the obligatory solidarity mechanism, and transparency 
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limited the possibility for stakeholders to modify their positions on these issues. The 
policy measures, that were not favoured by the Commission since the beginning (for 
example, a joint purchasing machinimas proposed by Donald Tusk), on the other hand, 
eventually did not appear in the Commission’s final proposal.  
In doing so, the Commission aligned with some like-minded Eastern European 
countries and with the Energy Community contracting parties. Most of the provisions 
of the Energy Security Package aimed to address concerns related to energy security 
in the above countries, which were dependent on Russian gas. The Energy Community 
contracting parties, of which Ukraine is a member, had regular commutation with the 
Commission (Interview 6). Also, they were a member of the Gas Coordination Group.  
The Commission extended the application of the SoS Regulation to the Energy 
Community (EC) contracting parties (including Ukraine) (European Commission, 
2016c, p. 12). 
 
6.6.2. Commission’s position on the interest groups 
In the analysed cases, Gazprom represented an outsider, whereas Equinor, Exxon, and 
Naftogaz made good examples of an insider. Firstly, as mentioned, Gazprom’s 
(Russia’s) actions triggered the debate on the security of supply in the first place due 
to the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014. In addition, antitrust 
investigations against Gazprom, together with a fear that the Nord Stream 2 project 
could put at the risk EU’s intentions to diversify its energy supplies, challenged the 
company’s reputation of being a reliable supplier. In such a situation, it was hard for 
Gazprom to lobby against the proposed measures and provide useful information.  
“(…) and of course a monopolist has an interest to maintain the dependency, so, 
in principle, they dislike diversification because then they [monopolists] have to 
accept that a lower price is paid. No serious argument was made by Gazprom to 
say, in such a blunt manner ‘we want to keep our monopoly in order to exploit 
you’, they would not say that (…) They did not go as far as arguing that. What 
they brought forward was that Russia is a reliable supplier in principle… and in 
principle, we would even agree with that. But what we have observed, and what 
they cannot deny, is that they had issues with Ukraine (…)” (Interview 6).  
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Besides, almost all EU documents related to energy security that were mentioned 
earlier cited dependence on Russian gas as an issue demanding a united European 
response, either with respect to the possible risk of a disruptions in supplies to the EU 
or in diversifying energy sources and reducing import dependence on Russian gas. 
Problems associated with its country of origin that were recognized by decision-makers 
in Brussels did not prove to be helpful for Gazprom’s lobbying efforts. The company 
was seen as part of the problem, rather than part of a solution.  
In contrast, all documents adopted by the Commission since 2014 stressed the 
significance of the EU’s partnerships with Norway, the United States, and Ukraine. 
Even more, already at the beginning of 2015, the EU took the position that “particular 
attention will be paid to upgrading the Strategic Partnership on energy with Ukraine”, 
to address the significance of Ukraine as a transit country (European Commission, 
2015a, p. 7). LNG coming from the US was also seen as an important energy source 
contributing to EU energy security (European Commission, 2015a). The US was also 
seen as an important energy partner because “the EU and the USA share a common 
approach on the need to promote open, transparent, competitive, and sustainable global 
energy markets”129. For similar reasons, and as a member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), Norway has been considered “a key energy partner for the EU.”130  The 
fact that the EU accelerated cooperation with Naftogaz’s, Equinor’s and Exxon’s 
countries of origin strengthened these companies’ positions when lobbying for their 
interests within the EU.  
Furthermore, despite its opposition to most of the proposed measures, Equinor, 
together with some other stakeholders, acted as a moderating voice for certain aspects 
of the adopted legislation (Interview 5). The company was very open to search for a 
best solution to problems related to energy security. Equinor’s position was well 
received because of its reputation as “a good student in the classroom” who from the 
beginning had been supporting EU energy market integration (Interview 5).  
                                                          
129 Available at the European Commission’s website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/international-cooperation/eu-cooperation-other-countries/united-
states-america. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
130 Available at the European Commission’s website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/international-cooperation/eu-cooperation-other-
countries/norway. [Accessed on 07/07/2019]. 
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Naftogaz had a different path to acquiring the status of an insider compared to its 
counterparts such as Equinor. While Equinor had enjoyed a long-term relationship with 
the Commission, Naftogaz’s relations began to develop intensively only after the 
emergency of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, after which Naftogaz opened an office 
in Brussels, in 2015. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict put Naftogaz at the centre of the 
EU decision-making on energy security. Owing to the Ukraine’s significance for 
transportation of Russian gas, Naftogaz was strategically important for the EU energy 
objectives.  
Overall, due to its reputation of being “a good student in the classroom” and the 
EU-Norway special relations, Equinor, together with some other stakeholders, did 
manage to moderate some of the Commission’s preferences. Naftogaz’s insider status 
was based on different grounds – the company derived its status from the significance 
of its country of origin and its relations with Gazprom related to energy security of the 
EU. Gazprom, on the other hand, was not able to make a good case against any 
proposed measures due to the Ukrainian crisis. Instead, the company was “bubbling” 
in trying to persuade the policy-makers that Russia was a reliable energy supplier. Still, 
even insiders, such as Equinor, did not manage to alter to a considerable extent some 
of the Commission’s prior positions. Nevertheless, as shown earlier, Naftogaz, 
Equinor, and Exxon, enjoyed better access to the Commission than Gazprom in terms 




The case study indicates that the Commission’s initial preferences influence interest 
groups’ prospects of lobbying successfully. Specifically, when the Commission has 
strong initial preferences, it is hard for non-EU interest groups to alter its position. 
Throughout the observed period, the Commission was driven by its policy priority - 
to improve the security of supply - and has consequently favoured those measures that 
were seen as necessary for the achievement of this predefined priority: fostering better 
regional cooperation, introducing obligatory solidarity, and enabling better 
information sharing on contracts. Interest groups did not manage to change 
substantially these Commission’s initial views.  
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The case also finds support for the assumption that, in order shift a debate towards 
its preferable position, the Commission might resort to organising a network of allies. 
The Commission has regular and well-established contacts with the Eastern European 
countries and the Energy Community contracting parties, which constituted a strong 
block backing a Commission’s intention to adopt measures that it prefers. 
The findings also indicate that the insiders - Equinor, Naftogaz, and Exxon – tend 
to be more successful than the outsiders, namely - Gazprom. At the outset of the debate 
on the European energy security, the Commission already established - with Norway, 
the US, and Ukraine - its objective to improve cooperation on energy issues. It was 
explicitly stated that the EU should increase LNG volumes imported from the US. 
Another set priority was the integration of the Ukrainian energy market with the EU 
energy market. On the other hand, Gazprom’s lobbying efforts were aggravated by its 
poor reputation among EU officials. Additionally, due to the Ukrainian crisis, 
Gazprom could not make a strong case against any proposed measure. It was, instead, 
“bubbling” making efforts to persuade the policy-makers that Russia has been a 
reliable energy supplier. The case provides support the assumption that insiders have 
better access to the Commission than outsiders. Naftogaz, Equinor, and Exxon, had 
better access to the Commission than Gazprom in terms of both, bilateral meetings 














Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis 
 
This chapter proceeds to a comparative analysis of findings obtained in the four case 
studies conducted above. The first section compares the Commission’s early 
preferences across the analysed cases and whether the extent to which the involved 
interest groups achieved their lobbying goals was a function of these preferences. Then 
a cross-case comparison is undertaken, with a focus on how the Commission’s views 
on those lobbyists, and their status in Brussels, correlate with their (lack of) lobbying 
success in the observed cases. The main conclusion is that, when the Commission did 
not have strong initial preferences on the issues under consideration, the insiders were 
more successful than the outsiders. However, when the Commission had strong early 
preferences, both – the insiders and outsiders – could not significantly change the 
resultant policy proposal in line with their lobbying goals. 
 
7.1. The Commission’s early preferences on the considered issues  
The empirical findings obtained through the analysis of the four case studies suggest 
that in some cases the Commission has strong early preferences concerning both the 
policy outcomes and measures that lead to those outcomes. These initial 
Commission’s preferences may be grounded in institutional expertise, predefined 
policy priorities, and previous experience, knowledge, or portfolio of individual 
Commissioners. 
The fourth case study – on energy security -  and the amendments to the Third 
Energy Package (analysed as part of the second case study), indicate that when it is 
led by its policy priorities, the Commission will favour measures that are seen as 
necessary for the achievement of those priorities. In these cases, the Commission’s 
ambition to improve energy security (the fourth case study) and to extend the 
applicability of the Third Energy Package to import pipelines (the second case study) 
was expressed even before the Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker was elected. 
The forth case study also suggests that the Commission’s preferences might be based 
on its institutional expertise, regardless of expertise provided by interest groups.  
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Commissioners in charge of a proposal, also might have initial preferences based 
on their previous knowledge, beliefs, personal or their countries’ experience. Thus 
Neelie Kroes, Commissioner for Competition had the strong preferences for 
ownership unbundling because of her country’s positive experience (the first case 
study). Connie Hedegaard was cautious about biofuels because of her previous 
experience on climate policies in Denmark, her home country (the third case study). 
Maroš Šefčovič, Commission Vice-President, prioritised energy security and his 
national background – Slovakian – played a big role here. Being in Central Europe, 
his home country depended on a single external supplier which led it to raise concerns 
over its energy security (the fourth case study).  
The Commissioners’ portfolio was also important in this respect. Unlike the Energy 
Commissioner seeking to find a balance between the different aims of the EU energy 
policy – competitiveness, sustainability, and security – the Commissioners in charge 
of environmental issues and climate action have more narrowly defined duties – they 
are primarily responsible for the environmental aspects of a proposal. While for 
Connie Hedegaard, major task was to deliver the legislation that will reduce CO2 
emissions, for Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, the EU policy on biofuels 
had to take into account not sustainability of biofuels only, but also other important 
aspects of their production – economic consequences, trade with non-EU countries, 
and security of supply (the third case study). Similarly, the main task of the 
Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes was to deliver the legislation that will 
facilitate the development of market competition (the first and the second case study). 
Her colleague, Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, has been trying to find a 
solution that would take into account not only competitiveness but other objectives of 
the EU energy policy as well. Besides, as stated by one of the interviewees: 
“For Competition Commissioner you need to be very straightforward. Because if 
you try to compromise, then you are not being seen as good enough. So you can 
see for Competition Commissioners, all of them being extremely firm” (Interview 
3). 
As the table below shows, policy-makers’ prior preferences affected interest 
groups’ prospects to lobby successfully - when they had strong initial views on policies 
under consideration, interest groups’ attempts to alter their positions were less likely 
(the Gazprom clause, the amendments to the Third Energy Package, certain provisions 
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related to energy security). Vice versa, when the Commission’s initial positions had 
not been strong (TPA) or clearly defined (ILUC) interest groups have been more 
successful.    
 
Table 14. Cross-case comparison of Commission’s early preferences and interest groups’ 
lobbying success.   
I Case II Case III Case IV Case 
No strong early position 
on ownership 
unbundling. 




(a) Third Energy Package (2009) 
No strong position on long-term 
contracts, exemptions from TPA 
to new infrastructure, access to 
storage, and price formation. 
Strong preferences for the 
establishment of the single 
European grid, harmonisation of 
powers and independence of 
national regulators, as well as 
cooperation among them. 
(b) Amendments (2017) 
Strong preferences for the 
amendments - the Third Energy 
Package is applicable to offshore 
parts of import pipelines.   
No strong 
position on how 
to deal with the 
issue of indirect 
land use change 
(ILUC).  
No strong early position 
on joint purchasing 
mechanism. 




transparency, and the 
diversification of 
energy supplies.  
 
 





 Since the 








Interest groups that 
opposed ownership 
unbundling were less 
successful than those 
that favoured ownership 
unbundling. 
 
Interest groups that had 
opposed Gazprom’s 
clause were 
unsuccessful and vice 
versa.  
(a) Third Energy Package (2009) 
Interest groups that had opposed 
legislation on long-term contracts, 
exemptions from TPA to new 
infrastructure, access to storage, 
and price formation were 
successful and vice versa.  
 
Interest groups that had opposed 
legislation on the single European 
grid, harmonisation of powers and 
independence of national 
regulators, as well as cooperation 
among them were unsuccessful 
and vice versa.  
 
(b) Amendments (2017) 
Interest groups that had opposed 
the amendments were 










Interest groups that 
opposed legislation on 
joint purchasing 
mechanism were 
successful and vice 
versa. 
 
Interest groups that had 
opposed regional 
cooperation, creation of 
an obligatory solidarity 
mechanism, better ex 
ante assessment of both 
intergovernmental as 
well as commercial 
agreements’ 
compatibility with the 
EU market rules, and 
the diversification of 
energy supplies were 





What was the relationship between the Commission’s initial preferences and the 
lobbying accomplishment of the involved interest groups? The first and the second 
case study suggest that the Commission might use competition law to advance its 
preferences. As early as her hearing before the European Parliament, Neelie Kroes 
announced that she would use all available tools to push for a more proactive 
application of competition law in the energy sector. The sectoral screening was one 
tool used in that respect. Unannounced inspections of gas companies and anti-trust 
investigations represented another significant tool in that respect. The fact that the 
Commission had strong cases against these and other large companies, helped the 
Commission to demonstrate that ownership unbundling is a necessary step forward, 
and to make a consensus with stakeholders opposing ownership unbundling more 
likely. 
Similarly, before proposing the amendments to the Third Energy Package (the 
second case study), the Commission had tried to defend its interpretation of the Third 
Energy Package - the Energy Package is applicable to offshore parts of import 
pipelines –  by seeking advice of its legal service. After receiving the negative 
response, the Commission asked for a mandate to negotiate the agreement on the Nord 
Stream 2 on the behalf of the EU. Only two months after the Council’s rejection of this 
request, the Commission tabled the amendments, without public consultations or an 
impact assessment being conducted. The interest groups opposing the proposed 
changes were thus left without an opportunity to issue position papers on the 
amendments and also without a reasonable timeframe for lobbying.  
Furthermore, on certain occasions the Commission may organise a network of allies 
to shift a debate in a direction preferred by the Commission. Thus, during the 
negotiations on ownership unbundling DG COMP has established regular contacts 
with energy-consuming industries thus creating a strong block backing the 
Commission’s intention to introduce ownership unbundling. In this way, DG COMP 
extended its role in the internal energy market, in an unprecedented way (Eikeland 
2011a, p. 253; Riley, 2006). Similarly, during the preparation of the Energy Security 
Package (the fourth case study), the Commission allied with the Eastern European 
countries as well as the Energy Community parties advocating in favour of measures 
preferred by the Commission.   
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Finally, empirical analysis confirms that information exchange is not a 
unidirectional process (Bouwen, 2002, p. 368). Interest groups try to defend their 
interests before the Commission, but the Commission also tends to defend its 
preferences before interest groups. As an interviewee stated: “Interest groups are, at 
least for very challenging proposals, crucial. You cannot afford for anybody to be 
extremely hostile.” (Interview 3). By sharing its views and by discussing its position 
with interest groups, the Commission aimed to avoid or at least relax member states’ 
resistance throughout interest groups (the first case study).  
In sum, empirical findings indicate that when the Commission’s initial preferences 
are strong, its officials may use various tools to shape a debate in line with their 
preferences. The Commission thus can use anti-trust proceedings and formal 
investigations to put pressure on interest groups opposing its views (the first and the 
second case study). The Commission also can organise networks of allies to create a 
block that would support its positions (the first and the fourth case study). Sometimes, 
the Commission would even skip ex-ante public consultations with stakeholders (the 
second case study). Finally, the Commission can use communication with interest 
groups to present its position vis-à-vis interest groups with an aim to weaken their 
disapproval and via them member states’ opposition (the first case study).  
 
7.2. The Commission’s position on the considered non-EU interest groups 
We have seen that sometimes the Commission might have early preferences on an 
issue under consideration. However, even when the Commission does not hold strong 
views on policy measures, there will be no guarantee that an involved interest group 
will succeed in its lobbying – instead, the groups’ success will depend on its status. 
The thesis’s findings, thus, indicate that insiders tend to be more successful than 
outsiders. Table 15 summarises the extent of lobbying success of the observed interest 







Table 15. Cross-case comparison of the interest groups’ status and their lobbying success.   
Interest groups Status  Lobbying success 
Gazprom Outsider 
I case study - achieved none of its objectives 
II case study: 
(a) achieved some of its objectives 
(b) achieved none of its objectives 
IV case study - achieved none of its objectives 
Equinor Insider 
I case study - achieved most of its objectives 
II case study: 
(a) achieved some of its objectives 
(b) achieved most of its objectives 
IV case study - achieved some of its objectives 
Exxon Insider 
I case study – achieved some of its objectives 
II case study: 
(a) achieved most of its objectives 
III case study - achieved most of its objectives 
IV case study - achieved almost none of its objectives 
MPOC Outsider III case study - achieved almost none of its objectives 
UNICA Outsider III case study - achieved almost none of its objectives 
Naftogaz Insider 
II case study: 
(b) achieved almost all of its objectives 
IV case study - achieved all of its objectives 
 
 
Some of the foreign actors analysed such as Exxon and Equinor, have managed to 
establish themselves as Brussels’ insiders. They have offices in Belgium’s capital from 
the early 2000s. They have managed to gain membership in most of EU business 
associations in the energy domain, and through these associations access to the most 
of the EU consultative forums. Equinor and Exxon even held major positions, through 
board seats, in some of these associations (e.g. Eurogas, GIE, and IOGP). They have 
been engaging in a broad set of issues discussed in the EU such as energy, external 
relations, taxation and competitiveness131. Finally, Equinor and Exxon had enormous 
financial resources and structural power - almost 20% of the EU gas consumption in 
2012 (13% in 2005) was supplied by Equinor, and Exxon satisfied 10% of the EU gas 
demand in 2012 (7% in 2005). 
The analysed cases also indicate that Equinor and Exxon were trying to create 
“give-and-take relationships” with the Commission, a condition seen as a necessary to 
get the status of an insider (Coen, 2010, p. 297). For instance, the process of gas market 
                                                          
131 Data obtained from the Transparency Register.  
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liberalisation in the EU, including the discussions on unbundling, influenced 
Equinor’s position about the future of the gas industry and what role Equinor could 
play within the newly created regulatory environment in Europe (Interview 5). As a 
result, the company decided to adjust its business strategy to changes preferred by the 
Commission and not to take a harsh position on ownership unbundling (the first case 
study). For similar reasons, Exxon has softened its position on the issue as well. 
Equinor has also agreed to support the Commission amendments after receiving 
reassurance from the Commission that the definition of upstream pipelines will not be 
changed by the proposed amendments (the second case study). Similarly, Exxon, 
together with some other companies, has provided a solution for the Commission in 
searching for a better alternative to conventional biofuels, by investing resources into 
development of advanced biofuels (the third case study).  
Naftogaz’s path towards a position of an insider was different in comparison to its 
counterparts (Equinor and Exxon). While Equinor and Exxon established the long-
term relationships with the Commission, Naftogaz’s relations with the Commission 
began to develop extensively only after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict had escalated 
in 2014. It was this conflict that put Naftogaz on the map as an important company for 
the EU policy-makers. Naftogaz opened an office in Brussels only in 2015. It did not 
develop a broad agenda like its Norwegian and American counterparts. However, 
Naftogaz has been strategically important for the accomplishment of the EU energy 
objectives owing to Ukraine’s importance as a transit country for Russian gas. This is 
another argument put forward by the thesis - foreign actors whose countries of origin 
are strategically important for the achievement of the EU energy objectives are more 
likely to receive the status of an insider. 
Gazprom, UNICA, and MPOC, on the other side, are closer to the group of 
Brussels’ outsiders. Among the analysed companies Gazprom has the biggest market 
share in the EU since almost 20% of the EU gas demand in 2012 (24% in 2005) had 
been provided by the company. Given its structural power one would expect Gazprom 
to enjoy the status of an insider. Indeed, owing to its economic power, Gazprom was 
able to secure a seat at a table discussing the future development of the EU gas market 
on various occasions. However, all other criteria making an insider have not been met. 
Firstly, Gazprom did not have an office in Brussels until 2013. The company was not 
sufficiently integrated with the EU industry associations and it did not have a broad 
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portfolio of engagement until recently. Gazprom has been less consensus-oriented 
when compared to its counterparts (Equinor and Exxon). It was focused on pursuing 
its own interests (against further liberalisation of the European gas market) without 
considering sufficiently the Commission’s preferences. Instead of developing a trust-
based relationship, Gazprom has been suspicious about the Commission’s intentions 
towards Russia. Besides, Gazprom’s public statements took a threatening tone on 
several occasions. Groups with the insider status will often restrain from deploying 
confrontational, outsider-like strategies, in order to escape jeopardising own 
relationship with the policy-makers (Grant, 2001, p. 343). On their side, some of the 
EU officials did not completely trust the company neither. Gazprom’s reputation 
among Brussels’ decision-makers was undermined already after the first gas dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine in 2006. The second gas dispute in 2009, followed by the 
Ukrainian crisis in 2014 has seriously challenged the company’s reputation of a 
reliable energy supplier. Since then the Commission has been seeking alternative 
energy sources to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas. Under such 
circumstances it was hard for Gazprom to lobby successfully. This was especially after 
2014, when the company struggled with access to policy-makers in Brussels.  
Similarly, UNICA and MPOC opened offices in Brussels in 2008 with an aim to 
monitor EU legislation concerning only a limited number of issues; they opened 
offices when the debate on conventional biofuel sustainability in the EU started. The 
two associations have not been integrated with EU industrial associations. Like 
Gazprom, UNICA and especially MPOC have struggled to overcome their bad 
reputation in the EU. MEPs who paid a visit to Malaysia, were facing criticism at 
home. Besides, during the preparation of proposal on ILUC (the third case study), 
UNICA’s and MPOC’s relations with the Commission have been strained since the 
two had threatened that the Commission’s proposal on ILUC might be challenged at 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) due to supposed discriminatory measures 
against external producers of biofuels. Under such circumstances it was hard for 
UNICA and MPOC to lobby successfully. 
How did the interest groups’ status affect their lobbying success? 
The literature on insiders/outsiders assumes that insiders have better access to 
policy-makers than outsiders. The thesis only partly finds support for this theoretical 
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assumption. Analysed cases indicate that insiders such as Equinor, Exxon, had better 
access to the Commission’s advisory groups through membership in EU associations 
representing energy industry. Exxon and, especially, Equinor were better integrated 
and connected with the most influential associations in the EU than Gazprom. UNICA 
and MPOC, to the authors’ best knowledge, have not been affiliated with European 
associations. Besides, Exxon and Equinor have representatives on the governing 
boards of some of these associations, which has given them more leverage over 
decisions made by these groups.  
Secondly, the number of high-level meetings with interest groups between 2014 
and 2016 (the forth case study) shows that in comparison to Equinor, the number of 
Gazprom’s meetings with Commission’s high ranking officials has been considerably 
lower – three meetings in comparison to Equinor’s 14 meetings, and similar to the 
number of Exxon’s (4), and Naftogaz’s (5) meetings. Thirdly, after 2014 Gazprom 
struggled to gain access to a Commission’s advisory groups - the Madrid Forum. 
Similarly, as MPOC’s example shows, sometimes policy-makers may face criticism 
for meeting stakeholders with a bad reputation. Gazprom had similar problem when 
Gplus, a Brussel-based PR company, have obtained a bad reputation for representing 
Gazprom’s interests. 
Thus, the number of groups’ high-level meetings between 2014 and 2016 and 
access to the Commission via European associations confirms the theoretical 
assumption that insiders (Equinor, Exxon, Naftogaz) have better access to the 
Commission than outsiders (Gazprom, UNICA, and MPOC). 
On the other hand, however, outsiders did manage to secure access to the 
Commission too. Even more in 2006, when the debate on ownership unbundling 
started (the first case study), the Commission invited Gazprom to take part in the 
discussion on future development of the EU gas market. Nonetheless, back then the 
company was still considered as a reliable energy supplier. After 2014, when 
Gazprom’s reputation in Brussels had been seriously undermined, the company 
struggled to gain access to the Commission (the second and the fourth case study). 
UNICA and MPOC have managed to secure access to the Commission as well. 
However, as explained earlier, due to Malaysian palm oil producers’ poor reputation 
in Brussels, some EU policy-makers has been facing criticism in Europe for meeting 
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MPOC representatives. One of the consequences of an interest group’s poor reputation 
may be that policy-makers could refrain from meeting stakeholders with a bad 
reputation due to criticism they may face at home. 
In addition, all analysed stakeholders (insiders and outsiders) had regular contacts 
with EU member states’ representatives. Besides, they all used services of Brussels-
based PR companies to advance their interest in the EU. Finally, some of the foreign 
actors, especially UNICA and MPOC, employed a number of outside lobbying tactics 
– organising public events (UNICA), placing advertisements in EU media (MPOC), 
publishing electronic newsletter (UNICA), and hosting EU journalists (MPOC). This 
is not surprising given they struggle with poor public image in Brussels.  
Therefore, when it comes to access to policy-makers, the analysed cases suggest 
that insiders had better access to the Commission than outsiders in sense that they may 
have more bilateral meetings with EU officials after 2014 and better access to 
Commission’s advisory groups through EU associations. On the other hand, however, 
the Commission has been open for outsiders as well. Only Gazprom after 2014 
struggled with access to the Commission.  
The empirical analysis also indicates that the outsiders managed to gain a seat at 
the table because of their structural power (e.g. Gazprom), because a policy initiative 
directly affects their interests (e.g. of MPOC and UNICA), or because the policy-
makers wanted to mitigate their opposition (e.g. Gazprom). The latest case was 
discussed in the previous section (7.2.). Occasionally, the Commission strategically 
engages in dialogue with opposing interest groups in order to weaken their opposition, 
and thus the opposition of member states. The two former conditions match the thesis’ 
expectations regarding the sorts of goods that foreign interest groups can offer in order 
to gain access to the policy-making process.   
The analysed cases suggest that the Commission was interested in hearing positions 
of those foreign groups whose businesses were expected to be affected by the 
forthcoming EU legislation. Thus, the Commission engaged in communication with 
Gazprom and, similarly, both UNICA and MPOC were seen as important actors in the 
debate on ILUC because the EU rules on ILUC were expected to affect the biofuel 
producers in non-EU countries; additionally, the question of EU trade with external 
countries and possible violation of the WTO rules was an important driver of the 
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debate on ILUC. The cases also show that “economic power” “buys” access to the 
policy-making process. As observed, some companies and associations, such as 
Gazprom, Exxon, and Equinor, gained a seat at the discussion table thanks to their 
economic power. 
Similarly to domestic (EU) groups, the analysed foreign groups were supplying the 
Commission with other “access goods” too, such as technical expertise, i.e. knowledge 
about the EU market. They often presented the Commission with the so-called “cause–
effect-logic” (Chalmers, 2013, p. 51) which pointed to the potential consequences of 
a policy initiative. For instance, Equinor argued against an increase in the transparency 
of supply contracts because such legislation would create additional reporting burden 
for the gas players (the fourth case). To provide arguments in support of its position, 
UNICA discussed scientific studies on ILUC (the third case study). Foreign groups 
cited examples of their own countries, thus providing expertise on foreign markets. 
For example, in its position paper, UNICA referred to the measures on tackling 
environmental concerns in relation to land usage in Brazil. Exxon proposed to the EU 
to establish ILUC factors for different types of biofuels, following the example of the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (third case study). Besides, the observed interest 
groups also provided “legal information” (Chalmers, 2013, p. 46) such as UNICA’s 
and MPOC’s warning notes that the Commission’s proposal on ILUC might violate 
the WTO rules. Also provided were information about the potential discriminatory 
nature of policy initiatives (Mahoney, 2008, p. 82). For instance, Nord Stream AG 
complained that the proposed amendments were discriminatory of the Russian 
pipelines brining undue advantage to the Norwegian pipelines (the second case study). 
This suggests that foreign interest groups can provide various types of information, 
though common to most of them is the so-called “cause–effect-logic” which if focused 
on proposals’ potential consequences, as suggested by Chalmers (2013, p. 51).  
Another argument put forward by the thesis, as explained earlier, is that foreign 
interest groups coming from countries that are strategically important for the 
achievement of the EU policy objectives are more likely to receive the status of an 
insider. An insider, therefore, may be important because the Commission wants to 
improve or maintain close relations with its country of origin. AmCham, Exxon, 
Equinor, and Naftogaz were insiders in this respect. The Commission’s intention to 
improve energy cooperation with Norway, the US, and Ukraine and to increase energy 
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imports from Norway and the US, has been expressed on various occasions and in 
many documents (strategies, green papers etc.). Thus, for instance, the Commission’s 
green paper adopted in 2006 (European Commission, 2006b), emphasised the 
importance of the EU energy relations with Norway and the US (the first and the 
second case study). Similarly, a strategy adopted in 2015, stressed the significance of 
the EU partnerships with Norway, the United States, and Ukraine (European 
Commission, 2015a) (the fourth case study). On the other hand, the Commission’s 
objective to decrease dependence on Russian gas has been stated many times. At the 
same time, the Commission did not give particular importance to Brazil and Malaysia 
when its energy policy is concerned.  As a result, it was easier for companies coming 
from Norway, the US, and Ukraine (Equinor, Exxon, and Naftogaz) to advance their 
interests in the EU than for actors coming from Russia, Brazil, and Malaysia 
(Gazprom, UNICA, MPOC). 
An insider’s importance is also reflected in the fact that she comes from a country 
where the Commission’s values, especially those on market liberalisation, are shared. 
Given that Norway, the US, and Ukraine share the Commission’s values with regard 
to energy market liberalisation, Equinor, Exxon, and Naftogaz have been considered 
as valuable partners backing the Commission’s policy objectives inside the EU and 
abroad. Indeed, part of the reason why the US, Norway and Ukraine were considered 
as significant energy partners was their general alignment with the EU values. The fact 
that the Commission wanted to accelerate cooperation with Naftogaz’s, Equinor’s and 
Exxon’s countries of origin has strengthened these companies’ position vis-à-vis EU 
policy-makers. On the other hand, Gazprom’s resistance to comply with certain policy 
objectives promoted by the Commission (e.g. liberalisation of the gas market) had 
triggered some of the policy initiatives drafted by the Commission – the amendments 
to the Third Energy Package (the second case study) and the Gazprom clause (the first 
case study) – that run counter to Gazprom’s interests.  
Finally, the thesis hypothesised that a foreign group may be less successful if its 
interests run counter to the interests of domestic (EU) groups, in which case the 
Commission may choose to protect the interests of the domestic groups. In other 
words, if there is a clash between domestic and foreign interest groups, the 
Commission may decide to follow the preferences of domestic, rather than foreign 
groups. The analysis of the third case finds support for this claim. Although it was 
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confirmed that production of biodiesel causes more GHG emissions than bioethanol 
production, the Commission eventually came up with a proposal which allowed EU 
biodiesel producers to escape the worst case scenario, at the expense of bioethanol 
producers, UNICA included. While all scientific studies had confirmed the superiority 
of bioethanol over biodiesel, crop-specific GHG emissions were eventually left out of 
the proposal. This was mainly owing to the extensive lobbying of EU biodiesel 
producers and farmers. Thus, even though UNICA’s position was in line with the 
scientific findings, the Commission eventually made a compromising solution 
between the sustainability objectives (based on scientific facts) and the interest of 
domestic biodiesel producers and farmers. It would be highly unlikely for the 
Commission to make such compromise in order to protect investments of foreign 
companies that are nor strategically important for the EU. 
Two final points are in order here. First, the thesis does not contradict the 
assumption that “information is power”. Numbers, figures, and arguments that the 
analysed interest groups provided were all welcomed by the Commission. The 
information presented by companies and industrial associations played a significant 
role when the first Barroso Commission decided to conduct the sectoral screening for 
barriers to energy market competition and to launch an inquiry into the EU gas and 
electricity market. The inquiry informed the Commission of the extent of gas market 
malfunctioning, helping it to draft the proposals on ownership unbundling and the 
third-party access to gas infrastructure (the first and the second case studies). As 
Neelie Kroes explained, the Commission’s findings “would simply not have been 
possible without the input and cooperation of people involved with the industry” 
(Kores, 2006). Still, the information provided by interest groups mattered because it 
was provided by almost all of the industrial actors. The Commission sent out 
approximately 3000 questioners to stakeholders, since back in 2005 little reliable 
quantitative data was available on how the EU energy market functions (European 
Commission, 2007a, p. 19). Stakeholders’ input was, thus, relevant not because of a 
study/position paper provided by a stakeholder or a group of stakeholders, but because 
almost all the actors interested in the development of the European energy market 
participated in the inquiry. Additionally, the sectoral inquiry was an investigation 
carried out by the Commission in which industrial actors were obliged to take part. 
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Lobbying, on the other hand, is based on the resolve of interest groups to shape policies 
by choosing which, if any, information they want to share with the policy-makers.  
Furthermore, in addition to the expert knowledge provided by the analysed interest 
groups, the Commission had its own in-house experts who carried out the needed 
analyses including those featuring highly technical issues. For instance, during the 
preparation of the report on indirect land use change (the third case study), the 
Commission issued several in-house studies on ILUC, which were used in addition to 
the information provided by the interest groups. Similarly, prior to the adoption of the 
proposal for amendments to the Third Energy Package (the second case study), the 
Commission asked its legal service to provide an opinion on whether the Third 
Package applies to offshore parts of import pipelines or not. Finally, during the 
preparation of the European Security Package (the fourth case study), the Commission 
requested member states to carry out a stress test exercise that informed the 
Commission of a number of problems related to EU energy security (European 
Commission, 2014a, p. 2-3). In addition, the Commission’s proposal related to 
intergovernmental agreement (IGAs) was based on the “significant experience” that 
the Commission has previously gained (European Commission, 2016d, p. 2). 
Therefore, the empirical findings provide evidence for the widely accepted 
theoretical assumption that interest groups do influence Commission’s proposals 
through their expertise and related information. What the thesis additionally 
emphasises is that interest groups’ lobbying does not represent the only source of 
information needed by the Commission. Instead, as the case studies show, the 
Commission may collect information through further investigations, by requesting 
member states to provide information, or by commissioning its own in-house experts 
to analyse the topic of interest.  
The second caveat is that, even though the Commission may have strong early 
preferences, this does not mean that it will not be open to altering those preferences if 
faced with convincing arguments by an opposing interest group. For instance, whereas 
the Commission had preferred ownership unbundling, Energy Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs, has acknowledged the argument made by companies which opposed this 
legislative measure, namely that ownership unbundling may be interpreted as some 
sort of expropriation (the first case study). This was one of the reasons why the 
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Commission eventually decided to propose the independent system operator (ISO) 
model, in addition to ownership unbundling. Similarly, during the preparation of the 
Energy Security Package, interest groups suggested some specific provisions to be 
added to the solidarity mechanism, such as a fair and prompt compensation for 
maintaining energy security (Interview 6). The point was well received by the 
Commission. As stated by an interviewee: 
“(…) I think the task is to always keep an open mind, not to basically say: ‘we 
said that, therefore, we stick to it, and we are always right’ – that would be the 
wrong approach and we usually do not do that. It is more important to get the 
right result in the end in terms of legislation. If along the way stakeholders bring 
to the table convincing and strong arguments why the initial approach was not the 
right one, then we have the duty to change. And actually during the consultations 
phase it’s still open anyway because the aim of the consultations is to test” 
(Interview 6). 
Therefore, the thesis does not suggest that the Commission is oblivious to interest 
groups’ arguments that run counter to its initial preferences. Instead, the point made 
here is that while in general being open for information provided by interest groups, 
the Commission’s starting position is not always the same – sometimes its early 
preferences are not strong, whereas in other cases they are. And when the Commission 
forms early preferences for certain legislative measures – based on its own knowledge, 













The purpose of thesis was to examine foreign interest groups’ success in the energy 
policy domain. Specifically, the thesis has analysed whether, how, and why European 
Commission’s initial preferences over policies under consideration and over involved 
non-EU interest groups affect the groups’ prospects to lobby successfully. 
The main motivation behind the research topic was that despite their growing 
number in Brussels, non-EU interest groups – particularly determinants of their 
lobbying success – have remained under-researched. Of all interest groups registered 
in the EU Transparency Register, at least 9% have a foreign origin. In addition, three 
foreign countries - the US, Switzerland and Norway - have more registered interest 
groups in Brussels, respectively, than ten EU states individually - Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg. 
However, despite their growing presence in the EU, foreign groups have not received 
sufficient attention in the literature on interest groups. The purpose of the thesis, 
therefore, has been to contribute to filling this gap. 
As one of the world’s largest markets, the EU single market has been attractive to 
foreign companies, many of which have sought to extend their businesses into the 
European Union. Thanks to its market size and the status of a global power, the EU 
has been able to shape norms and rules not only within but also beyond its borders. As 
a result, actors from outside the EU have had high incentives to try to influence EU 
policies, given their possible effects on foreign interests not only inside, but outside 
the EU as well.  
Following the resource dependency and exchange theory developed by Bouwen 
(2002) and building on the findings offered by prior studies on non-EU interest groups 
in Brussels (e.g. Cowles, 1996; Eliassen and Peneva, 2011), the expectation has been 
formed that the Commission will be the most likely lobbying target for foreign 
business groups, due to their capacity to provide expertise and technical knowledge. 
The thesis, therefore, has explored this assumption by analysing foreign lobbyists’ 
success during the preparation stage – led by the European Commission – on energy-
related policy proposals.  
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The thesis has put forward the argument that the lobbying success of foreign 
interest groups depends on the initial views of the Commission on issues under 
consideration and involved interest groups. It has been hypothesised that the 
Commission’s early preferences on issues under consideration decrease the likelihood 
of lobbying success of those groups opposing the Commission. Conversely, when the 
Commission does not have strong initial preferences on the measures that are being 
discussed, the involved interest groups have better prospects to lobby successfully.  
The absence of Commission’ strong views on policies, however, does not guarantee 
that an interest group will be successful in its lobbying effort. Instead, it was 
hypothesised that a group’s lobbying success also depends on its status among policy-
makers. Exploring the conceptual insider/outsider distinction among lobbyists, 
developed in prior lobbying literature (Broscheid and Coen, 2003; 2007; Coen, 2010; 
Grant, 1995; 2004), the thesis has suggested that insiders tend to be more successful 
than outsiders. As a contribution to this literature, the thesis has introduced an 
additional criterion attached to the traditional insider/outsider distinction which 
concerns specifically foreign interest groups – the importance of their particular non-
EU origin for the achievement of the Commission’s policy objectives.  
Employing process-tracing and cross-case comparison, the thesis has explored four 
cases of Commission proposals covering the key aspects of EU energy policy: 
competitiveness, sustainability, and security. The case studies covered around 20 
different policy issues (measures), which have provided a constellation featuring 
variations on Commission’s early preferences over considered issues and involved 
interest groups. The analysis included the lobbying success of several interest groups 
within those cases. 
The thesis analysis of the four case studies provides evidence in support of the claim 
that Commission’s early preferences on issues under consideration reduce the 
likelihood of a lobbying success of groups that oppose the Commission. In contrast, 
when the Commission does not have strong initial preferences related to the measures 
that are being discussed, the interest groups’ prospects to successfully lobby are better. 
The thesis has also found support for the assumption that insiders tend to be more 
successful in lobbying than outsiders. This yields the conclusion that insiders are more 
likely to be successful in their lobbying when the Commission does not have strong 
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early preferences on issues under consideration. However, when the Commission’s 
early preferences are strong, then both – insiders and outsiders tend to be less 
successful. 
The thesis’ findings add to the literature on non-EU interest groups. Prior research 
on foreign interest groups in the EU has been scarce, with only a few studies so far 
examining lobbying activities of foreign interest groups in the EU. Among those, the 
prevalent focus has been on analysis of interest groups coming from a single country, 
without comparative cross-country insights. Secondly, only Cowles’ (1996) and Coen’ 
(1999) findings are on determinants of the lobbying success of non-EU interest groups. 
The other have mainly explored lobbying strategies employed by foreign groups, 
rather than determinants of lobbying success. This thesis has added to the empirical 
basis with its analysis of groups from several foreign countries, which was conducted 
with a uniform theoretical framework applied across all those groups. This has enabled 
more systematic findings to be acquired about non-EU interest groups and their 
lobbying prospects. Secondly, unlike most of the existing studies that examined non-
EU groups’ strategies, the thesis has offered empirical findings of factors behind their 
lobby success. 
Finally, the extant studies have yielded conflicting findings on non-EU groups’ 
access to policy-makers and their consequent lobbying success. While one camp has 
argued that a lack of “national patronage” makes it harder for foreign groups to access 
to EU institutions, thus hampering their lobbying success, another camp has held that 
non-EU companies can still be as successful as their EU counterparts. Addressing this 
debate, the thesis has found that the lack of EU membership by itself is not necessarily 
a lobbying weakness; instead, foreign interest groups’ access to the policy-makers, 
and hence consequently their lobbing success, depends on the combination of 
Commission’s positions over policies under consideration and over the involved 
lobbyists. 
Further, another thesis’ contribution lies in that its findings could be used in the 
literature on lobbying regardless of an interest group’s country of origin. It 
complements the literature on informational lobbying by arguing that, in some cases, 
decision-makers have strong preferences over both - the outcomes and means required 
to achieve them, thus making interests groups’ attempts to alter their positions less 
236 
 
likely. The thesis also contributes the literature around the insider/outsider status of 
lobbyists by drawing attention that for non-EU interest groups there are additional 
criteria for the insider/outsider distinction to be taken into account. 
The thesis’ findings also inform the broader scholarship on corporate lobbying in 
the EU (e.g. Bouwen, 2002; 2004; Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009; Coen, 2009; 2010; 
Taminiau and Wilts, 2006; Vannoni, 2012; Woll, 2009), as well as the literature 
examining business groups’ lobbying success relative to the status quo (Dür, 
Bernhagen, and Marshall, 2015). Additionally, the thesis has been shown that large 
firms as a group do not necessarily share similar prospects for lobbying success 
(Hamada, 2007b, p. 10; Coen, 2010); those prospects can, namely, vary greatly across 
a set of large companies depending on the examined factors. Finally, the thesis might 
bring valuable insights for considerations of legitimacy of foreign interest groups’ 
engagement with EU institutions (Korkea-Aho, 2016), cautioning against the 
conclusion that powerful companies will necessarily be able to shape EU decisions. 
The thesis’ conclusions pertain to a single policy domain, namely that of energy, 
which is often described as a “highly politicised” sector (Talus, 2013, p. 4). EU is the 
world’s largest energy importer which is why the degree of public attention that often 
follows the debates on EU energy legislation is high. These characteristics make the 
energy policy distinctive from other policy domains. To enhance the external validity 
of its findings, the thesis examined cases covering different aspects of the energy 
policy, namely competitiveness, environment, and security, and policy measures 
featuring various levels of salience. Still, as with any study that examines lobbying in 
a single policy sector, the problem of limited external validity will never be fully 
dispelled. In those policy domains that are less politicised and hence more technical 
by nature, it is possible that the Commission will not have strong early preferences. 
Also, in the policy sectors where the commodities are non-strategic, or where the EU 
had not been dependent on the imported goods, non-EU groups’ countries of origin 
could be a factor that plays a less important role.  
Future studies on foreign interest groups’ lobbying in Brussels could take the thesis’ 
approach forward by testing its empirical findings across other policy domains. While 
the conclusions drawn here are derived from analysis of the energy domain, their 
external validity could be advanced if similar conclusions could be reached in other 
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policy domains that are also relevant for non-EU companies and associations, for 
instance financial market, digital economy, transportations, and others. 
The thesis’ findings should be best generalised to the cluster of resource-rich 
foreign business groups. The sample of case studies did not include small foreign 
companies and citizen groups. If other types of foreign interest groups were analysed, 
it is possible that another logic of mobilisation, lobbying strategies, access to the 
Commission, and lobbying success would have been identified. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the majority of foreign groups trying to shape EU laws are 
precisely resource-rich groups. Usually only large non-EU companies have the needed 
resources to extend their business operations into the EU. Besides, lobbying in 
Brussels is a costly activity which many domestic (EU) – let alone foreign – 
companies, associations, and NGOs, cannot afford. It is possible that in other domains 
too the majority of foreign business groups is made up of resource-rich groups. Future 
studies could explore this assumption and test whether the lobbying logic observed in 
this thesis is generalisable to those groups featuring less resources.   
Another avenue for future research could be to test whether the success of foreign 
groups’ lobbying depends on the supply side factors such as information processing 
by foreign interest groups (Chalmers, 2011, p. 472). How do lobbying tactics (e.g. 
Chalmers, 2013) and framing (e.g. De Bruycker, 2016) affect non-EU groups’ 
lobbying prospects? Similarly, further research on the mechanisms explaining how the 
Commission shapes interest groups’ activities in Brussels (for example through 
funding) (Mahoney, 2004, p. 442), could be also examined in regards to non-EU 
groups. 
Lastly, to advance further the logic of lobbying success of non-EU actors, future 
studies could explore how other EU institutions – the European Parliament and the 
Council, interact with these groups. Policy formulation is an important stage for 
lobbying, but it is not the only stage in which interest groups can exert influence. 
Efforts of interest groups usually extend to the decision-making process in the 
European Parliament and the Council as well. Research on non-EU interest groups 
certainly needs to go beyond the European Commission.  
Thus, there is a number of aspects related to foreign interest groups’ lobbying in 
Brussels that future research can elucidate. One further angle is particularly interesting 
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to explore, namely that of foreign vs domestic (EU) groups: What would be the 
outcome of foreign groups’ lobbying when their interests clash with the interests of 
domestic (EU) groups? Although the thesis’ findings suggest that the lack of EU 
membership is not necessarily a lobbying disadvantage, the empirical analysis has 
indicated that if non-EU and EU interest groups find themselves at the opposite sides 
of a debate, the EU officials will more likely follow the preferences of the domestic 
groups. This is particularly the case when outsiders among foreigners are trying to 
counter EU interest groups. The findings obtained in this thesis suggest that there is a 
division between those long-standing non-EU participants in the law-making process 
in Brussels, who have managed to Europeanise and build close relationships with 
policy-makers, and those foreigners who engage with EU law-making only 
occasionally and usually with a narrowly defined agenda. If the latter face the 
opposition by EU interest groups, the chances are that they will ‘lose’. Yet, more 
systemic studies are needed for firmer conclusions, which would then help us expand 


















Non-EU interest groups with offices outside the EU member states  
(Transparency Register) 
 
Argentina 9 Iraq 1 Pakistan 1 
Armenia 2 India 8 Qatar 1 
Australia 9 Iceland 7 Russia 12 
Azerbaijan 1 Isle Of Man 2 Reunion 1 
Benin 2 Indonesia 3 Serbia 9 
Brazil  10 Japan 25 Syria 2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 Jordan 1 Saint Marino 3 
Bermuda 2 Republic of Korea 6 Singapore 6 
Belize 1 Kenya 4 South Africa 6 
Bolivia 1 Kyrgyzstan 1 Senegal 3 
Barbados 1 Kazakhstan 1 Sri Lanka 4 
Bahamas 1 Kiribati 1 Switzerland 251 
Belarus 1 Liechtenstein 6 Tunisia 1 
Cameroon 3 Lebanon 1 Trinidad And 
Tobago 
1 
Cambodia 3 Laos  1 Togo 1 
Canada 34 Mexico 5 Thailand 4 
Cote D'ivoire 3 Malaysia 13 Taiwan 2 
Costa Rica 1 Moldova 6 Tanzania 2 
Democratic Republic Of 
Congo 
1 Martinique 1 Turkey 22 
Colombia 2 Monaco 1 Uganda 3 
Chile 2 Morocco 3 United Arab 
Emirates 
7 
China 9 Montenegro 1 Uruguay 2 
Dominican Republic 2 Myanmar 1 Ukraine 18 
Dominique 1 North Macedonia 7 US 394 
Ethiopia 2 Nigeria 5 Vietnam 1 
Fiji 1 Netherlands 
Antilles 
1 Venezuela 1 
Guatemala 2 New Zealand 5   
Ghana 2 Nepal 1   
Georgia 2 Norway 85   
Hong Kong 4 Philippines 4   
Israel 7 Palestinian 
Occupied 
Territory 
2   
TOTAL 1.093     
*The search criterion was an interest group’s country of registration. The dataset includes only   
interest groups with registered offices outside the EU.  





Interest groups with offices in a EU member state  
(Transparency Register) 
 
Austria 258 Italy 799 
Belgium* 2.197 Latvia 39 
Bulgaria 72 Lithuania 52 
Croatia 58 Luxembourg 80 
Cyprus 28 Malta 33 
Czech Republic 112 Netherlands 679 
Denmark 197 Poland 212 
Estonia 47 Portugal 187 
Finland 245 Romania 108 
France 1.118 Slovakia 63 
Germany 1.513 Slovenia 69 
Greece 143 Spain 740 
Hungary 93 Sweden 268 
Ireland 191 United Kingdom 1.103 
TOTAL  10.704   
* Many interest groups with offices in Belgium are originally from another country – EU or non-EU  
   (Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, 2018, p. 18).  






















List of Interviews 
 
Interview 1: Former European Commission’s official, 2019, Brussels 
Interview 2: Foreign interest group, 2019, Brussels  
Interview 3: Former European Commission’s official, 2019, Brussels  
Interview 4: Foreign interest group, 2019, Brussels  
Interview 5: Foreign interest group, 2019, Brussels  
Interview 6: European Commission’s official, 2019, Brussels 
Interview 7: European Commission’s official, 2019, Skype call 






















Guiding questions for interviews with EU officials 
 
Commission’s initial position before consulting stakeholders 
1. Why did the Commission decide to open a debate on the given policy issue?  
1.a. Was the proposal part of the broader Commission’s agenda (e.g. policy priorities) 
established in the beginning of the Commission’s mandate, or stakeholders outside 
the Commission raised the issue thus triggering the early debate? 
1.b. How important was the issue for the achievement of the general Commission’s 
policy priorities? 
2. Did the Commission had clearly defined preferences for the considered policy before 
consulting other interested parties? 
3. Did the Commission had clearly defined preferences for the measures that were seen at the 
time as necessary to achieve the desired outcome? 
4. Did the Commission speak with a single voice on the issue? Was the Commission united or 
internal divisions existed?  
5. Did you have previous experience in the specific area (e.g. education and/or working 
experience in the field)? 
 
Consultations with stakeholders 
6. How would you estimate the level of activity of interest groups? Were they ‘not so active’, 
active, or highly active? 
7. What interest groups were the most active? 
8. How did interest groups seek to influence the Commission’s proposal? Through public 
consultations, meetings, advisory groups, conferences, public campaigns, or some other 
means? 
9. What were the arguments most frequently invoked by those interest groups? 
10. How did you use to weigh arguments put forward by various interest groups? 
11. Were non-EU interest groups active in the case in question? 
11.a. Which non-EU interest groups were the most active? 
11.b. Did you meet foreign groups’ representatives to discuss the policy initiative in 
question? If so, why? 
11.c. How often did you meet foreign groups’ representatives to discuss the policy 
initiative in question? 
11.c. How were foreign interest groups trying to shape the debate? 




Commission’s position after consulting stakeholders 
12. Were the information provided by interest groups (both EU and non-EU) relevant when 
considering whether to table the final policy proposal? 
13. Did the information provided by interest groups (both EU and non-EU) bring something 
new to the debate (e.g. a new argument, perspective, or new data/figures, etc.)? 
14. Did the information provided by interest groups (both EU and non-EU) change the early 
position (preferences) that the Commission had before the consultations with stakeholders 
started? If so, to what extent and why? 
15. Did it matter which interest group provides information, in the sense of its reputation, 
nationality (lack of EU citizenship), expertise, and resources? 
16. In general, do you think that foreign interest groups are disadvantaged in comparison to 
























Guiding questions for interviews with interest groups 
 
Positions of interest groups 
1. To what extent was the issue in question important for your company/association? 
2. What was the position of your company/association in the given case? 
3. Did the position of your company/association differ from the position of other stakeholders, 
both EU and non-EU? 




5. Was your company/association trying to make an impact in the considered case? 
6. How did your company/association try to influence the policy proposal (through bilateral 
meetings, participation in public consultations, participation in the Commission’s advisory 
groups, influence through European associations, influence through PR companies, public 
campaigns, or through another means)? 
7. Which lobbying strategies your company/association taught were the most effective in the 
considered case? 
8. How often, in the considered case, your company/association communicated with 
Commission’s officials? 
8.a. How frequent, in general, is your company’s/association’s communication with 
Commission’ officials?   
9. Did your company/association, in the considered case, face any difficulties in lobbying 
because it represents non-EU interests? 
 
Lobbying success 
10. Did the Commission’s proposal reflect the preferences of your company/association? If 
so, to what extent? 
11. How would you estimate the level of your lobbying success in the considered case? 
12. Did your company/association manage to alter the Commission’s position in the 
considered case? 
12.a. Why was your company/association (not) able to change the Commission’s 
position?  
12.b. Does (the lack of) lobbying success of your company/association have to do 
with your foreign origin? 
13. What makes a lobbyist successful? Its reputation, nationality (lack of EU citizenship), 
expertise, resources, or something else? 
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14. In general, do you think that in Brussels foreign interest groups are disadvantaged in 
comparison to domestic (EU) interest groups? If so, why? 



































































VKU (Germany); Wintershall/ 
WINGAS (Germany); E.ON 
(Germany); Gaz de France 
(France); BGW; Royal Dutch 
Shell (Netherlands); 
EnergieNed (the Netherlands); 
Vattenfall (Sweden); RWE 
npower (Germany). 
 
House of Lords 
(the UK), the 
Netherlands 
the UK; the 
Netherlands; 
Denmark. 
 Germany; France; Austria; 
Greece; Bulgaria; Slovakia; 
Latvia; Luxemburg; Hungary; 
Czech Republic. 
 
 Equinor AmCham Gazprom; Exxon 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 
public consultations in 2006; interest groups’ websites; European Commission (2006c).  
 
Interest groups’ positions on reciprocity (2007) 
Support Oppose No clear position 
Finish Energy Industries; BG Group (the UK); 
Centrica (the UK); Chemical Industries 
Association (the UK); Royal Dutch Shell plc; 
EnergieNed (the Netherlands); Polish Chamber 
of Chemical Industry; Vattenfall (Sweden); 
DIHK (Association of German Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce); Suez (France). 
 Association of Electricity 
Producers in the UK; 
ScottishPower; 
Wintershall/ WINGAS; 
E.ON AG; Gaz de 
France; IOGP. 
The UK; the Netherlands; Poland; Benelux; 
France. 
 Hungary; Sweden. 
Equinor; Exxon; AmCham. Gazprom  
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 








Interest groups’ positions on the establishment of a European Energy Regulator 
(2007) 
Support Oppose No clear position 
Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA UK); 
Vattenfall; APPA; Gaz 
de France; Suez; 
CEDEC; CEFIC; EFET;   
EUROGIF; GEODE; 
German Wind Energy 
Association. 
Finish Energy Industries; BG Group; 
Centrica; National Grid; Association of 
Electricity Producers in the UK; 
Energy Networks Association (ENA); 
EnergieNed; DIHK; RWE power; 
E.ON; CEEP; COTREL/CAPIEL; 
European Transmission System 
Operators (ETSO); EURELECTRIC; 
EUROCHAMBRES; Eurogas; GIE; 
IFIEC Europe; ScottishPower; 
VDEW/VDN; VIK; VKU; BDI. 
Polish Chamber of 
Chemical Industry; 
Austrian-Power-Grid 
(APG); UFE; UNICE; 
ZVEI. 
Hungary; Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise (HIE). 
The UK; Slovenia; Sweden; Germany; 
Estonia; Czech Republic; France; The 
Netherlands; Poland. 
CEER 
 Equinor Exxon; AmCham; 
OGP. 
Ukraine EEA; EFTA. 
 
 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 
public consultations in 2006; interest groups’ websites; European Commission (2006c). 
 
 




No clear position 
CEDEC; CEFIC; 
Chemical Industries 




chemical industry; VIK. 
VKU; Verbund-
Austrian-Power-





National Grid; AEP 
(Association of 
Electricity Producers 
in the UK); Energy 
Network Association 
(ENA UK); APPA; 
EURELECTRIC.   
Shell; Gaz de 
France;  
EUROCHAMBR
ES; Eurogas.  
France; CEER; Highlands 
and Islands Enterprise 
(HIE); Slovenia. 
Estonia; the UK.  Czech Republic; 
Hungary. 
Equinor; Exxon.    
Norway; Ukraine.   EEA; EFTA. 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 





Interest groups’ positions on the European Centre for Energy Network (2007) 
Support Oppose No clear position 
CEFIC; Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA UK); EFET; 
Suez; Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA UK); VIK; 
Suez. 
VKU; Verbund-Austrian-Power-Grid 
AG; BG Group; E.ON; Finish Energy 
Industries; BG Group; Centrica; AEP; 
Energy Networks Association (ENA 




Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise (HIE); APPA; 
EURELECTRIC. 
France; Hungary.  The UK; Netherlands; Poland; Estonia;  CEER 
 Exxon. Equinor  
  EEA; EFTA. 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 




























Interest groups’ positions on ILUC (2010) 













EU: ACCIONA BIOCOMBUSTIBLES 
(Spain); BP; NFU (UK); Novozymes 
(Denmark); REA (UK); Shell; Svebio 
(Swedish); Svensk  Energi -  Swedenergy AB; 
Vireol Ltd (UK); VNBI; VERNOF; SCOPA 
(UK); P.N.Pettas (Greece); Oxem SpA (Italy); 
Lantmännen Energi; INEOS (France); APPA 
(Spain); Huileries  de  France; GF Energy 
(Greece); German Biofuels Sector; Expur 
(Romania); Elin Biofuels (Greece); Eco Fox 
Srl (Italy); Diester Industrie (France); British 
Sugar; Swedish Wood-fuel Association; Neste 
Oil (Sweden); EBB; ePURE. 
Non-EU: ABIOVE (Brazilian Association of 
Vegetable Oil Industries); CARBIO 
(Argentine Biofuels Chamber); Malaysian 
Palm Oil Council; PBE (biodiesel producer 
company from Argentina); UNICA (Brazilian 
Sugarcane Industry Association); Argentinean 
Soybean Chain Association; Vicentin 
(Argentina); USB (United Soybean Board - 
U.S. volunteer soybean farmer -leaders 
appointed by the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture); RENOVA (Argentina). 
EU states: Spain.  
Foreign states: Argentina; Brazil; Indonesian 
Palm Oil Council.  
(2) EU  action  





EU states: Danish 
Energy Agency 
Netherlands; the UK.  
Foreign states: 
Switzerland; Norway.  
EU: ACCIONA. BIOCOMBUSTIBLES 
(Spain); BP; NFU (UK); Svebio (Swedish); 
Vireol Ltd (UK); VNBI - Dutch association of 
biodiesel producers; SCOPA (UK); P.N.Pettas 
(Greece); Oxem SpA (Italy); INEOS (France); 
APPA (Spain); Huileries  de  France ; GF 
Energy (Greece); Expur (Romania); Elin 
Biofuels (Greece); Eco Fox Srl (Italy); Diester 
Industrie (France); British Sugar; Swedish 
Wood-fuel Association; Neste Oil (Sweden); 
EBB; ePURE. 
Non-EU: ABIOVE (Brazilian Association of 
Vegetable Oil Industries); CARBIO 
(Argentine Biofuels Chamber); Malaysian 
Palm Oil Council; PBE (Argentina); UNICA; 
Argentinean Soybean Chain Association; 
Vicentin (Argentina); RENOVA (Argentina). 
EU states: Austria; Spain. 
Foreign states: Argentina; Brazil; Indonesian 
Palm Oil Council. 









* European Commission (2010c). 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 





Energi -  Swedenergy 
AB; P.N.Pettas (Greece); 
Oxem SpA (Italy); 
INEOS (France); APPA 
(Spain); Huileries  de  
France; GF Energy 
(Greece); German 
Biofuels Sector; Elin 
Biofuels (Greece); Eco 
Fox Srl (Italy); Diester 
Industrie (France); 













EU states: Austria; Spain. 
Foreign states: 
Argentina; Brazil; 
Indonesian Palm Oil 
Council. 
B. Encourage 
some types of 
biofuel. 
EU: Novozymes 
(Denmark); Agri Energy 
(UK); Living Fuels (UK). 
 
 
EU: Shell; SCOPA (the UK); APPA (Spain); 
Huileries de France. 
Non-EU: ABIOVE (Brazil); CARBIO 
(Argentine Biofuels Chamber); PBE 
(Argentina); Argentinean Soybean Chain 
Association; Vicentin (Argentina); RENOVA 
(Argentina), EBB.  
Foreign states: Argentina; Indonesian Palm 
Oil Council. 
C. Discourage 
some types of 
biofuel   
Foreign states: 
Switzerland; Norway.  
EU: Shell; SCOPA (UK); APPA (Spain); 
Huileries de France; Neste Oil (Sweden); EBB. 
Non-EU: ABIOVE (Brazilian Association of 
Vegetable Oil Industries); CARBIO 
(Argentine Biofuels Chamber); PBE (biodiesel 
producer company from Argentina); 
Argentinean Soybean Chain Association; 
Vicentin (Argentina); RENOVA (Argentina).  






Interest groups’ position on N-1 rule (2015) 
 Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 
public consultations in 2015; interviews; interest groups’ websites; European Commission (2015b). 
 
 
Interest groups’ position on Reverse Flows (2015) 
Bi-directional flows should be offered at all 
interconnections 
Existing 
procedures for exemptions from bi-
directional capacity obligation  should 
be maintained 
Energy Community; CEZ Group; Czech 
Chamber of Commerce; DIHK; Energias de 
Portugal; Central Europe Energy Partners 
(CEEP); Czech Republic; CNMC (Spanish 
Competition Regulator); UK; Naftogaz.   
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber 
(AFCO); EDF (France); GDF SUEZ 
(France); BDEW; E. ON; BBL Company; 
EFET; WINGAS; Exxon; Equinor. 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted the during 







Regional N-1 (obligatory) Regional N-1 in 






Austrian Gas Grid Management; 
Verbund; NET4GAS; DIHK; E. 
ON; RWE; IBERDROLA; GDF 
SUEZ; GRTgaz; Total; 
UPRIGAZ; MFGT; MOL Group; 
ENEL; Snam; GasTerra; Grupa 
Azoty ; Hermes Energy 
Group S.A; EDP; Vattenfall;  
Finnish National Emergency 
Supply Agency; Italy; Lithuania; 
Poland;  Slovenian Regulatory 
Authority.Central Europe Energy 
Partner; CEER; GIE;  IFIEC 
Europe;  
 
Czech Chamber of 
Commerce;  
Enagas; Czech 







Spain; UK;  
EFET. 
Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber; Austrian 
Association of Gas and 
District Heating Companies; 
Gas Connect Austria; CEZ 
Group; BDEW; 
DVGW; NB Gas; INES; 
SWM; Reganosa; EDF; 
Edison; 
BBL Company; Gasunie; 
PGNiG; Austria; Hungary;  
Competent Authorities of 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands;  
Eurelectric; Equinor; Wingas 
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Interest groups’ positions on Risk Assessment and Preventive and Emergency Plans 
(2015) 
Plans should be regional Plans should be national (regional plans 
should be only voluntary) 
Energy Community; Czech Chamber 
of Commerce; Direct Energie; E. 
ON; Creos Luxembourg; EDP; 
Central Europe Energy Partners; 
Austria; Czech Republic; CNMC; 
UK. 
Enagas; Energy UK; Wingas; Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber; Austrian Gas 
Grid Management; EDF; BDEW; BBL 
Company; Centrica; EFET; Competent 
Authorities of Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands; Italy. 
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during 
the public consultations in 2015; interest groups’ websites; European Commission (2015b). 
 
 
Interest groups’ positions on definition of protected customers (2015) 
Definition of protected customers should be 
harmonised 
Definition of protected customers should not 
be harmonised 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber; DIHK; 
DVGW; Enagas; EFET; Central Europe Energy 
Partners; Austria; Competent Authorities of 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands; Italy; CNMC (Spanish competition 
regulator); UK; WINGAS. 
Czech Chamber of Commerce; Edison; AGFW; 
Czech Republic; Energy Community.   
Source: Manually coded positions from the interest groups’ position papers submitted during the 
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